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Israeli Securities Law*
PAUL H. BARIS-
I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the rapid development of the Israeli economy, Is-
raeli securities markets have been particularly active recently. There
have been numerous public offerings, both initial and subsequent, of a
wide variety of companies, including the increasing use of public offer-
ings as a mode of privatizating major government companies. Foreign
investment activity, both international and private, has also increased,
coupled with sometimes frenetic stock exchange trading. Consequently,
there is increasing importance in the regulation of the securities mar-
kets. These regulations are contained in the Securities Law of 1968
(the "Law"), securities regulations promulgated under the Law (the
"Regulations"), and the internal rules of the country's only public mar-
ket for the trading of securities, the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (the
"TASE"). Related issues concerning the regulation of publicly traded
companies are dealt with in the Companies Ordinance [New Version]
1983, an amended version of the 1929 English Companies Act.
Israeli securities regulation, as reflected in the Law, is in turn
based in major respects on the pattern established by the U.S. Securi-
ties Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The study that
led to an enactment of the Law was conducted by a committee headed
by Dr. A. Yadin, then serving in the Ministry of Justice. The commit-
tee, appointed in 1962, rendered its report in 1963. Among the distin-
guished witnesses who testified before the committee were Professor
* Copyright 1994 by Clark Boardman Callaghan (1-800-323-1336). All rights
reserved. Reprinted by permission of Clark Boardman Callaghan from International
Capital Markets and Securities Regulation by Harold S. Bloomenthal and Samuel
Wolff.
** Partner, Yigal Arnon & Co., Tel Aviv and Jerusalem; Professor of Law, Bar
Ilan University, Ramat Gan. I acknowledge the valuable assistance of my associate
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Louis Loss of the Harvard Law School and Emanuel Cohen, then a
member of the Securities Exchange Commission and subsequently its
chairman. Mr. Cohen's testimony before the Yadin committee, the only
testimony quoted in detail in the committee report, included the follow-
ing suggestions:
[While there are no serious abuses as yet, it is better to have the
law and anticipate the abuses than to wait for abuses and then
adopt a law. You should provide against such abuses in the future
by making appropriate laws in advance.... To the extent that you
are in a position to tell the public that you have erected a structure
and adopted a law designed for their protection, you will have a
better chance of encouraging local investment. Finally, Israel is
interested in encouraging portfolio investment from abroad. In the
U.S. and England you will instill confidence if people know that
you have erected a structure of control which provides a real mea-
sure of protection. Consideration should be given to a law rather
more sophisticated than present conditions alone would warrant
but one which will serve the above purposes.1
In response to the committee report, and closely following Com-
missioner Cohen's suggestions, the Israeli Knesset (Parliament) adopt-
ed a broad scheme of regulation, far more sophisticated than was
called for in the early 1960s when the Israeli securities markets were
in their infancy, only fifteen years after the establishment of the State.
Although there have been some major changes in the Law since its
adoption, the initial Law has remained the basic structure of securities
regulation and has certainly fulfilled Commissioner Cohen's vision.
II. THE SECURrrs AUTHORITY
The Law established a statutory Securities Authority (the "Au-
thority"), modeled generally after the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission. The responsibilities and powers of the Authority are
broad and include the approval of prospectuses for public offerings, the
supervision of the TASE, and the review of periodic reports submitted
by all companies that have issued securities that are publicly traded.
The purpose of the Authority, as expressed in the Law, is to pro-
tect the interests of the general public who invest in securities.' The
Authority is today composed of no more than thirteen members (an
increase from the original limit), appointed by the Minister of Finance
(the "Minister"). The only stipulations regarding the appointment of
the members of the Authority is that some should be members of the
public, some should be employees of the State, and one should be an
employee of the Bank of Israel. In addition, the Minister is charged
with appointing a chairman and deputy chairman from among the
1. YADIN COMM. REP. 4 (1963) [hereinafter YADIN].
2. Securities Law 5728-1968 § 2 (1968) (Isr.) [hereinafter Securities Law].
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members of the Authority.' In contrast with the SEC's employment of
full time commissioners, the Law does not require that any member of
the Authority be a full-time employee. In practice, the chairman is the
only full-time employee of the Authority.
There are a number of disqualifications for service as a member of
the Authority, such as (1) individuals who are members of the TASE,
(2) persons who engage in the business of the trading securities for
their own or others' accounts, and (3) employees of those who do one of
the above.' Further, individuals who are not employees of the State or
the Bank of Israel and who, in the opinion of the Minister, carry on
business activities that may lead to conflicts of interest with the posi-
tion on the Authority are similarly disqualified.5
A member is initially appointed. for a period of three years and
may thereafter be reappointed for additional terms of similar length.6
The chairman serves for a term of five years, with the possible renewal
of his appointment for further terms of three years each.' The Minis-
ter is empowered, however, to cancel the appointment of any member
who exceeds certain boundaries of reasonable absences from meetings
without cause.8
For the obvious reason of avoiding conflicts of interest, members
of the Authority must report all securities held by them or their spous-
es to the Minister and the Authority within seven days of their ap-
pointment. Subsequently, members must notify the Minister and the
Authority within seven days of the relevant transaction of any acqui-
sition or sale of shares by them of their spouses.' Furthermore, a
member of the Authority is forbidden to acquire any securities except
as authorized under a special permit (whose form may be specific to a
certain category of securities or general) from the Minister.0 The Law
also includes a provision regarding notice to the Minister and required
permits for the acquisition of securities by any employee of the Minis-
try of Finance who undertakes administrative or professional tasks
regarding securities."
3. Id. § 3(a)-(b).
4. Id. § 3(cXl)-(3).
5. Id. § 3(cX4).
6. Id. § 4(a), (c).
7. Id. § 4(b).
8. Id. § 4(d). The Minister is authorized to act in this manner if a member of
the Authority, without a reason satisfactory to the Ministry, misses four consecutive
meetings or six meetings in a year. A parallel provision for removal of a director of
a government company who misses board meetings of that company appears in the
Government Companies Law § 22(aX2) (1975) (Isr.). In that instance, however, the
removal is automatic unless the Ministers responsible for that company excuse the
absence after consultation with the Government Companies Authority.
9. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 5(b).
10. Id. § 5(a).
11. Id. § 5(c).
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The Minister is required to remove a member of the Authority if
he becomes a member of the TASE, violates one of the holding or ac-
quisition of securities provisions mentioned above, is convicted of a
crime that involves ignominy, is declared bankrupt, or has a receiver
appointed for him by the court.' Similarly, members of the Authority
who are employees of the State or of the Bank of Israel are automati-
cally removed from their positions as members of the Authority upon
the termination of their employment in any such position.1" Upon res-
ignation, removal from office, death, or determination of a lack of fit-
ness to perform a member's functions, the Minister is charged with
appointing a successor for the remainder of the term of the member
who has been so removed.1"
Despite its statutory nature, the Authority is treated as a corpo-
rate entity, competent with regard to any right, legal action, or du-
ty. 5 However, concomitantly, the Authority is deemed subject to gov-
ernment audit under Section 9(2) of the State Comptroller Law
[Consolidated Version] 1958.6
The Authority is granted a free hand in determining the proce-
dures to be followed in its meetings and discussions, so far as they are
not established by the Law. Notably, the Authority is charged with
preparing rules for the consideration of permit applications for the
issuance of prospectuses, but the Authority does not adopt such rules.
The rules are instead adopted by the Minister and must be published
in Reshumot, the official register."
A number of significant changes were made in the Law in 1988
(Amendment No. 9 to the Law). Among them was a provision granting
the absolute right to any party injured by a decision of the Authority
to appeal such a decision directly to the District Court.' Previously,
injured parties could petition to the Supreme Court sitting as the High
Court of Justice (the so called "Bagatz" action), a very familiar Israeli
judicial technique, patterned on that of the English court system, for
challenges to administrative and other government actions. The
Knesset wisely chose to amend this procedure since the District Court,
Israel's senior trial court of general jurisdiction, can effectively take
testimony and rule on matters of fact and law and is better equipped
to deal with testimony than the Supreme Court. Moreover, the District
Court considers significant business transactions and has the greatest
12. Id. § 6(a).
13. Id. § 6(b).
14. Id. § 6(c).
15. Id. § 8(a).
16. Id. § 9.
17. Id. § 12 (providing that the Minister can take the initiative with respect to
the rules, needing only to consult with the Authority).
18. Id. § 14A.
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background for dealing with securities law matters in the first in-
stance.
A similar right of appeal may be granted under Section 47 of the
Law (discussed below). The District Court recently considered the
fundamental difference between the two possible paths of appeal.
While recognizing the Supreme Court's time limitations, the District
Court judge also noted that the lower courts possessed the requisite
ability and authority to carry out a review of the facts of a case con-
cerning administrative decisions of governmental authorities. The
Court quoted Professor Yitzhak Zamir's9 book, Judgment of Adminis-
trative Issues, as stating that the investigation of the District Court
will very often be more thorough than that available in a correspond-
ing appeal to the Supreme Court.'
III. PUBLIC OFFERINGS AND PRIVATE PLACEMENTS; PROSPECTUS
DISCLosuRE
A. In General
The cornerstone of the Law is the requirement, parallel to that of
the Securities Act of 1933, that any offer of securities to the public
must be in accordance with a prospectus that has been published pur-
suant to a permit granted by the Authority.2" The term "securities" is
broadly defined to include any serial certificates issued by a compa-
ny,2 a cooperative entity, or any other corporate body that grants
participatory or membership rights in, or a basis of claim against, such
an entity, including certificates of participation in a trust fund for joint
investments and any certificate that carries the right for the bearer to
acquire any such securities.' In all of these cases, the fact that the
securities are registered or in bearer form is immaterial.
However, the definition of securities, for purposes of the prospec-
tus requirement, significantly excludes any securities issued by the
Government or under the authority of any special law.2' The Knesset
considered prospectus disclosure unnecessary when the Government
issues securities, as it has regularly done over the years. If, however,
the sale of securities are those of a government company, as is the case
in privatization by public offering, then the Law requires prospectus
19. Israel's former Attorney General who was appointed to the Supreme Court in
December 1993.
20. Katz v. Securities Exchange Ltd., (2) P.M. 296 (Dist. Ct., Tel Aviv/Jaffa
1991) (Isr.).
21. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 15(a).
22. Israeli corporate law, following the lead of the English Companies Act, which
was its source, describes a corporation as a "company.* In general, the same termi-
nology is used herein.
23. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 1.
24. Id.
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disclosure, since such a sale is not of securities issued by the Govern-
ment. The Law focuses on the offer of securities rather than on their
actual sale. Finally, it is clear that the only prospectus that counts for
purposes of a public offering is one that has been reviewed by the
Authority and for which an Authority permit has been issued; the most
complete and accurate offering memorandum, cast in the form of a pro-
spectus, will not suffice for these purposes.
The distinction between private placements and public offerings
has been an interesting one. The first case to interpret the Law, in
1977, dealt with an offer of securities by an Israeli real estate company
to private investors in Turkey and Iran.' Evron and two companies
under his control had sought financing for the construction of a hotel
in the Metropolitan Tel-Aviv area. Agents acting for Evron and the
companies travelled to Turkey and Iran and met with investors in
those countries who were interested in investments in Israel. A crimi-
nal proceeding was brought in Israel with respect to the alleged offer-
ing of securities to the public without a prospectus approved by the
Authority as required by the Law and, at the same time, claiming that
the offering material used was fraudulent. Prior to the hearing, the
two companies, which by then had been acquired by other sharehold-
ers, pleaded guilty and Evron was the only defendant left in the case.
The District Court held that there had been a violation of the Law on
both issues and discussed at length and in detail the history of the
Law and its underlying purposes. The Court, reviewing the legislative
history of the Law, concluded that the definition of a public offering
was based on the U.S. Securities Act of 1933 pattern and was designed
to prohibit a public offering where offers were made to those who did
not have access to the kind of information that registration would
disclose. Citing the leading Supreme Court case of SEC v. Ralston
Purina,' the Court concluded that in the case at hand the investors
should have been provided with a prospectus approved by the Authori-
ty and held that there had been a violation of the Law. Interestingly,
the Court specifically referred to the development by the SEC of simi-
lar rules, citing Professor Louis Loss' treatise and the early opinion of
the SEC General Counsel that an offer to not more than twenty five
investors would not require a prospectus. The District Court, however,
rejected the position that any rigid standard should be adopted. The
Evron case was subsequently appealed and affirmed in this respect by
the Israeli Supreme Court. Evron's appeal from the portion of the
District Court decision holding the offering material to be deceptive
was accepted, and he withdrew his appeal from the conviction of affect-
ing an offering without a prospectus. No real conclusion can be reached
from the withdrawal of the appeal. Since the penalty imposed on
25. State v. Evron, (1) P.M. 329 (Dist. Ct., Tel Aviv/Jaffa 1977) (Isr.).
26. S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
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Evron with respect to the prospectus violation was a modest one, it
was clear that the Supreme Court was not interested in hearing argu-
ment on that issue. Once Evron's counsel saw that the Supreme Court
was inclined to rule in Evron's favor on the more serious count, with
respect to the quality of the offering materials, he withdrew the ap-
peal.
27
Very recently, again following the lead of U.S. securities regula-
tion and the safe harbor of Rules 502-506 under the Securities Act of
1933, the Securities Authority has informally adopted a similar ap-
proach, without all of the protections offered by the U.S. Rules, and
today the Authority will, in effect, take no action with respect to a
private placement to not more than thirty five investors.' Regula-
tions have recently been adopted providing for certain procedures and
public notifications to be followed for a private placement by a com-
pany whose shares are publicly traded.'
The Law also provides for certain instances where the Authority
may waive the requirement of offer by prospectus for reasons of conve-
nience or sensible business practice. Thus, offers for sale of securities
that are registered on the TASE in the course of trading on the market
merit a statutory exemption.' Consequently, transactions by a con-
trolling person, no matter what the extent of his holdings, do not re-
quire an Israeli prospectus so long as the transactions are effected on
the TASE, a significant change from the U.S. pattern. Similarly, the
Authority is authorized to exempt offers by receivers, trustees in bank-
ruptcy, or other cases where the offeror is not the issuer, in accordance
with regulations made by the Minister and approved by the Knesset
Finance Committee (the "Finance Committee"). 1 In addition, the Au-
thority may exempt from the obligation to offer by prospectus securi-
ties that will not be traded on the TASE and will only be offered to
insurers, benefit funds, or banking corporations.'
B. Disclosure Requirements
The Law establishes two guiding principles that govern the con-
tent of materials that are to be included in the prospectus to be pub-
27. Evron, 32(2) P.D. at 189 (1978).
28. This is true although there is no "formal no action letter" procedure in effect
in Israel.
29. Securities Regulations, Private Placement of Securities by a Registered Com-
pany (1992).
30. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 15(b). The Minister and the Knesset Finance
Committee have very important roles under the Law, in contrast to the provisions of
the Securities Act of 1933, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and other U.S. securi-
ties legislation. As a result, the SEC is much more independent in issuing regula-
tions and performing other functions than the Authority.
31. Id. § 15(c).
32. Id. § 15(d).
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lished under the permit from the Authority. First, the prospectus must
include every particular that a reasonable investor would regard as
material when considering investment in the securities described in
the prospectus. ' A non-exhaustive list of particulars that are deemed
to fall into this category is to be provided by the Minister in regula-
tions to be approved by the Finance Committee. Second, no misleading
particular may be included in the prospectus." With these two gov-
erning principles as a background, it is possible to commence an exam-
ination of the sections of the Law, including regulations promulgated
thereunder, governing the particulars that should be included in the
prospectus.
Section 17 of the Law provides the basic framework for the regu-
lations that the Minister, after consultation with and recommendation
of the Authority, may present to the Finance Committee for approval.
This task was discharged almost immediately with the adoption of the
Securities Regulations, Particulars of a Prospectus, Its Structure and
Form (1969) (the "Prospectus Regulations"). Amendments 9 and 11 to
the Law, passed in 1988 and 1990 respectively, greatly increased the
type and nature of particulars accompanying professional opinions that
the Minister could require, by regulations, to be included in the pro-
spectus.
Regulations, according to Section 17(b) of the Law, may, among
other things, refer to the following particulars: (1) financial reports of
the issuer, its subsidiaries, and affiliated companies and the opinions
of the accountants on such reports; ' (2) an opinion from an attorney
referring to certain specified legal matters as prescribed by the regula-
tions; ' (3) confirmation from an attorney that all necessary permits
for the offering have been obtained;" and (4) details as to interested
parties of the issuer and the nature of such interests, particulars of
which the interested party is obligated to deliver in order to enable the
issuer to meet this requirement. '
1. Regulations Regarding Prospectuses
The prospectus must be in a printed form that is easily read-
able. ' The cover must include the word "prospectus," the name of the
issuer (and the offeror, if he is a different person), the date of the pro-
spectus, and a description of certain details regarding the securities
33. Id. § 16.
34. Id.
35. Id. § 17(bXl)-(2).
36. Id. § 17(bX3).
37. Id. § 17(bX4).
38. Id. § 17(bX5), (c).
39. Securities Regulations, Particulars of a Prospectus, Its Structure and Form,
5729-1969, § 2 (1969) (Isr.) [hereinafter Prospectus Regulations].
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offered.' The prospectus must include all details required under
these regulations, as well as any particular of which the issuer notified
the Authority as being potentially of interest to a reasonable investor
and that the Authority requested be included in the prospectus." Fi-
nally, unlike the U.S. prospectus, which must meet certain re-
quirements but does not need to follow a specific order, the structure of
the prospectus must follow the order established under the regula-
tions. 2 The discussion set forth below follows the order required by
the regulation, which prescribes the structure and content of the vari-
ous sections of the prospectus.
2. Introduction to Prospectus
The introduction must include a notice that all relevant permits
for the offering have been obtained, a statement regarding the status
of an application (or lack thereof) for the registration of the offered
securities for trading on the TASE, a description of the issuer that
includes details of its outstanding share capital and existing reserves,
and a list of any outstanding debenture series previously issued.'
From this starting point, the regulations move into a prescription of
the details that must be included within the body of the prospectus
itself.
3. Particulars on the Offering of Securities
The rules first require inclusion of details regarding the securities
to be offered under the prospectus." In addition to the expected re-
quirements to disclose information regarding the price and payment
terms, the manner of ordering the securities, the date of allocation, the
manner of refunding refused orders, and the details of any underwrit-
ing agreement, the regulations also include a number of prescribed
disclosures that are rooted in concern for the protection of the unwary
investor." Examples of such rules include the disclosure of the under-
taking by any party to acquire securities of the same category as those
being offered which have not as yet been issued and the specification
of any rights to acquire the offered securities that have been extended
to any specific category of persons (e.g. the previous shareholders).'
40. Id. § 3.
41. Id. § 6.
42. Id. § 5.
43. Id. §§ 7, 9, 11-15.
44. Id. § 16.
45. Id. §§ 21-23, 25.
46. Id. §§ 19-20; see also State v. Rubinstein, (1) P.M. 89 (1992) (Isr.) (providing
a judicial application of these regulations).
1994
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4. Issuer's Securities and Capital
The regulations continue by enumerating various rules surround-
ing particulars regarding the issuer's securities and capital. The first
such requirement regards the disclosure of certain rights and restric-
tions that are attached to the offered securities and any other catego-
ries of outstanding securities.47 The prospectus must also disclose var-
ious details, depending on whether the offered securities are shares or
debentures, regarding the capital of the issuer. These include particu-
lars of changes in the capital of the issuer in the three years prior to
the date of the prospectus, the terms of any underwriting agreement
during that period, and the general details of any offering by pro-
spectus in the relevant years.' Further facts that also require disclo-
sure include the nature of the holdings of any interested parties in the
issuer, any undertaking by the issuer to issue or to abstain from issu-
ing securities or to abstain from taking loans under certain conditions
for a specified period, and the particulars of any exemptions or reduc-
tions from the provisions of tax or foreign currency control regulations
available to holders of the offered securities." Additionally, the pro-
spectus must contain the highest and lowest quotation prices in trad-
ing on the TASE for the two years preceding the prospectus for all
categories, if any, of the issuer's shares that are registered for trading
thereon.' Lastly, in connection with the offering of debentures, the
prospectus must disclose various material facts regarding the parties
to and the terms of the trust indenture that is used in accordance with
Section 35B of the Law (discussed below).5'
5. Use of Proceeds
The regulations require that the issuer clearly state the anticipat-
ed use of the proceeds of the offering. More specifically, the company
must disclose all of the intended objectives to be achieved with the
funds, the amount necessary for each objective, the timetable under
which the issuer intends to operate with the funds, and how any addi-
tional money required for the achievement of these objectives will be
raised. 2
An insurer, a banking corporation, or a company whose main pur-
pose is the investment in other companies may give notice that the
consideration of the offering is not intended for any specific objective
47. See Prospectus Regulations, supra note 39, § 26 (providing details of the
types of restrictions and rights that require disclosure).
48. Id. § 27.
49. Id. §§ 28, 30-31. Israel has broad foreign currency control rules under the
Currency Control Law of 1978.
50. Prospectus Regulations, supra note 39, § 29,
51. Id. §§ 32-33.
52. Id. § 39(a)-b).
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but rather is earmarked for use in the expansion of the business. Nev-
ertheless, even in these exceptional cases, if twenty-five percent or
more of the funds are intended for a specified objective, the nature of
such an intended use must be disclosed." Similarly, the regulations
set rules governing disclosure of certain essential particulars and de-
tails of any asset or enterprise that is to be acquired, of any contem-
plated expansion or building in relation to the concern of the issuer, or
of any company in which the issuer plans to invest, all with the pro-
ceeds of the offering.'
Along the same lines, if the issuer reserves the right to alter thi
stated objectives or any details related thereto, it must disclose the
conditions under which such a right of adjustment might be exercised,
the type of decision that must be taken on the part of the company to
authorize such changes, and the means by which notice of such a deci-
sion will be publicized.' Finally, if no minimum amount that the is-
suer expects to raise through the public offering is set, then this fact
must be included in the prospectus."
6. Particulars of the Issuer
The prospectus must include a detailed description of the issuer
for a period of at least five years prior to the prospectus, focusing in
greater detail on the last two years prior to the offering.67 In the same
section, the prospectus must include disclosure of certain vital details
of its directors. These include personal details, such as age, address,
and citizenship, as well as business facts, such as the director's posi-
tion in the company, his service on board of directors' committees, and
his being a relative of any interested party in the issuer.' Further,
the prospectus should include the provisions of the Memorandum and
Articles of Association, the Israeli statutory names for charter docu-
ments, of the issuer as they relate to the appointment, service, and
powers of the directors."
In addition, the issuer must list personal details and certain pro-
fessional facts regarding the remaining senior officers in the issuer for
whom details were not included in the section regarding directors.'
53. Id. § 39(c).
54. Id. §§ 41-43 (providing details of the required disclosure in each of these
cases).
55. Id. § 39A.
56. Id. § 40; see also Securities Law, supra note 2, § 27(a) (providing the back-
ground rules regarding minimum amounts and refunds).
57. Prospectus Regulations, supra note 39, §§ 44-44A.
58. Id. § 45(a).
59. Id. § 45(b).
60. Id. § 45A; Section 1 of the Prospectus Regulations defines "ranking officers"
of a company to include the directors, the general manager, the deputy general
manager, the vice general manager, the accountant, the internal auditor, and any
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Furthermore, the prospectus must contain a list of the number of em-
ployees, by profession, who work for the issuer at the date of the pro-
spectus."1 Lastly, the issuer is required to disclose the nature of any
undertaking, agreement, or practice under which the company is liable
to make payments, calculated as a percentage of its profits, income,
assets, or turnover, to anyone.6
7. Subsidiaries and Associated Companies
For obvious reasons, the prospectus must include a list of all the
subsidiaries and affiliated companies of the issuer, including details of
the nature of the issuer's holdings in the companies and the essential
terms of any loans or other transactions between them.' A descrip-
tion of the main business of each such company and basic financial in-
formation must be disclosed.' In addition, following the line of disclo-
sure regarding interested parties in the issuer that is discussed below,
the prospectus must specify the names and the holdings of any persons
who, to the best knowledge of the issuer and its directors, hold twenty-
five or more percent of the outstanding share capital, of the voting
rights, or of the power to appoint directors in any of the subsidiaries or
affiliate companies.6
The regulations contain even stricter disclosure requirements if
the issuer has invested, or is about to invest, at least fifty percent of
its total assets, including the proceeds of the current offering, in anoth-
er company, whether by way of shares, loans, or other means. In such
a case, the issuer must include particulars of the entity as if it were
the issuer, with all the attendant requirements discussed above.'
However, the regulations do provide an exemption from such a dis-
closure in the case of an issuer that offers debentures, all the consider-
ation of which is intended for deposit in a "bank" that undertakes to
fulfill all of the payment terms under the debentures qualifying as a
"recognized investment" according to the Income Tax Regulations
(Rules for the Approval and Management of Benefit Funds) 1964. 87
other individual who performs those functions regardless of title. In addition, any
employee of the issuer who holds at least five percent of the outstanding nominal
share capital or of the voting power in the issuer is, for the purposes of these regu-
lations, considered a "ranking officer."
61. Id. § 46.
62. Id. § 47.
63. Id. §§ 48, 50.
64. Id. § 50.
65. Id. § 49.
66. Id. § 51(a).
67. Id. § 51(b)-(c). In this context the regulation defines a "bank' as a company
that deals with the receipt of money on current account from which, by check, pay-
ments can be made on demand.
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8. Interested Parties in the Issuer
The definition of "an interested party" in a company includes the
following: (1) a person who holds five percent or more of the out-
standing share capital or voting power of the company;" (2) a person
who can appoint one or more of the directors, or the general manager
of the company or an individual who serves in such a position; (3) a
company in which a person meeting the requirements of (1) or (2)
holds twenty five percent or more of the outstanding share capital or of
the voting power or in which such a person is entitled to appoint one
quarter or more of its directors; and (4) a subsidiary of the company,
except for a bank registration company.'
For the purposes of this definition, the director of a trust fund for
joint investments is to be considered as the individual who holds the
securities included among the fund's assets. Similarly, a trustee, as
opposed to a registration company, who holds securities in trust for
another is to be considered as the holder of those securities. °
With these definitions in mind, the regulations provide that the
issuer must disclose the holdings of shares and options of any interest-
ed party or of any ranking officer in the issuer, its subsidiaries, and its
affiliated companies, at a date as near as possible to the prospectus
and at a date twelve months prior to such a date. 1 Additionally, the
nature of any benefits that any interested party has received or is due
to receive, directly or indirectly, from the issuer, its subsidiaries, or its
affiliated companies in the two years prior to the offering, must be
detailed. However, the salaries and related expenses paid to the direc-
tors and the general manager, as long as they do not deviate from
expected norms, do not need to be individually specified; rather, they
are to be included in a total sum figure for all the employees.72 The
interest that any such interested party had in any transaction not
executed in the ordinary course of business, involving the same compa-
68. Amendment 11 to the Law, enacted in December 1990, reduced the previous
figure of 10% of the outstanding shares in the corporate entity to the current figure
of 5%. This change brings the Israeli law into line with the corresponding United
States law on the issue of interested parties. See Section 13(d) of the U.S. Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. A special set of regulations has just been adopted to exempt
the Government from certain regulatory provisions, in connection with privatization
of the banks in order to avoid the nightmarish disclosures of all affiliations of Gov-
ernment companies with the bank. See Securities Law, Interested Persons Emergen-
cy Order (1993).
69. Share certificates of securities traded on the TASE are generally held by
banks for their customers through subsidiaries of the banks called registration (or
nominee) companies. Such companies are defined by the Law as "registration com-
panies." See Securities Law, supra note 2, § l(f).
70. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 1(m).
71. Prospectus Regulations, supra note 39, § 55.
72. Id. § 53.
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nies in the two years prior to the date of the prospectus, must be de-
tailed in this section, to the best of the knowledge of the issuer and of
its directors."
9. Financial Information
Audited annual financial reports of the issuer, dated no more than
fourteen months prior to the date of the prospectus, must be presented
as part of the prospectus. The regulations also provide for a presenta-
tion of interim reports (including the profit/loss report, the change in
financial status report, and the change in capital report), to be includ-
ed for the interim period. 4 In addition, there are specific provisions
for the disclosure of comparative reports; in general, this incorporates
the comparison of figures in the latest profit/loss report with the corre-
sponding figures for the prior three annual reports.75
Lastly, the regulations establish that all financial reports required
under this heading in the prospectus must be drawn up in accordance
with the provisions of Securities Regulations (Preparation of Financial
Reports) 1969."" However, with the recent publication of the new Se-
curities Regulations (Preparation of Annual Financial Reports) 1993
("1993 Regulations"), which repeal the 1969 regulations on financial
reports, changes were made in this regard." Except for certain in-
terim provisions regarding applications to publish a prospectus that
were made before March 31, 1993, allowing in certain circumstances
the inclusion of reports based on the now-repealed format, the finan-
cial reports to be included in a prospectus must be modeled on the
format provided in the new Annual Report Regulations.78
10. Miscellaneous Particulars
The regulations require the inclusion of an opinion of an attorney
certifying the following: (1) the accuracy of the description of the rights
related to the offered securities and of the rights related to the other
shares of the issuer if the offered securities are shares; (2) the authori-
73.. Id. § 54.
74. Id. § 56. The system works as follows: (i) if the date of the annual report
predates the prospectus by more than five months, then the interim reports must be
presented up to a date three months after the annual report; (ii) if it predates by
more than eight months, then the interim reports must cover up to a date six
months after the annual report; and (iii) if it predates by more than eleven months,
then the interim reports must cover up to a date nine months after the annual re-
port. All of the interim reports must conform to the format of the annual report.
75. See Id. § 59 (providing further details on the presentation of such informa-
tion).
76. Id. § 60.
77. Securities Regulations, Preparation of Annual Financial Reports, 5753-1993, §
65 (1993) (Isr.) [hereinafter 1993 Regulations].
78. See Id. § 67 (providing details of these interim provisions).
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ty of the issuer to offer the securities in the form in which they are
offered; (3) the lawful appointment of and the full disclosure of the
directors of the issuer; and (4) the agreement of the attorney to the
inclusion of the opinion in the prospectus."
Similarly, the regulations stipulate that the issuer must include
the opinion of its accountants regarding the audited financial reports
that are included in the prospectus. The opinion must include certifica-
tion that the reports were prepared in accordance with Securities Reg-
ulations (Preparation of Financial Reports) 1969 and that the accoun-
tant has agreed to the inclusion of his opinion in the prospectus.'
In addition to the opinions described above, this section of the pro-
spectus must describe the rate of the underwriting commissions that
the issuer has agreed to pay in connection with the offering of the
securities, as well as an estimate of the total expenses connected with
the offering.81 Further, the issuer must detail any commissions that it
undertook to pay in connection with the subscription of the various
categories of securities offered by the issuer in the two years leading
up to the date of the prospectus." The issuer must also include the
names of the parties to, and a short description of the substance of,
every material agreement signed by the issuer in the two years prior
to the offering and of every material agreement that still obligates the
issuer, unless in either case the agreement was made in the ordinary
course of business.'
Similarly, this section must include a disclosure of all liens creat-
ed by the issuer in respect of any of its obligations along with the out-
standing balance of such underlying obligations." Finally, the issuer
must describe any guaranty, effective at the date of the prospectus,
79. Prospectus Regulations, supra note 39, § 61. In the published adopted reg-
ulations, not all areas suggested in the corresponding list in the Securities Law, §
17(bX3) (1968) (Isr.) (as amended), have been mentioned. These omissions include the
references in the attorney's opinion to such issues as the certification of the accuracy
of the descriptions, if any, mentioned in the prospectus of the agreements to which
the issuer is party, and of the details of any liens or sureties that are still effective
and that were created by the issuer, and the particulars of any legal proceedings to
which the issuer is party at the date of the prospectus. Even though updated regu-
lations have not yet been published, in practice the Authority has required the
attorney's opinion to conform to the revised provision in the Law. An argument
could be made that this should not be required until the regulations are amended.
80. Prospectus Regulations, supra note 39, § 62; see also Securities Law, supra
note 2, § 17(bX2) (containing the background provision regarding this opinion). Pre-
sumably, with the repeal of the 1969 regulations on financial reports and the intro-
duction of the 1993 Annual Reports Regulations, this section is amended mutatis
mutandis to reflect this change.
81. Prospectus Regulations, supra note 39, § 63.
82. Id. § 64.
83. Id. § 66.
84. Id. § 67.
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that it has given to any company other than a subsidiary in which it
holds more than fifty percent of the voting power, if such a guaranty is
not limited in amount or represents a sum larger than one-quarter of
its adjusted equity; further, any guaranty in any amount that is given
to any company otherwise than in the ordinary course of business
must be described. '
11. Prospectus for Commercial Securities
The regulations provide for a special form of prospectus in the
case of an offering of "commercial securities," which are defined to
include securities issued by a company that grant the right to claim
monies from the company at a date that is not less than ninety days
following the offering and not later than nine months after the offer
date." As a part of the cover which discloses the vital information
regarding the offering, the description of the securities offered by the
prospectus must include the following: (1) the total value of the series;
(2) the nominal value of each commercial security; (3) the interest rate
carried by the securities; (4) the maturity date of the securities; and (5)
the name of the guarantor, if any.87 Apart from this change, the con-
tent of the prospectus is governed by the regulations described above
applying to any other prospectus."
C. Other Requirements
After drafting a prospectus, the offeror must submit the draft to
the Authority for review. If the offeror wishes to take advantage of
certain exemptions that the Authority may grant concerning the inclu-
sion of specified particulars in the prospectus, it should omit the rele-
vant particular and attach an application to the Authority requesting
that such an omission be authorized under the powers granted to the
Authority to issue exemptions.' Furthermore, the Authority, at its
discretion, is empowered to request further details or clarification
regarding any information surrounding the offering and the prospec-
tus.90
The Law then proceeds to explain the procedure and grounds
under which an exemption from the publication of a certain particular
may be obtained. Amendment 9, passed in 1988, was a major step
forward in the clarification of these matters. Grounds under which an
exemption may be granted include the protection of trade secrets of the
offeror, provided that the excluded particular is not of a type that
85. Id. § 67A.
86. Id. § 70.
87. Id. §§ 71-72.
88. Id. § 73.
89. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 18(a)-(b).
90. Id. § 18(c).
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would likely deter a reasonable investor from considering acquisition of
the offered securities.91 In addition, the Authority may grant an ex-
emption on the grounds that publication is liable to cause damage to
the State's economy, to the national security, or to an ongoing police or
Authority investigation.' However, in the latter cases, if the Authori-
ty believes that the omitted particular would be important to the rea-
sonable investor, then the Authority is not authorized to permit the
publication of the prospectus.' In all cases where an exemption has
been granted, notice of that fact must be disclosed in the prospectus.'
After specifying the particulars that are generally to be included
in every prospectus pursuant to Section 17 of the Law and the related
regulations, the Law proceeds to establish a wide-ranging residual
power of the Authority to demand the inclusion of any particulars
beyond those listed in the regulations that, in the Authority's opinion,
would be important to the reasonable investor, regarding the issuer
and its subsidiaries and affiliated companies." In addition, the Au-
thority may request the inclusion of further matters that in the opin-
ion of the attorney should be attached to the prospectus; it may also
request additional opinions or reports, especially in relation to finan-
cial matters." Finally, presumably to protect the interests of an un-
wary or careless investor, the Authority may require that the offeror
emphasize any detail to be included in the prospectus in a particular
matter.97
Once the Authority has reviewed the prospectus and insured its
compliance with the Law and regulations and the receipt of all neces-
sary permits for the publication of the prospectus, the Authority is to
grant a permit allowing the publication of the prospectus.9 The Law
stresses that such a permit does not constitute any opinion on the part
of the Authority regarding the reliability or completeness of any partic-
ulars in the prospectus, and the permit is not meant as an expression
of any belief regarding the quality of the offered securities." That
91. Id. § 19(aXl).
92. Id. § 19(aX2). In each case such a claim of potential damage must be con-
firmed by a signed document from the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Defense,
the Minster of Police, or the Chairman of the Authority (or a person authorized to
act in his stead) sanctioning the claim of the offeror.
93. Id. § 19(b). In the case of confidential trade secrets, which are governed by
the test of being "likely to deter the reasonable investor," it would seem that the
test is wider and less favorable to the offeror, than the proposed test. The opposite
would be expected, with greater emphasis on encouraging offerors to apply for ex-
emptions in the so-called "security" cases without fear of being refused permission to
publish the prospectus.
94. Id. § 19(c).
95. Id. § 20(a1)-(2).
96. Id. § 20(aX3)-(6).
97. Id. § 20(b).
98. Id. § 21(a).
99. Id. § 21(b); see also id. § 21(c) and the resulting regulation in Prospectus
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statement is, of course, parallel to the one that SEC regulations re-
quire to be included on the cover page of a U.S. prospectus. There is,
however, one major difference in prospectus procedure between the two
countries. Whereas SEC regulations generally require that the prelim-
inary prospectus (the so-called "red herring prospectus") be distributed
widely prior to the distribution of the final prospectus, no such proce-
dure exists in Israel; instead, the contents of the Israeli draft prospec-
tus are deemed confidential prior to the granting of the permit in the
actual public offering. The assumption that the public reads prospec-
tuses in detail is not a very well founded one, however, despite the
efforts of the Authority by requiring summary statements and cover
emphases to highlight important points. One of the problems is that
prospectuses are not distributed to every potential purchaser. Rather,
they are made available at branches of banks, brokerage firms, and at
the Authority and TASE. On the other hand, there is a very active and
competitive financial press that generally provides summaries of pro-
spectuses and general evaluations of companies going public.
Another difference between Israeli and U.S. procedures is that the
Authority has not yet developed any rules with respect to so-called
"gun-jumping." When a public offering is pending in Israel, articles
frequently appear in the press that partake of obvious promotion by
the company and its interested parties. It would not be surprising if
this issue is dealt with by legislation or regulation in the years to
come.
Both the draft submitted to the Authority and the final prospectus
to be published by permit from the Authority must be approved by the
board of directors of the issuer."° Once the final draft is approved,
the prospectus must be signed by the issuer and by a majority of its
directors, including at least one public director; in the case of an initial
public offering, at which point public directors will not yet have been
appointed, the majority of the directors must include at least one direc-
tor who is only considered an interested party as a result of his serving
as a director.'
The concept of a "public director" was provided for in 1987 by
amendment to the Companies Ordinance. The concept is that any
Regulations, supra note 39, § 8 (regarding the language used to emphasize the lim-
its on the Authority's permit to be included in the "Introduction" section of the pro-
spectus).
100. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 22(a). The requirement that the draft, as
well as the final prospectus, be signed, was added by Amendment 9 in 1988 and
was designed to overcome the problem created by companies filing inadequate and
incomplete draft prospectuses, in periods of substantial prospectus activity, just to
get on line at the Authority.
101. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 22(b); see also Companies Ordinance (New
Version) 5724-1983, § 96B(c) (1983) (Iar.) [hereinafter Companies Ordinance] (provid-
ing the definition of "public director").
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company that has effected a public offering is required by law to have
two public directors appointed. These must be Israeli residents who
have no economic connection or familial relationship with the company
or its controlling shareholders and whose appointment has been ap-
proved by a special committee established under the Ordinance for
that purpose."° In addition, if an underwriter has undertaken to ac-
quire securities that are not purchased by the public, the underwriter
must also sign the prospectus." s Further, if the securities are offered
otherwise than by the issuer, the offeror must also sign.'" It must be
noted that as in U.S. and other securities laws, signatories to the pro-
spectus are not merely for show; rather, the Law, as discussed below,
attaches varying degrees of civil liability to those who have signed a
prospectus that contains misleading particulars or omits material de-
tails. '0
As a result of the potential liability even of directors who do not
sign the prospectus, the Law adopted a procedure by which a dis-
senting director may cause the Authority to consider staying the publi-
cation of the prospectus for a period of twenty days (unless otherwise
instructed by a court of law). This power may be exercised after a
director brings to the notice of the Authority, in written form, any
detail which, if brought before a court, would be considered sufficient
grounds to warrant the court's intervention."° The Authority should
receive notice of and may appear as a party to any proceedings in the
courts that result from any action undertaken under this proce-
dure.1
07
Assuming that all the preceding requirements have been fulfilled,
the issuer may proceed to publish the prospectus and distribute it to
the public. The prospectus is to be dated no more than seven days
after the permit from the Authority has been granted, unless such a
date has been extended by the Authority."° Within one business day
of the date of the prospectus, the issuer must submit a copy thereof to
the Registrar of Companies, a government office which deals with all
matters affecting company charter documents and also keeps records
102. Companies Ordinance, supra note 101, § 96B(a). It had been generally as-
sumed that public directors need not be appointed for Israeli companies whose only
shares are traded in the U.S. However, the District Court of Tel Aviv/Jaffa ruled
otherwise in an unreported decision, Ido Ben-Yehuda, Adv. v. Interpharm Indus.,
decided on June 6, 1993. That case is on appeal to the Supreme Court, which en-
tered a stay with respect to implementation of the District Court decision.
103. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 22(c).
104. Id. § 22(d).
105. See Id. § 31.
106. Id. § 22(e).
107. Id. § 22(f.
108. Id. § 23(a).
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on all Israeli companies, along with a copy of the permit from the
Authority.'09 Within the same time period, the issuer must publish,
in two Israeli, widely-circulated, Hebrew language, daily newspapers, a
notice that includes details of the submission of the documents to the
Registrar, advice of the place where copies of the prospectus may be
obtained and where orders for securities may be submitted, and of any
other particulars that the Authority may require to be included in the
notices.1 Lastly, the Authority may require the distribution of pro-
spectuses within a certain time period, in certain locations, and in
certain numbers, all according to its discretion.'
The Tel Aviv-Jaffa District Court dealt with these prospectus
related matters in the case of Israel v. Rubinstein & Partners, Con-
tracting Co. Ltd. et. al. ("Rubinstein")."' While this is a decision of
the District Court, which therefore bears less precedental authority
than a Supreme Court decision, it is one of the rare recent occasions in
which any of the higher courts in Israel has undertaken an exploration
of the issues involved in the criminal side of the securities law in a
published opinion. Almost all of the criminal cases brought under the
Law are heard in the Magistrates Court, and those decisions are al-
most never officially reported. The defendant company undertook a
public offering of its securities in 1984. The pronounced intention was
to sell a certain percentage of the shares in the company to the public;
all of the shares were previously owned by two rival factions of the
Rubinstein family. It was against a background of disagreements be-
tween the two groups that the offering was finally affected. Through a
number of transactions, each involving participation by some or all of
the ten named defendants, a significant majority of the shares which
were offered eventually came back under the control of members of the
family or parties close to them.
While the accused all claimed that their actions had been carried
out in good faith and according to the Law and/or the prevailing prac-
tice in the securities markets, the Authority and the prosecution
viewed these transactions differently. A number of different charges
were brought against each defendant. The prosecution claimed that the
accused, as a group, had been involved in a form of overall conspiracy
with an intention to commit fraudulent or deceitful behavior. While
some of the charges were brought under the Criminal Law of 1977, a
portion of the charges were also brought under the Law, which pro-
vides for criminal sanctions in certain situations, as discussed below.
The Court began by making some general observations regarding
109. Id. § 23(cX1).
110. Id. § 23(cX2).
111. Id. § 23(d).
112. Rubinstein, 192 (1) P.M. at 89 (1972). An appeal to the Supreme Court has
been argued, but no decision has been rendered.
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various sections of the Law and securities law in general. The judge
stated that despite its suspicious appearance, the purchase of securi-
ties through strawmen and the splitting of purchases through various
accounts or persons are not unlawful in and of themselves. Because
such activity was accepted practice at the time of the alleged offenses,
such actions would only run afoul of the law if they were connected to
some form of unlawful activity. He then went on to establish Sections
16 and 18(a), the tests of the reasonable investor, as the sources for
the requirements of disclosure in the prospectus. He added that oral,
as well as written, contracts and agreements needed to be tested for
disclosure. With this in mind, the judge moved on to describe certain
fundamental points about the overall approach adopted by the Law.
The judge pointed out that the Law clearly provides a framework
that focuses on civil obligations and remedies. The focus on civil reme-
dies and the relegation of criminal sanctions to a position of secondary
importance show that the lawmakers hoped that securities law ques-
tions would center around civil rather than criminal litigation."1 ' He
added that, except for the provisions of Section 25 that deal with
amendments to the prospectus after its publication, all transgressions
of the provisions of the Law relating to prospectus liability that are
relevant in creating liability must occur before the date of the signing
of the prospectus by the relevant parties. Any events that occur after
that date are not to be relied upon in establishing prospectus related
liability under the Law. 4 Before proceeding to an examination of the
particular facts of the case, the judge explicitly noted the enormity of
the task before him as he realized that he was entering an area of the
law, namely the criminal penalties, that had been little touched in
previous decisions of the higher courts.
With this background established, the judge began to attack the
legal and factual issues raised in the charges against each of the de-
fendants. The overall claim of the prosecution was that the so-called
public offering was not meant to be for the public at all. Rather, it was
alleged that, under a wide-ranging conspiracy, the defendants had
colluded in a plan that would allow the family to purchase the offered
shares in an attempt to tighten their control over the company. While
the judge recognized that the imposition of control by a group of share-
113. The judge pointed to the continuing reluctance of the lawmakers to amend
problematic areas of the criminal sections of the Law, for example, the difficulty of
meeting the requirements of "fraud" in order to convict the defendants of manipula-
tive actions with regard to the value of securities in Section 54(aX2). At the same
time they have amended civil areas of the Law on eleven separate occasions since it
was enacted. This demonstrates the lack of importance attached to the criminal pen-
alties offered therein. This theme is discussed further in the section dealing with the
criminal provisions of the Law.
114. The judge did comment that, although this was the current state of the law,
it could hardly be considered ideal.
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holders was by itself a legal action, the transactions involved had to be
tested in their circumstances and surroundings. While numerous tech-
nical issues were involved with the verdicts passed on the individual
parties, often revolving around fine distinctions in questions of crimi-
nal law that are not particularly relevant for present purposes, the
judge did enunciate certain principles regarding securities law that
bear mention here.
First, .the judge, on the available evidence, was unable to find a
basis for claiming that the various parties were involved in some sort
of overall criminal conspiracy to defraud the Authority and the public.
Thus, the court was left to consider the charges against each accused
independently. With regard to the family and the related investors, the
judge found that they had tried to disguise the purchase of shares by
current shareholders (members of the family) and thus, taking account
of the wide definition of acquisition, violated provisions of the prospec-
tus, which stated that no current shareholders would purchase shares
in the offering.
The meaning of "holding" or "acquisition" in relation to securities
and voting power and similar issues was amended in July 1988 as part
of the wide-ranging Amendment 9 to the Law. It now includes holding
or acquisition by an individual alone or in conjunction with others,
directly or indirectly, through the medium of a trustee, a trust compa-
ny, a registration company, or by any other means." 5 So, a subsid-
iary or an affiliated company may be held liable for holding or making
acquisitions on behalf a company. Similarly, trading by an individual
includes all trades made by the individual, family members who live
with him or whose livelihoods depend on one another." As a result,
they could be found guilty of deceit under Section 415 of the Criminal
Law in their false representations and actions that lacked good faith
when they procured the permit from the Authority and the right to
register the shares for trading on the TASE. Further, these defendants
had run afoul of the disclosure requirements in Section 16 of the Law.
Their plan to purchase shares, in addition to directly contradicting to
explicit statements in the prospectus, also should have been disclosed
to the public, perhaps in an emphasized form, for the parties to fulfill
their legal requirements of disclosure.
The judge went on to consider the criminal liability of the compa-
ny itself. The judge stressed that a company, through its agents, could
be guilty of criminal activity. On examination of the facts, the judge
held that Abraham Rubinstein, in view of his exercise of significant
control over the affairs of the company, represented the alter-ego of the
company for the purposes of liability. Thus, once charges were proved
115. See Rubinstein, (1) P.M. at 89 (providing an example of the application of
the wide definition of acquisition).
116. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 1(G).
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against this individual, the company, for the purposes of criminal law,
could also be considered guilty.
With these issues settled, the judge proceeded to the question of
criminal liability as to the underwriters of the offering. While he felt
confident in stating that the underwriters had some form of responsi-
bility in regard to proper disclosure in the prospectus, the extent of
such responsibility was an issue that raised great doubts. While the
United States securities law establishes a test for underwriters based
on whether a reasonable investigation would reveal facts that would be
of interest to a prudent investor,"7 the Israeli law in this matter was
subject to great debate among legal scholars.118 However, the judge
did say that it is clear that no comparison or assumptions about the
underwriters' criminal liability may be made from the extent of the
underwriters' civil liability as regards issues of disclosure, clearly
spelled out in the Law. It is only based on the words of the statute
that criminal liability could be established; as a result of the prevailing
uncertainty in this area, any doubts had to be decided in favor of the
defendants, following a cardinal principle of the criminal law. The
remaining issues decided by the judge regarding these defendants and
the others tend to turn on technical issues of interpretation of certain
criminal and securities offenses. As a result, they will, where relevant,
be discussed elsewhere in this article.
IV. SALES BY PROSPECTUS: PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS
A separate chapter of the Law sets out the rules and procedures
that must be followed in the placement and filling of orders for secu-
rities offered by prospectus. Amendment 9 changed a number of these
provisions in a significant fashion. First and foremost, the Law was
amended to provide for a shorter maximum duration in which orders
may be received for an offering under a particular prospectus.
The lawmakers were obviously concerned to ensure that the infor-
mation provided to potential investors by a prospectus remain as cur-
rent as possible. As a result, the Law, as it stands today, provides that
the period for receiving orders must not commence less than seven
days, and must not terminate more than one month, after the date of
the prospectus."" Further, the Authority is empowered to shorten the
seven day period or to extend the one month deadline (provided that
the date does not extend past six months, or twelve months in the case
117. See Section 11 of the U.S. Securities Act of 1933; Escott v. Bar Chris
Constr., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip.,
332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
118. See, e.g., MEIR CHET, THE UNDERWRITING OF SECURITIES IN ISRAEL-THE CUR-
RENT STATUS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR AMENDMENTS (Hamishpat A, 1993) (arguing in
favor of expanding the Israeli law in this area); see also Rubinstein, (1) P.M. at 122.
119. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 24(a).
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of a mutual fund, described as a "joint trust investment fund" in the
Law), under such conditions as they might establish.'
The Law does not require circulation of preliminary prospectuses.
Therefore, the Law requires that there be a specified waiting period
between the date of publication of the prospectus and the actual com-
pletion of sales under that prospectus, thereby at least theoretically
providing investors with an opportunity to study the prospectus and to
make their investment decisions.
In addition, the Law provides for a broad area of discretion and
responsibility for the Authority with respect to the post-publication
amendment of the prospectus. Thus, the offeror, issuer, or any person
who gave a report, permit, or opinion in the prospectus must inform
the Authority of any material facts that have arisen or come to light
and that are omitted from the prospectus as soon as they become
aware of those facts."l If through this obligation of reporting, or by
other means, between the time that the publication permit was grant-
ed and the expiration of the period for the placing of orders, the Au-
thority learns of a fact that would have prevented the granting of the
permit or caused the Authority to require that the draft prospectus be
amended in a material fashion, then the Authority may demand, in a
form or manner that it sees fit, that the offeror, after being granted an
opportunity to present its case, print and distribute an amendment to
the prospectus or an amended prospectus including the relevant chang-
es or additions.'
The Law provides for the postponement of the period for the
placement of orders if such an amendment is ordered. As a result of
these postponement provisions, unless the Authority sets alternative
dates, the offeror is precluded from accepting orders for securities from
the date on which the Authority issues an order to amend the prospec-
tus until the end of seven days following the publication of the re-
quired amendment.'
One of the other Amendment 9 changes was in the improved
mechanism providing for the amendment of the prospectus, after its
publication, on the initiative of the offeror. The new provision allows
the offeror, before the expiration of the offer period, to apply to the
Authority for permission to amend any particular in the prospectus; if
that permission is granted, the prospectus is to be amended in accor-
dance with the request.
The criteria established by the Law for the Authority to consider
in the case of such an application are two-fold. The Authority may
120. Id. § 24(b).
121. Id. § 25(d).
122. Id. § 25(a).
123. Id. § 25(c).
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certify such a request if, in its opinion, such a change is "necessary" or
if the granting of such permission will in no way adversely affect the
rights of any party who submitted an order for or acquired the securi-
ties before the amendment is published.2 Similarly, the Authority is
required to order the publication of an amended prospectus or an
amendment to the prospectus if the financial reports of the offeror,
issuer, or any other corporate entity whose reports are included in the
prospectus are submitted to the Authority, presumably, although not
specifically mentioned, pursuant to the periodic reporting requirements
of the Law (Sections 36 through 38B) before the order period termi-
nates.'
The Law also provides for an amending procedure in cases of
technical, linguistic, printing, or similar errors. The offeror is to report
on such an error to the Authority, publish notification of such in at
least two wide-circulation, Hebrew language, daily newspapers in Isra-
el, and include a copy of such a correction in each copy of the prospec-
tus.M
The Law also provides a mechanism to protect investors who may
have placed orders for securities before the publication of any of the
amendments described above. Thus, any such investor may, without
penalty, cancel his order within ten days of the publication of those
amendments.' Hence, no unwitting investor is left to the discretion
of the offeror, or the Authority for that matter, in deciding whether the
amended prospectus contains provisions that may have caused him not
to place his order. Upon receipt of a cancellation notice, the offeror
must, within seven days, refund all funds paid by such an investor."2
If the Authority orders the publication of an amendment, and the offer-
or decides not to undertake such a publication, then the offeror must,
within seven days of the date set by the Authority as a deadline for
the publication of the amendment, refund all monies paid by any in-
vestors for the securities.'
Attention is also paid to cases where refunds must be made for
other reasons. For example, the offeror is obligated, within seven days
of the termination date for orders to be placed, to refund to investors
all payments if the total amount of orders placed does not reach the
124. Id. § 25A(a).
125. Id. § 25A(b); note that Section 25A(c) of the Securities Law provides that the
same postponement provisions, described above as applying in the case of Authority-
initiated amendments, also apply in the case of these procedures.
126. Id. § 25C; the public notification by way of newspaper advertisement is simi-
lar to that required in Section 23(cX2) of the Securities Law with respect to an-
nouncing the submission of the documents to the Registrar and the locations where
copies of the prospectus may be obtained.
127. Id. § 26(a).
128. Id. § 26(b).
129. Id. § 26(c).
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minimum amount, if any, stated in the prospectus as being the expect-
ed minimum consideration to be obtained through the offering.1' In
the converse case, where orders received exceed the total offered, pres-
ently a fairly common although not inevitable occurrence, the 1988
amendment to the Law established that the available securities be dis-
tributed in the manner provided in the prospectus rather than on a
purely discretionary basis."1 The allocation of securities under such a
plan specified in the prospectus must be announced, within seven days
of the end of the order period, in at least two Hebrew daily newspapers
of general broad circulation appearing in Israel."'2 In this case, how-
ever, the offeror must refund the monies within two business days of
the distribution of the securities to any investors whose orders were
wholly or partly rejected.'
A further provision of the 1988 amendments to the Law, intended
to protect and enhance the position of those who have placed orders for
securities, mandates the steps to be taken by the offeror with the mon-
ies paid in consideration of offers. The Law establishes, notwithstand-
ing a power granted to the Minister and the Finance Committee to
provide otherwise by regulation, that the subscription payments be
maintained in a separate trust account in a banking institution, until
the status of the offeror's obligation to refund payments to investors
under the above provisions is clarified.' Thereafter, the offeror, if
required, must refund the funds and the accrued interest to the date of
repayment to any investors whose orders were not flled.'
In addition to providing such mechanisms for the protection of
investors, the Law also establishes an enforcement clause to give teeth
to these provisions. If the offeror fails to fulfill any of its obligations re-
garding the refund of canceled orders or the maintenance of a separate
trust account and repayments, and the offeror is a company, then the
directors are to be jointly and severally liable, except for any director
who has taken the appropriate steps to ensure the repayment of funds
130. Id. § 27(a).
131. Id. § 27(bX1). In the recent Bank Hapoalim partial privatization public offer-
ing, the Finance Committee insisted that there be no maximum price fixed; the
offering was, as a result, almost a total failure, so much so that a subsequently
scheduled offering for Bank Leumi has been postponed indefinitely. The secret seems
to have been that the institutional investors were not prepared to invest on an un-
certain basis.
132. Id. § 27(bX2). The various publication requirements of the Law have led
recently to a proliferation of notices in the Israeli Hebrew language economic press.
As a result of the substantial volume of public offerings, much more material ap-
pears than in a typical U.S. "tombstone" notice.
133. Id. § 27(bX3).
134. Id. § 28(a), (c).
135. Id. § 28(b). This provision obviously secures the investors from the dangers
of the arbitrary use of their funds while they await the results of the offering.
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to any investors who do not receive the proper payments.'
The final area covered in this section concerns the notification of
the results of a public offering. The Law provides that the offeror must
inform the Authority of the results of the offering within seven days
after the end of the order period or the date of allocation in cases of
over-subscription. ' Further, the Law provides authority for regu-
lations to be issued with respect to these issues; that authority was
exercised almost immediately with the passing of the Securities Regu-
lations (Announcement of the Results of an Offer by Prospectus) in
1969. These regulations, adopted by the Minister after consultations
with the Authority, provide the framework and content required in the
report to the Authority on the results of an offering. First, the report
must include the nominal value, by category, of the securities ordered,
of orders that were canceled under Section 26(a) of the Law (described
above), and of orders rejected, as well as the details of the provisions
made for the refunding of payments for orders that were not filled."s
Further, the report must detail the total consideration received for
orders that were filled and the total nominal value of the securities, if
any, acquired by underwriters.' In addition, in cases of over-sub-
scription, the manner of allocating the securities among those who
have ordered them must be included."4 Lastly, all of the above de-
tails must be arranged according to the categories of the investors if
all or part of the offering consisted of securities offered to specific cate-
gories of investors.""
A recent amendment to the Law created special arrangements for
the processing by the Authority of public offerings by government com-
panies being privatized or by the sale of controlling shares by the gov-
ernment in its banks. 4 2 The commentary to the proposal of the new
law states that
[bIringing a government company to the position where it is feasi-
ble to privatize it [by a public offering] involves considerable prepa-
ration, including structural changes in the company and in the
business branch in which it operates. In order to prevent a situ-
ation in which after the investment of great efforts in these sub-
jects the privatization would be delayed, it is proposed that special
procedures be adopted as to companies being so privatized.
The commentary points out the possibility that prospectuses
136. Id. § 29.
137. Id. § 30.
138. Prospectus Regulations, supra note 39, §§ 1-4.
139. Id. §§ 5-6.
140. Id. § 7.
141. Id. § 8.
142. Government Proposed Law, No. 2226 (1993), adopted as Amendment 13 to
the Law on Feb. 13, 1994.
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might be used in such a situation with financial statements which
would otherwise be stale under current regulations. The commentary
continues by stating that, "sale of controlling share interests in banks
is also a very important challenge" and should be subject to these
special proposed rules. In adopting the amendment, the Knesset ex-
tended its scope to public offerings of substantial companies and con-
glomerates based on criteria to be established administratively.
V. PROSPECTUS LIABILITY
The 1988 amendments had a sweeping effect on the civil liability
of various parties connected to the offering. Prior to the amendments,
a number of limitations on the extent and scope of the liability severe-
ly hampered potential plaintiffs. First, the liability extended only to
those individuals who purchased the securities as part of the original
offering by prospectus. In a market where securities rapidly and fre-
quently change hands, such a provision was unsatisfactory. In addi-
tion, the scope of the liability of experts whose opinions or reports were
included in the prospectus was not sufficiently defined. Further, the
provisions regarding the signing of the prospectus by the directors of
the company and the resulting liability were viewed as unsatisfactory.
The amendments strengthened the system of civil liability for
defective prospectuses. As a starting point, the amended Law extends
liability to any party who signed the prospectus as required under
Section 22 (described above). These parties are liable to any party who
acquired the securities from the offeror, and to any party who pur-
chased or sold such securities in trading on or off the TASE, for any
damages caused to that party as a result of the inclusion of any mis-
leading particular in the prospectus."
The signatories under Section 22 must include the company, a
majority of its directors, any underwriter, and the offeror, when the
offeror is not also the issuer. The change in requirements under Sec-
tion 22 for signatures is noteworthy. Previously, this section required
that all directors of a company sign the prospectus. A case arose in
which a distinct minority group within a board of directors refused to
sign. Although the majority of the directors had approved a public
offering, that public offering never took place due to the objection of
the minority and their ability to frustrate the offering by a failure to
143. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 31(a). Section one of the Securities Law
defines "misleading particular' as including a fact, matter, or omission that would be
likely to mislead a reasonable investor. Although there is some theoretical, academic
debate as to whether there is an implied requirement of materiality, it would appear
that since a reasonable investor would only be likely to be affected by material
matters, materiality is implied. See, e.g., E. KINDERMAN, LIABILITY OF AcCOUNTANTs,
LAWYERS AND DmwcRs AS TO A PROSPECTUS, ROEH HESHBON 402 (1972/1973) (in
Hebrew) (supporting the notion of implied materiality).
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sign. A request for exemptive relief from the Authority was rejected on
the grounds that there was no available statutory authority for the
granting of an exemption in such a case. The amendment to Section 22
was the Knesset's response to this dilemma. However, to negate any
view that a non-signing director could escape liability arising out of
the prospectus, the Law was also amended to provide that all directors
of the company serving on the date that the final prospectus received
approval by the board are deemed, for purposes of liability, to have
signed the prospectus unless they can prove that they either (1) did
not know about the prospectus and ought not to have known about it
or (2) that they submitted a written statement to the Authority imme-
diately upon becoming aware of the presence of a misleading particular
in the prospectus.'" The statute of limitations on such claims is the
earlier of two years from the date of purchase by the plaintiff or seven
years from the date of the prospectus.1"
The Law, as amended in both 1988 and 1990, also overhauled the
provisions surrounding the liability of experts whose opinions, permits,
or reports were included in the prospectus. Despite initial confusion as
to the scope of liability, it now is clear that the liability of such experts
is limited to the information included in the prospectus, permission for
the inclusion of which was received by the offeror prior to their publi-
cation.1" The extent of the liability, the available defenses, and the
limitation period on such claims is identical to those that are estab-
lished for the other signatories.
The Law provides for a number of defenses to potentially liable
parties for including misleading particulars. First, liability will not be
incurred by any party who can prove that he took all necessary steps
to insure that no misleading particulars were included in the area
covered by his liability, that he believed in good faith that no such
particulars were present, and that he fulfilled his obligation to imme-
diately report any particular that might lead the Authority to require
the amendment of the prospectus. 47 A similar complete defense is
available against any plaintiff who knew or ought to have known
about the presence of the misleading particular at the date of his pur-
chase of the securities.1" Third, a defense is available in any case
where the issuer has submitted an immediate report to the Authority
correcting any misleading particular, notification of such correction
was publicized in a fashion similar to the publicity requirement deriv-
ing from the original offering, and the purchaser bought the securities
144. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 31(b)-(c); see also id. § 22 (regarding provi-
sions concerning board approval and signature by the directors).
145. Id. § 31(b).
146. Id. § 32.
147. Id. § 33(1); see also Id. § 25(d) (concerning the report obligation discussed
above).
148. Id. § 33(2).
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after the date of the publication of that notice."" Finally, any individ-
ual who incurs liability as a result of being a signatory, of being
viewed as a signatory for the purposes of liability, or due to his opinion
or report being included in the prospectus, can escape liability if he
submits to the issuer, in writing, notice regarding the correction of any
misleading particular in the document; such a defense is only effective
against a purchaser who acquired the securities more than twenty-four
hours after the submission of such a notice."W If more than one party
is liable to a purchaser under these provisions, the responsible parties
are jointly and severally liable to each injured party. The distribution
of liability among the defendants is governed by the same principles
that control contributions between tortfeasors under the laws of
tort.
15 1
Even in cases where damages may not have been incurred, the
purchaser from the issuer may cancel any purchase made in reliance
on any misleading particular in the prospectus. However, to receive
full refund of the consideration paid, the purchaser must cancel within
a reasonable time after becoming aware of the misleading particular or
after publication of an immediate report regarding the correction of
that misleading particular. The Law limits the right to cancel to two
years following the acquisition. 2 The right to cancel the purchase is
available against an issuer even if the issuer is in the midst of liquida-
tion proceedings.'
Two other areas of civil liability bear mention in this context. The
first concerns the liability of interested parties. In certain circumstanc-
es described below, an interested party, the company, or other entity in
which he holds an interest may be required to submit to the Authority,
the Registrar, the TASE, or to include in the prospectus, certain re-
ports or notices." In such a case, the provisions regarding liability of
signatories and experts for misleading particulars in notices or reports
will also apply to interested parties .'
The second area is the surprisingly wide liability of the issuer to
holders of its securities for any damages suffered as result of the
issuer's violation of any provision of the Law or any regulations made
thereunder, of the Joint Investments Trust Law 1961 or regulations
made thereunder, or of the trust indenture under which the issuer
incurs an obligation towards the trustee in favor of holders of obliga-
149. Id. § 33(3) (1968); see also id. § 23(cX2) (describing the notice procedures
discussed above).
150. Id. § 33(4).
151. Id. § 34(5).
152. Id. § 35(a) (providing for this specially short limitation period).
153. Id. § 35(b).
154. See Id. §§ 36-37 (describing the conditions regarding such reports or notices).
155. Id. § 38B; see also id. § 1 (defining an 'interested party," as described
above).
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tion certificates issued by him.' This liability applies to directors of
the issuer, its general manager, 57 and its controlling parties." It
is not clear how the latter liability will combine with or augment the
other liabilities of the parties in cases where they happen to intersect.
For instance, where a prospectus contains misleading particulars, it is
unclear whether liability would extend to the general manager and
controlling persons. It would be anomalous if the Knesset intended this
result, considering its detailed description of the signing requirements
under Section 22 and the cross-reference in the prospectus liability sec-
tions to those requirements. Yet, the result is hard to avoid under
ordinary rules of statutory interpretation.
It should be noted at this point that the Israeli securities markets
were founded and have for years been controlled by Israel's commercial
banks. Despite major problems involving the banking system and a
government appointed investigatory commission that suggested reform,
Israeli securities markets continue to be dominated by commercial
banks, which have various functions (commercial banking, brokerage,
investment companies and the like). Israel has never had the equiva-
lent of the U.S. Glass-Steagall Act,5 ' although interestingly enough
just as Glass-Steagall is being liberalized and relaxed in the United
States, Israel is considering ways of separating the banking and bro-
kerage functions.
Another important question is the degree of liability extending to
an underwriter that signs a prospectus, and the level of diligence re-
quired by underwriters examining the prospectus. The 1985 case of
Kaufmann v. First Int'l Bank of Israel, decided in the District Court of
Jerusalem, raised some pertinent questions concerning the role of the
underwriter in the case as a secondary issue."e The case dealt with a
claim for damages against the defendant bank, which had originally
planned to serve as underwriter of the plaintiff company's public offer-
ing. After making numerous demands and receiving subsequent partial
concessions regarding the contents of the prospectus, the bank, at the
last moment, decided not to proceed with the underwriting. The bank
claimed that the company and its principals had withheld vital facts
and misrepresented certain circumstances throughout the relevant
period. The bank's withdrawal gave the defendants short notice before
the deadline set by the TASE for the offering expired. As a result, the
public offering was abandoned. The plaintiffs demanded damages for
156. Id. § 52K(a).
157. In other words, using the terminology prevalent in English companies law, a
senior executive officer of the company who is not a director.
158. Id. § 52K(b).
159. This was formally known as the Banking Act of 1933. It forced commercial
banks out of the investment banking business.
160. Kaufmann v. First Int'l Bank of Israel, (1) P.M. 265 (Dist. Ct., Jerusalem
1988).
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losses incurred by the company and its principals in the abortive pub-
lic offering.
The court ruled that the bank had acted in good faith in its nego-
tiations with the company and in its sudden last-minute withdrawal,
despite suspicions that were obviously aroused by the timing of its
actions. The court based its decision on a wide understanding of the
underwriter's civil (Section 31 of the Law) and criminal (Section 53 of
the Law) liability for the contents of the prospectus. Since the under-
writer accepts this wide liability, it must undertake a continuing, dili-
gent examination of the company that encompasses, among other
things, the contents of the prospectus itself, the company's financial
situation, and the suitability of its officers.
Further, the court decided that the general understanding be-
tween an underwriter and a company prior to the offering is just that
and no more. Only upon the signing of the underwriting agreement,
immediately prior to the offering, does the general understanding con-
vert into a legal contractual obligation. As a result, the underwriter
reserves the right to withdraw from the process at any point that it
feels it lacks the requisite confidence of the veracity and accuracy of
the information in the prospectus. The question of good faith in these
situations is of a subjective nature. Due to the suspicious circumstanc-
es encountered throughout the process, the court felt that the under-
writer in this case was justified in its withdrawal, even at a late stage.
Thus, the extent of the underwriter's potential liability required its
due diligence in investigating the company and the prospectus, and it
could subsequently justify its withdrawal if unsatisfied with the re-
sults of such inquiries."
VI. TRUST INDENTURES
The 1988 Amendment added a new chapter providing for the
appointment of a trustee, including the execution of a trust indenture,
before any corporate entity may offer any ordinary or convertible de-
bentures to the investing public."8 2 While certain of these provisions
161. For an interesting comparison of the issues regarding the extent of the
underwriter's civil and criminal liability, see Rubinstein, (1) P.M. at 89, where the
District Court of Tel Aviv-Jaffa, a few short years later, was much less settled and
much less clear on the extent of the underwriter's liability, both civil and criminal,
for contents of the prospectus. The Rubinstein court did not refer to the Kaufmann
case in its proceedings. It did decide, however, that regardless of the extent of the
civil liability of the underwriter - thus requiring underwriters to undertake a wide
investigation - no such conclusions could be reached regarding the scope of its crim-
inal liability.
162. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 35A (establishing that the trust indenture
provisions apply to "certificates of obligation"). This term, in turn, is defined as se-
rial certificates issued by any company or other similar entity that grant to the
holders the right to claim cash payments from the company or entity at a given
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have proved controversial, overall they have been viewed as a positive
step towards increasing the protection of the rights of the investors
with respect to this type of security, where the absence of voting rights
and participation in the affairs of the corporate entity often render the
investors vulnerable.
The Law establishes as an absolute precondition the appointment
of a trustee by a trust indenture in accordance with the terms of the
Trust Law 1979 (the "Trust Law"). ' The Law also provides that the
trustee must be a company registered in Israel and whose main occu-
pation is trusteeship.1' In addition, the trustee must have certain
minimum levels of paid-in capital before it can engage in its business.
It must hold equity in an amount at least equal to the total amount, or
a proportion thereof, of the value of the debentures for which it acts as
trustee, according to such regulations as the Minister, with the approv-
al of the Finance Committee, shall determine.'l Requiring a measure
of paid-in capital, rather than possible alternatives such as the
trustee's total capital or net worth, has proved less than satisfactory.
Establishing one of the suggested alternatives as a minimum standard
could more effectively serve the primary purpose of this particular
provision, insuring the financial stability of the trustee company. Fur-
ther, the Minster, after consulting the Authority and on the approval
of the Finance Committee, is empowered to enact additional regula-
tions regarding the permitted manner of investment of the equity of
the trustee company and the submission of reports to the Authority
regarding such investments and changes thereto."'
The chapter proceeds to detail certain circumstances that serve to
disqualify a company from serving as a trustee; a company is deemed
ineligible if any of the following hold true: (1) a director or officer of
the company is also a director or officer of the issuer, its parent compa-
ny, or of an affiliated company; (2) circumstances exist that suggest
the possibility that conflicts between the interests of the trust compa-
ny, its parent company, or of an affiliated company, and those of the
owners of the debentures may arise; (3) the company has begun wind-
ing-up proceedings or receivership; or (4) the company or a director or
officer thereof have been convicted of an offense that would call their
date or on the occurrence of a specified condition but do not grant a right of mem-
bership or participation in the company or other entity. In addition, the definition
includes certificates that are convertible into shares or other securities that grant
the right to purchase such certificates, to the exclusion of certificates that are issued
by the State or issued under the provisions of a special law. An interesting parallel
to these new provisions is the U.S. Trust Indenture Act of 1939.
163. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 35B(a).
164. Id. § 35C.
165. Id. § 35D(a).
166. Id. § 35D(b).
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credibility into question."6 7
The trust indenture signed by the issuer and the trustee is one of
the central features of the trust mechanism. For the benefit and pro-
tection of the holders, the Law requires the trust indenture to contain
certain terms regarding the activity of the trustee: (1) the total amount
of liability assumed by the issuer in relation to the debentures, includ-
ing a description of and the enforcement capability attached to any
guarantees, liens, or other undertakings that are meant to secure the
liability; (2) the means for the release or exchange of any such guaran-
tees or similar undertakings; (3) the conditions and circumstances
under which the trustee company will be able to demand the immedi-
ate redemption of the debentures or the realization of any guarantees
or similar undertakings which the issuer used to secure its liability; (4)
the obligation of the trustee to call meetings of the debenture holders
and the procedures to be followed in those meetings; (5) the fees to be
paid to the trustee, either as a set sum or as a percentage of the total
of the obligation under the debentures; and (6) any other matter re-
quired in regulations that the Minister may enact, after consultation
with the Authority and with the approval of the Finance Commit-
tee." ' The Law further protects holders by stating that changes to
the trust indenture may only be made if either the trustee is convinced
that the change does not adversely affect the interests of the holders,
or the holders, at a general meeting, approve of the proposed change
by special resolution.'"
The Law provides a detailed description of the obligations of the
trustee with respect to the debenture holders. As a general principle,
the trustee must act in the best interests of all of the holders. 7 ' Fur-
ther, the trustee is assigned wide responsibility with regard to taking
all necessary steps to insure, before the payment of any monies in
consideration of the debentures, the validity of any guarantees or simi-
lar undertakings from the issuer or any third party in favor of the
holders; in addition, the trustee must ascertain and is responsible to
the holders for the accuracy of the description of these matters in the
prospectus by which the debentures are offered to the public. 1 ' If the
trustee becomes aware of any material violation of the terms of the
trust indenture on the part of the issuer, it must notify the holders of
the violation and of the steps taken by it to prevent such violation or
167. Id. § 35E.
168. Id. § 35F.
169. Id. § 35G. The meeting must be attended by holders representing at least
fifty percent of the outstanding balance of face value of the relevant series of deben-
tures. Alternatively, an adjourned meeting must include the representation of at
least ten percent of that balance.
170. Id. § 35H(a).
171. Id. § 35H(b).
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to insure that the issuer fulfills its obligations." Although not grant-
ed the right to vote, the trustee must attend and participate in the
general meetings of the issuer in order to assure the representation of
the interests of the holders."' Also, specific provisions are made for
the preparation of the annual trusteeship report and the availability
for inspection thereof by the holders of the debentures. 7' Lastly, the
trustee company is obligated to represent the holders in any matters
arising from the obligations that the issuer has assumed towards
them. 175
The trustee is granted the legal right to receive such reports as
the issuer may be required to submit to the Authority, in addition to
receiving copies of any documents that the issuer may send to its share
or debenture holders. Further, the issuer is obligated to turn over any
information reasonably requested by the trustee." In addition, the
Minister is authorized to adopt regulations regarding special reports
that the issuer may be required to submit to the trustee regarding the
guarantees and similar undertakings that the issuer has given to se-
cure its liability to the holders.'77 As is clear, the lawmakers have re-
quired the issuer to cooperate with the trustee, in a number of re-
spects, in order to insure that the protection of the investors is not
sacrificed due to a scarcity of information flowing between the two
parties to the trust indenture.
In order to avoid the possibility of conflicts of interest, the Law
provides that the trustee is not permitted to acquire or hold, for its
own account, any of the debentures of the series for which it is acting
as trustee. In addition, the trustee is disqualified from holding for its
own account any securities of the issuer, its parent company, its sub-
sidiary, or of an affiliated company."' For similar reasons, the trust-
ee is excluded from executing any transactions on behalf of another
party, by way of a power of attorney that grants freedom of discretion,
in relation to any securities for which it is serving as trustee.'
In order .to insure that the interests of the holders are not compro-
mised, the Law provides that the actions of the trustee are valid re-
gardless of any defects discovered in regard to its appointment or qual-
ifications."w In addition, the Law sets specific conditions regarding
the termination of the service or the resignation of the trustee. A trust-
ee may resign by written notification to the party who appointed him;
172. Id. § 35H(c).
173. Id. § 35H(d).
174. Id. § 35H(e).
175. Id. § 351.
176. Id. § 35J(a).
177. Id. § 35J(b).
178. Id. § 35K.
179. Id. § 35L.
180. Id. § 35M.
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however, the resignation is only effective if approved by the court and
only from the date of such approval. 81 Further, the term of the trust-
ee is automatically concluded if the trustee fails to continue to meet
any of the qualifications set out above, including those related to min-
imum equity.182 The Law also grants power to the court to dismiss a
trustee if it fails to fulfill its duties properly, or if the court sees fit to
do so for other reasons.' s Finally, the holders of ten percent of the
outstanding balance of the face value of a particular series of deben-
tures may call a general meeting to initiate an action to dismiss the
trustee. At the general meeting, the holders may remove a trustee by a
vote of fifty-percent of the outstanding balance.' On the expiration
of the term of the trustee, the court may appoint a replacement for a
term and under such conditions as it sees fit; in the interim period, the
trustee whose term has expired continues to serve as trustee.""
The Authority is also granted a role as to these matters. The Au-
thority is authorized to apply to the court with regard to any of the
provisions described in the preceding paragraph." However, the
Authority's role, as protector of the holders in court proceedings, is not
limited to the period surrounding the expiration of the trustee's term.
The Authority and the TASE must be informed, in writing, of the com-
mencement of any court proceedings to which the trustee is a par-
ty.187 When the chairman of the Authority believes that the interests
of the holders are liable to be affected or involved in such civil proceed-
ings before the court, he may appear in those proceedings and have his
say regarding the matter.1' This is a rare instance, but not the only
one, in which the Law specifically assigns a responsibility to the chair-
man of the Authority and not to the Authority as such.
In short, 'the Law requires an effective mechanism by which the
trustee arrangements are implemented in order to protect the interests
of the investing public. Through the provisions outlining the obliga-
tions of the various parties, including the provision of information to
the trustee by the issuer and the trustee's participation in the issuer's
general meetings, the holder of a debenture is offered a level of protec-
tion heretofore unavailable under Israeli law.
181. Id. § 35N(b).
182. Id. § 35N(a). The disqualifications are enumerated in Sections 35C, 35D(a), &
35E of the Securities Law.
183. Id. § 35N(c).
184. Id. § 35N(d).
185. Id. § 35N(e).
186. Id. § 35N(g).
187. Id. § 350(a).
188. Id. § 350(b).
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VII. CoNTiNuous DISCLOSURE
A. In General
The Authority's responsibilities do not end after a public offering
is effected. Instead, the Authority has a continuing responsibility to
insure fair practice on the part of companies whose securities are held
by the public. As a result, the Law and the related regulations provide
for a system of reports to the Authority and the TASE on a periodic
basis and on the occurrence of certain events, in order to facilitate
continuing supervision by the Authority and the TASE and to furnish
vital information to the investing public. These reports in a broad
sense follow the pattern of periodic reporting called for by the U.S. Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934.
Any entity whose securities have been offered to the public by
prospectus and are still held by public investors must submit reports
to the Authority and to the Registrar of Companies. If the securities
concerned are also traded or registered to be traded on the Stock Ex-
change, such documentation must also be sent to the TASE."9 Be-
cause of the special structure of Israeli tax law, which provides for
total exemption from capital gains tax where securities are listed on
the TASE, essentially all publicly traded securities are listed and, as a
practical matter, essentially all reports are rendered to the TASE as
well."9
The underlying purpose of these provisions is to facilitate a regu-
lar flow of information about public companies to investors and poten-
tial investors, based on the overriding doctrine of disclosure of any
information that the reasonable investor who is considering the pur-
chase or sale of securities would consider important.'91 This doctrine,
like the principle behind disclosure of information in the prospectus,
reflects the Law's goal to protect the interests of the investing public
by furnishing it with a continuous flow of information about companies
extending beyond the issuance of a prospectus. As a result, the Law
adopts the same general guidelines for the regulations concerning
current reports as for those concerning prospectuses." The Authority
is also empowered to demand further particulars from the company
regarding information contained in the reports or to require additions
or amendments to the reports where the Authority deems it neces-
sary.
193
189. Id. § 36(a).
190. In August 1994, the Government announced its intention to tax TASE gains
as of January 1995; that action will require legislation.
191. Id. § 36(b)-(c).
192. Id. § 36(c); see also id. § 17(b) (providing the guidelines concerning the pro-
spectus regulations, as discussed above).
193. Id. § 36(d)-(g).
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The 1988 Amendments to the Law established a framework en-
abling the Authority to issue temporary directives to specific compa-
nies whose shares are traded publicly. The Authority may also issue
directives of general application regarding the inclusion of certain par-
ticulars in the reports. The Authority may, if necessary to protect the
investing public, issue a directive to a company specifying the manner
of presentation of a certain particular in the company's annual finan-
cial, current, or immediate reports, as long as instructions regarding
this issue are not already in force by power of regulations made under
Sections 17 and 36 or by accepted reporting or accounting princi-
ples.1" If the Authority believes that the interests of the public thus
require, it may issue such instructions as temporary directives for all
reporting bodies, made public in accordance with a method established
by the Authority's Chairman.'"
Directives issued by the Authority are effective for one year and
may be renewed, on the approval of the Minister, for another year.'
Presumably to ensure the fair and uniform application of these provi-
sions, the Authority is required, within sixty days, to issue such a
general directive if it has issued individual instructions with respect to
a specific matter to more than one company.19 Finally, as represen-
tative of an interested party in these directives, the President of the
Israeli Chamber of Accountants is granted a statutory right to state
his opinion to the Authority on the relevant provisions, both before the
general directives are issued and before they can be extended. In re-
turn, the Chamber of Accountants may publicize an opinion regarding
the directives while they are in effect only with the permission of the
Authority. 1
B. Regulations Regarding Reports
The principal regulations that have been promulgated under the
authority of Sections 17 and 36 of the Law are the Securities Regula-
tions (Periodic and Immediate Reports) 1970 (the "1970 Regulations)
and the newly issued Securities Regulations (Preparation of Annual
Financial Reports) 1993 (the "Annual Report Regulations"). While each
of these sets of regulations will be examined in turn, it is clearly be-
yond the scope of this article to engage in a discussion of the minute
technical details of the regulations. A discussion of general principles,
with a focus on legal, as opposed to technical, aspects, follows.
The 1970 Regulations establish the timing, manner, and content
of the various periodic and immediate reports that are required to be
194. Id. § 36A(a).
195. Id. § 36A(b).
196. Id. § 36A(c).
197. Id. § 36A(d).
198. Id. § 36A(e).
446 VOL. 22:2,3
ISRAELI SECURITIES LAW
submitted to the authorities. In general, the reports must be legible
and constructed in a manner prescribed in these regulations and must
be signed by the company before their submission to the Authority and
the Registrar.'"
C. Periodic Reports
Chapter two of the 1970 Regulations establishes the framework
for the submission of annual reports on the part of companies whose
securities have been offered to the public by prospectus or are traded
on the TASE.' The date for the submission of the annual reports is
fixed as within four months of the end of the company's accounting
year, provided that the report is presented by the date of the earlier of
at least fourteen days before the date set for the general meeting at
which the financial report of the company will be presented or within
fourteen days of the date of signing of the accountant's opinion and of
the audited reports of the company."1 The particulars that are de-
tailed below as requiring inclusion in these reports should be divided
into separate statements regarding the accounting year which they
cover and regarding the remainder of the report period.'
The first area covered by the regulations is the inclusion of finan-
cial reports of the company.' The regulations require the presenta-
tion of properly audited annual financial reports as of the date when
the accounting year of the company ended, drawn up in accordance
with the 1993 Regulations.' In addition, the company must include
199. Securities Regulations (Periodic and Immediate Reports) 5730-1970, §§ 2, 3, 5
(1970) (Isr.) [hereinafter 1970 Regulations].
200. Id. § 2.
201. Id. § 7.
202. Id. § 8. Section 6 of the 1970 Regulations defines "report period" as the
period beginning and ending with the respective start and final dates of the
company's fiscal year, as long as the report is submitted within three months of the
end of that year. If, however, the report is not submitted until after that three
month period, then the report period includes the time period until the date of the
report. This is, in turn, defined as the date of the signing of the periodic report,
provided that it is within fourteen days of its being sent to the Registrar and the
Authority.
203. Section one of the 1970 Regulations defines "financial reports" as including
the balance sheet, profittloss statement, report on changes in the company's equity,
report on changes to its financial situation, and explanatory notes.
204. 1970 Regulations, supra note 199, § 9(a). Section 65 of the 1993 Regulations
repealed previous Securities Regulations, Preparation of Financial Reports (1969). As
a result, Section 67 of the 1993 Regulations provided an interim measure by which
corporate entities could submit annual financial reports drawn in accordance with
the repealed regulations as part of their periodic reports. These reports are submit-
ted before February 28, 1993, and contain financial reports for the accounting year
ending December 31, 1992. Obviously, the interim measures are no longer effective
and all references to annual financial reports made in the Law and the Regulations
now refer to the 1993 Regulations, discussed below.
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a dated and signed opinion of the accountant for the company regard-
ing the audited financial statements of the company and its consoli-
dated financial statements, including confirmation of their confor-
mance with the provisions of the 1993 Regulations.' A similar opin-
ion of an accountant must be included regarding the financial report of
any subsidiaries whose reports were attached to the reports of the
company.'
Another area that must be covered by the periodic report is the
use made of the funds raised by the sale of the securities offered by the
last prospectus published before the date of the report. In general, the
report must provide a breakdown of the various objectives specified in
the prospectus and the status of progress made towards achieving
these objectives.' Such a breakdown must be included in the period-
ic report of the company until all of the funds received pursuant to the
offering have been expended and until a report that specifies the final
breakdown of the application of the consideration has been submit-
ted.u
Furthermore, the report must include an itemized description of
the investments of the company in any of its subsidiaries or affiliated
companies, with particular attention paid to the changes in these in-
vestments over the report period and the essential terms of the trans-
actions that brought about such changes.' In addition, the report
must include the profit/loss statement of each of the relevant subsid-
iaries and affiliated companies, adjusted as to the date of the
company's annual financial statement, particularly specifying the divi-
dend payments, management fees, and interest payments that the
company has received or is due to receive from these other compa-
nies.210
If the granting of loans is one of the main business pursuits of the
company, then the report must include a detailed list outlining the
categories of loans and the outstanding balances owed to the compa-
ny. 2 1 Also, details surrounding the occurrence of any special event
that occurred during the report period that, in the opinion of the direc-
tors of the company, has had or is likely to have a material effect on
the profits, assets, or liabilities of the company, must be divulged.212
205. 1970 Regulations, supra note 199, § 9(b).
206. Id. § 9(c).
207. Id. § 10A(a)-(c).
208. Id. § 1OA(d).
209. Id. §§ 11-12.
210. Id. § 13. Section 1 of the 1970 Regulations defines the term "adjusted" as
referring to a multiplication to give effect to changes in the Consumer Price Index
(including fruits and vegetables) as published by the Central Bureau of Statistics or
to changes in the foreign currency exchange rate.
211. Id. § 14.
212. Id. § 15.
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Along the same lines, the company must report on any changes in its
registered, issued, or paid-up capital during the report period." Fur-
ther details that must be included regarding the outstanding capital of
the company include the terms of any issues of shares for which full
consideration in cash was not received and the particulars of any op-
tions for the purchase of securities of the company which were grant-
ed.' Lastly, details of the registration of the company's securities for
trading on the TASE or the termination of such trading during the
report period must be explained..1 5
The report must also include certain information regarding some
of the internal transactions of the company. The report must detail
any salaries and benefits, received or due to be received, by any inter-
ested party in the company, either directly or indirectly, from the com-
pany, any subsidiary, or any affiliated company. However, the overall
payments made to the directors and to the general manager, as long as
they do not deviate from accepted standards, can be reported as a total
sum rather than in an itemized form for each individual.1 The na-
ture of any interest that an interested party in the company has or
had in any transaction during the report period in which the company,
its subsidiary, or affiliated company was a party thereto, unless such
transaction was undertaken in the ordinary course of business of the
company, must also be included.1 7 Similarly, the report must de-
scribe the parties and substantive content of any material agreement
made during the report period, unless the agreement can be described
as being in the company's ordinary course of business. This includes,
but is not limited to, any agreement under which a party consents to
serve as underwriter to a public offering or as a trustee for an offering
of corporate debentures."1
The last general area covered by the regulations regards the dis-
closure of information regarding various individuals who are involved
213. Id. § 16.
214. Id. §§ 17-18.
215. Id. § 20.
216. Id. § 22. Section one of the 1970 Regulations establishes that the definition
of "interested party" is the same as that given in Section one of the Securities Law.
The Companies Ordinance, Amendment 6 (1983) (New Version), however, made a
change by expanding the reporting of payments made to the five officers with the
highest salaries in the company. The amended provision requires that the company
includes in its periodic reports the total payments and benefits, including any cash
or cash equivalent, loans, securities or any credit or benefits, made to these five
individuals during the report period, that are not a result of the officer's capacity as
a shareholder alone. The report must specify all payments made during that period,
including any termination benefits. These details must be included regardless of
whether the payment was made by the company itself or by one of its subsidiaries,
affiliated companies or parent, and whether the payment was made to the officer
himself or to another person on his behalf.
217. Id. § 23.
218. Id. § 25.
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as shareholders or officers of the company. The required list of share-
holders must include only the nature and quantity of the holdings of
interested parties in the reporting entity and in its subsidiaries and af-
filiated companies."' For the purposes of this section, the regulations
establish that the manager of any investment fund be considered as
the holder of the securities in the fund's assets and that a subsidiary
be automatically considered an interested party.' In addition, the
report must list the directors of the company along with a variety of
personal and professional information regarding each of them. Perhaps
the most significant item, from the investor's viewpoint, is the disclo-
sure, to the best of the company's and its directors' knowledge, of any
familial relation between the listed directors and any interested party
in the company.2"' A slightly less detailed description of the re-
maining ranking officers in the company must also be included along
with a disclosure of the accountants of the company and any interest
or office of rank held by the auditor or his partner or by a relative of
one of those in the company.'
Interest has been expressed in regulating the benefits granted to
interested parties. On January 13, 1994, Dan Tichon, a senior member
of the Knesset, advised the press that he is preparing a proposed pri-
vate law that would restrict the attractiveness of options that could be
granted by a company to interested parties in a public offering context
by requiring that the exercise price of such options be at least at a
price equal to 95% of the public offering price of the underlying
shares.'
The regulations concerning periodic reports conclude with the
listing of certain miscellaneous information that must be included.
Examples include the address and telephone number of the relevant
entity and description of any changes made to the Memorandum or
Articles of Association of the company during the report period.'
Lastly, both the recommendations of the board of directors before the
general meeting and decisions of the directors that do not require the
219. Id. § 24(a)-(b).
220. Id. § 24(c).
221. Id. § 26. Section one of the 1970 Regulations defines the term "Relative" in
the same way as does Section 52A of the Securities Law. However, no definition of
the term is given there. It is likely that the regulations intend to refer to Section
one of the Securities Law, which defines "relative* as "a spouse or a sibling, parent,
grandparent, offspring, or spouse's offspring or a spouse of any of these."
222. Id. §§ 26A, 27. The term "ranking officer' is defined in Section one of the
1970. Regulations as including "the directors, general manager, vice- and deputy-
general manager, accountant, internal auditor, and any person who fulfills such
duties under a different title; also, any other employee of the entity who holds five
percent or more of either the outstanding nominal share value or of the voting pow-
er of the body."
223. HA'ARETL, Jan. 14, 1994, at IC.
224. 1970 Regulations, supra note 199, §§ 25A, 28.
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approval of the general meeting regarding the following matters must
be included in the report: (i) the distribution of any dividends or bonus
shares; (ii) changes in the registered or issued capital of the entity; (iii)
changes in the Memorandum or Articles of Association of the company;
(iv) the redemption of shares; (v) the early redemption of debentures;
and (vi) any transaction between the company and an interested party
in it if the transaction does not conform to market conditions.' In
addition, decisions of the general meeting that do not accord with the
recommendations of the directors about the above-listed matters must
be stated, along with a disclosure of any decisions taken at extraordi-
nary general meetings and any decisions, copies of which must, under
law, be sent to the Registrar.2
D. Immediate Reports
In addition to the regular periodic reports, companies are required
to submit immediate reports to the Authority and to the Registrar
under certain circumstances. Generally, the report must be furnished
to the relevant authorities as near as possible to the date of the perti-
nent event occurring or the company's becoming aware of such an
occurrence; in all cases, the report must be made within seven days of
the occurrence of the event and must be submitted before the germane
information is made public by the company or its directors.' For the
sake of clarification, the regulations state that publicizing the infor-
mation on the TASE does not exempt the company from its obligations
under this Law.' The regulations continue by establishing a residu-
al discretion for the Authority to request that an immediate report be
submitted regarding any event that the Authority considers to be im-
portant to the reasonable investor, despite the absence of a particular
provision in these regulations requiring a report on such an occa-
sion.'
The regulations proceed to identify a long list of events that trig-
ger an obligation under this section. The first such event is a change in
the issued share capital of the company, otherwise than by a public
offering pursuant to a prospectus. When a change occurs, the company
must describe it and identify the consideration paid or to be paid for
such an issue of securities.' Similar information must be reported
in cases where the company grants options or rights to purchase any of
225. Id. § 29(a).
226. Id. § 29(b)-(c).
227. Id. § 30(a)-(b). Section 30(c) of the 1970 Regulations creates an exception for
reports under Section 37(a), which refers to decisions or recommendations of the
board of directors to the general meeting, that must be submitted within two days
of the decision or recommendation being adopted.
228. Id. § 30(b).
229. Id. § 30A.
230. Id. § 31.
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its securities."
The next group of regulations covers the holdings of and transac-
tions involving interested parties in the company. The first such re-
quirement arises in situations where a change has occurred in the
holdings of an interested party in any of the categories of securities
issued by the company, its subsidiaries, or an affiliated company.
When such a change occurs, the company must file a detailed report
that includes the following: (1) the name of the interested party; (2)
the identity of the relevant security; (3) the date of the change; (4) the
manner of the change occurring (e.g. by sale, purchase, bonus shares,
etc.); (5) if the change was through acquisition or sale, then whether it
was by way of trading on the TASE or outside of that framework, and
if the change was by way of acquisition from an issue, whether such
issue was to the public or by way of rights; (6) the number of securities
held by the interested party both before and after the relevant change;
(7) the price at which the change was executed and the total consider-
ation received, including details of any arrangements for deferred pay-
ment; (8) the date, where relevant, for the delayed transfer of the secu-
rities; (9) the total proportion of the outstanding share capital of the
company held by the interested party after the change; and (10) the
total proportion of the voting power in the company held by such a
party after the change. 2 Similar details must be provided, in addi-
tion to a description of the person's address and itemized holdings in
the company, its subsidiaries, and affiliated companies, when such a
person first becomes an interested party in the company.'
Various stages of reporting also surround the execution of a trans-
action between a company and a party interested in it. When negoti-
ations between parties begin, the company must inform the Authority
immediately regarding the contemplated transaction (the sides in-
volved, its nature, size, and other details), if the proposed bargain is
not pursuant to market conditions.' The Authority has the discre-
tion to require the company, within a specified period, to submit a full,
immediate report to the Authority and to the Registrar regarding the
progress of the negotiations.' Finally, upon completion of the con-
templated transaction, the company is obligated to fie a further report
231. Id. § 32.
232. Id. § 33(a). Note that an additional immediate report, including reasons for
such, must be submitted if the conditions regarding deferred payment or delayed
transfer of title are not fulfilled in accordance with the conditions described in the
initial report.
233. Id. § 33(b). Section 33(c) of the 1970 Regulations provides that for the pur-
poses of this section, a subsidiary of a company is deemed to be a party interested
in it. See, e.g., Israel v. Elman, (1) P.M. 343 (1990) (dealing with a violation of the
provisions of this section).
234. 1970 Regulations, supra note 197, § 33A(a).
235. Id. § 33A(b).
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to the authorities.'
The next area covered by the regulations concerns changes in
certain personnel of the company. If a ranking officer or alternate
director ceases to be employed, then the name of such an individual,
the vacated position, and the date of his departure must be reported;
further, the report must indicate either that the circumstances sur-
rounding the departure are not of a type that need to be brought to the
attention of the shareholders or that the circumstances, which must
then be specified, are in fact of such a variety. 7 Conversely, if an
individual is appointed to a position of a ranking officer or alternate
director, an immediate report must be filed, including, as the case may
be, the same personal and professional details concerning that individ-
ual that must accompany the list of directors or the list of ranking
officers submitted as part of the periodic report.'
The same dual scheme exists for immediate reports upon the
termination of the employment of and the appointment of accountants
of the entity. On the one hand, if an accountant ceases to be employed
by the company, the name and the date of his departure must be in-
cluded. In addition, the report must include a statement either that
the circumstances surrounding the departure are not of the type that
need to be brought to the attention of the shareholders or that the
circumstances, which then must be detailed, are of that nature. 9 On
the other hand, if an accountant is appointed, a report must be filed
that includes the name and address of the new accountant, the date of
the appointment, and the fact, if relevant, that the accountant, one of
his partners, or a relative of either is an interested party or ranking
officer in the company.' °
The regulations then list a variety of miscellaneous situations that
also require the submission of an immediate report. One such example
is a report on the failure or the delay in the implementation of one or
more of the objectives of the use of the consideration listed in a pro-
spectus."1 Further, a company must report on the date, place, and
planned agenda for the calling of a general meeting, including special
meetings called under Companies Ordinance (New Version) 1983.4
In addition, a company must file an immediate report outlining the
recommendations of the directors before the general meeting and deci-
sions of the directors not requiring further approval regarding the fol-
236. Id. § 33A(c).
237. Id. § 34(a).
238. Id. § 34(b); see also id. §§ 26, 26A (providing the required details regarding
directors and other ranking officers).
239. Id. § 35(a).
240. Id. § 35(b); see also supra note 221 (discussing the definition of "Relative").
241. Id. § 36A.
242. Id. § 36B (referring to Companies Ordinance §§ 109-110 (1983) (New Ver-
sion).
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lowing matters: (i) any distributions of dividend payments or bonus
shares; (ii) changes in the issued or registered capital of the capital;
(iii) amendments to the Memorandum or Articles of Association of the
company; (iv) the redemption of shares; (v) the early redemption of
debentures; (vi) the exercise of any right that the company reserved in
the prospectus to make changes to the objectives of the consideration
of an issue of securities; and (vii) any transaction between the compa-
ny and an interested party, other than in accordance with market
conditions.' A report must also be filed describing any decisions of
the general meeting regarding the foregoing matters if the meeting has
not acted in accordance with the recommendations of the board.'
Lastly, a company must submit an immediate report concerning rec-
ommendations of the board of directors to an extraordinary general
meeting, in addition to any recommendations of the board concerning
the adoption of any decision, a copy of which must be sent, by law, to
the Registrar.'
The final, and perhaps most significant, situation that demands
the submission of an immediate report is described in a broadly cast
provision covering the reporting of "special occurrences." Any extraor-
dinary event that has occurred otherwise than in the ordinary course
of business of the company must be reported if the event has had or is
likely to have material effect on the profits, assets, or liabilities of the
company.2" Similarly, the company must immediately inform the Au-
thority of the conduct of negotiations outside the ordinary course of
business that will likely lead to the occurrence of such an extraordi-
nary event; the Authority is empowered to request a full report on
those negotiations if it feels that such is necessary for the protection of
the investors.2 7 Further, the company is obligated to file an immedi-
ate report upon signing any contract or memorandum of understanding
regarding a material matter if it is executed outside the ordinary
course of business.' However, the regulations add a proviso that the
requirements of this section regarding the report of special occurrences
do not apply if the relevant event has been well-publicized, unless the
event has extraordinary effect on the business of the company, in
which case a report is still required."
243. 1970 Regulations, supra note 199, § 37(a). Note the similarities between the
Section 37 of the 1970 Regulations and the provisions, described above, regarding
periodic reports.
244. Id. § 37(b).
245. Id. § 37(c).
246. Id. § 36(a).
247. Id. § 36(b).
248. Id. § 36(c).
249. Id. § 36(d). The vague tests established by this section have the obvious
potential to create difficulties in interpretation. It is hoped that the combined appli-
cation of common sense by the Authority, the courts, and the companies involved in
these matters will prevent these difficulties from giving rise to litigation.
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E. Interim Financial Reports
The final topic covered by the 1970 Regulations is interim finan-
cial reports. "Interim reports" are defined as interim consolidated fi-
nancial reports of the company that must be prepared on a calendar
quarterly basis. With regard to a company that is not obligated to
draw up consolidated reports under accepted bookkeeping principles,
the term "interim report" refers to the interim reports of the company
alone.' The relevant interim reports must be submitted to the Au-
thority and the Registrar, as well as the TASE if the securities of the
entity are traded there, within two months of the date of the report
and no more than ten days after it was signed by the company.21
The interim reports must be prepared in accordance with general-
ly accepted accounting principles governing such reports and should
follow the detailed format provided in the first three schedules at-
tached to the regulations. 2 The notes to the reports must include
the following: (i) the seasonal effect on the reported results; (ii) the
description of any changes in accounting methods adopted since the
last annual reports and the resultant financial effect of such changes;
(iii) deferred expenses in the interim report, indicating any similar
expenses from the last accounting year which were not deferred in the
last annual report; and (iv) any new presentation or recategorization in
the interim reports as opposed to the last annual reports and any
resulting financial effects of the changes.' If the last annual report
of a company included the financial reports of a non-consolidated sub-
sidiary or of an affiliate, then the interim reports of such a subsidiary
or affiliate for the same period must also be attached to the company's
interim reports unless the Authority, in its discretion, excuses the
company from fulfilling this obligation due to the apparent inability of
the company to comply with this regulation.'
If the company presents its interim reports in an abridged form,
then the notes must include a detailed profit/loss report in nominal
terms.' Further, if the company acquired or amalgamated with an-
other company during the report period, then the effect, if it is mate-
rial, of such an event on the interim report should be indicated. 6
Similarly, the report must disclose any material transactions entered
250. Id. § 38; see also Section 5 of the 1993 Regulations regarding consolidated
reports.
251. Id. § 39.
252. Id. § 40(a) and Schedules 1-3. The format provided in the schedules includes
sample reports for the three, six, and nine month periods covered by the respective
interim reports.
253. Id. § 40(b).
254. Id. § 42.
255. Id. § 43.
256. Id. § 44.
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into with an associated party, as defined by generally accepted ac-
counting principles, during the period between the last annual report
and the date of the signing of the interim report.2 67
The completed report must be approved by the board of directors
of the company or by a committee of the board authorized to act. Be-
fore submission, the report must be signed, in the name of the compa-
ny, by the chairman of the board of directors or by the managing di-
rector and by the chief financial officer." Finally, the company's ac-
countant must approve the interim report and certify the completion of
a review of the report. The review should be filed with the Registrar,
the Authority, and the TASE; if the review included any reservations
on the part of the accountant, then those must be specified."
F. Annual Financial Reports
The 1993 Regulations, adopted pursuant to Sections 17(b)(1) and
36 of the Law, represent a significant effort to tighten accounting prac-
tices of Israeli public companies.' The 1993 regulations, some inter-
im transitional provisions notwithstanding, repeal the previous regula-
tions that covered this topic, Securities Regulations (Preparation of
Financial Reports) 1969.261
The general goal in instituting the new regulations was to update,
the accounting regulations and fully to adopt, as a rule, the principles
that govern modern accounting practices in industrialized countries.
While the extensive 1993 Regulations contain this important frame-
work for the overhaul of the current system, a detailed study of the
minute details is well beyond the scope of this article. The following
examination is confined to a review of some of the guiding principles
behind the enactment and a more detailed study of a few of the provi-
sions that carry special significance for legal practitioners.
The principle of modernization finds particular expression in the
overall requirement for more detailed and more specific reporting of
expenses and profits alike." 2 Furthermore, the Authority insisted on
257. Id. § 45.
258. Id. § 46.
259. Id. § 47. Although the regulations do not state as such, it is assumed that
the requirement to send the survey report to the TASE will only apply in such cas-
es where the interim report itself must be sent to the TASE (i.e. where the securi-
ties of the entity are traded or registered for trading on the stock exchange).
260. The provisions of these regulations, as stated in Section 66(a) of the 1993
Regulations, generally went into effect with regard to the annual reports for the
year that ended December 31, 1992. Section 66(b) of the 1993 Regulations allows for
an exception for Section 64(2)-(3), dealing with income from and transactions with
interested parties, which did not take effect until the reporting year that ended
December 31, 1993.
261. 1993 Regulations, supra note 77, § 66-67.
262. Id. §§ 46-58.
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the adoption of a uniform format for all annual reports, from which
any deviations must be accompanied by an explanatory notice.' Pre-
viously, under the repealed 1969 regulations, it was often left to the
company's accountants to decide on the format of the statements, mak-
ing comparison and examination by non-professionals difficult, if not
impossible. In addition, the 1993 Regulations attempt to provide a gen-
eral mechanism for the uniform definition of the concept of "materiali-
ty" that governs much of the determination of what information is to
be included in or excluded from the statements. Instead of the decision
being left to each accountant on a case-by-case basis, the regulations
were designed to remove the uncertainty of such a procedure by pro-
viding, wherever possible, detailed rules regarding this matter.'
Chapter 8 of the regulations deserves special attention due to its
approach to the issue of interested parties. The term "interested party"
is defined as (i) one who holds at least five percent of the outstanding
share capital or voting rights of the company; (ii) one who may appoint
a director or general-manager of the company or one who serves in
such a capacity; or (iii) a corporate body in which a person described in
(i) or (ii) holds twenty-five of the outstanding share capital or voting
rights therein or may appoint twenty-five percent or more of its direc-
tors.' Previously, the reporting of dealings with such parties was
governed by scattered provisions of the now-repealed 1969 regulations.
Perhaps the realization that the detailed presentation of such transac-
tions was essential to accomplish full and proper disclosure of company
finances led to provision of specified and detailed rules for the report-
ing of such activities in the company's financial statements.'
Without becoming entangled in the intricate details that are best
understood by the accountants, it is possible to take a quick glance at
the general provisions in this area. The statements must, in detailed
fashion, reflect both the company's obligations to such parties and its
investments in them. While the obligations of the company and its
consolidated companies must be divided into sections reflecting long-
term and short-term liabilities, the investments of the company and its
consolidated companies in the interested party are defined to include
capital investments (such as investment in securities and loans) as
well as the giving of guaranties for such party's debts."7 Similarly,
detailed procedures are set out for the report of benefits and payments
paid to, and transactions with, such interested parties by the company
263. Id. § 8.
264. For examples of this trend in the 1993 Regulations, see §§ 37, 45, and 64,
among others.
265. Section 1 of the 1993 Regulations refers to the definition of "interested par-
ty" contained in Section 1 of the Securities Law.
266. 1993 Regulations, supra note 77, §§ 62-64.
267. Id. §§ 62-63.
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and its consolidated companies.'
One of the principles upon which the new regulations are based is
clearly investor security and tighter corporate regulation. Both the
uniform format and the detailed reporting required will allow for closer
scrutiny of companies' actions. This trend is not unique to accounting
regulations; similar interests have been the driving force behind much
of the recent legislation in the area of company law.' As in these
other areas, the lawmakers and the regulatory authorities have shown
a willingness to modernize the sometimes outdated framework provid-
ed under previous enactments.
G. Other Provisions
After a digression concerning the regulations regarding the sub-
mission of certain reports to various authorities, the analysis returns
to the Law itself. After establishing the framework for the enactment
of the regulations and other forms of directives, the Law states that in
a case where the prospectus for the offering of debentures to the public
(covered by Section 35A of the Law) includes the financial statements
of a company that gave guarantees for the fulfillment of the obligations
under the debentures, then the provisions regarding reports to the
various regulatory bodies will also apply to that company for as long
as the guarantees are still effective."'
Further, the Law provides for a framework by which a company
may be exempted from reporting certain particulars required under
this chapter. The Authority is empowered to exempt the disclosure of a
certain particular if, in its opinion, the exemption is justified for the
protection of trade secrets of the company, as long as such a particular
is not of the variety that would deter potential reasonable investors if
it had been included in the report." In addition, the District Court,
on application, can grant an exemption from the disclosure in a report
of a particular if such a disclosure is likely to harm national security,
the State economy, or a continuing investigation of the police or the
Authority, if, respectively, the Minister of Defense, Minister of Fi-
nance, Minister of Police, or the chairman of the Authority, or their
designee, certifies the possibility of such harm being suffered. In such
cases, the Attorney General is to act as respondent to the applications
before the court. 2 If an exemption is granted under this section,
268. Id. § 64.
269. See, e.g., Companies Ordinance, Amendments 4-7 (New Version) 1983.
270. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 36B.
271. Id. § 36C(a). The conditions in this provision are identical to those stated in
§ 19(aXl) regarding exemptions from publication of particulars in a prospectus.
272. Id. § 36C(b). The conditions here are copied from § 19(aX2) regarding exemp-
tions from the prospectus disclosure.
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then this fact must be noted in the relevant report."'
Because of the extensive responsibilities placed on the company to
report particulars, some of which are outside of its control, the Law
provides certain mechanisms, especially in regard to interested parties,
by which the company is assisted in obtaining the necessary informa-
tion to fulfill accurately its obligations. The Law places an obligation
on any interested party to affect a timely submission to the company of
such particulars as are necessary to allow the company to complete its
duty under Section 36. If the securities of the interested party are held
by a trustee, and the trustee has submitted such information, then the
interested party is free from his obligation. Similarly, a report by the
interested party exempts the trustee from any such obligation. 4
The District Court is also given a role in insuring the proper sub-
mission of reports to the Authority. On application of the Authority,
the court may issue an order requiring that the company and its direc-
tors, within a time set by the court, submit or amend a report or at-
tached opinion, if the entity has failed to properly and fully fulfill any
of its reporting obligations. When necessary, the court may also order
that an interested party file his particulars with the company as pro-
vided in Section 37. Further, the company itself has the statutory right
to apply to the District Court in order to force an interested party to
submit or amend a report that he was obligated to submit under this
chapter.275 The Legal Procedure Regulations (Securities) 1991 clari-
fied that the application of the Authority under this section is to be
executed by summary proceedings in the Jerusalem District Court. 6
In order to insure that investor security is not jeopardized by
shortcomings of the company in the fulfillment of its reporting obli-
gations, the Law provides that the Authority may, after consultation
with the chairman of the TASE and after giving the company an op-
273. Id. § 36C(c).
274. Id. § 37(a). See also State of Israel v. David Ben Abraham Blass, 1990 (1)
P.M. 255 (Dist. Ct. Tel Aviv/Jaffa 1990) (considering the failure of an interested
party to report as a peripheral issue in a criminal case that centered around the
acquisition of the means of control in a banking corporation without the requisite
permits). While the case report does not state which section of the Securities Law
such a failure to report would violate, presumably the relevant provision is found in
§ 37 of the Law, violation of which is grounds for a fine being imposed on the of-
fender. See also State of Israel v. Aviva Elman, et al, 1990 (1) P.M. 343 (Dist. Ct.
Tel Aviv/Jaffa 1990) (considering the imposition of criminal penalties for the admit-
ted violations of certain provisions of the Securities Law, including charges of violat-
ing § 37 of the Law and § 33 of the 1970 Regulations as a result of an interested
party's failure to submit proper reports to the necessary bodies). However, again the
issue is not discussed in any detail.
275. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 38(b).
276. Legal Procedure Regulations of 1991 § 1. It is presumed that the same pro-
cedure applies to applications by a corporate body under Section 38(b) of the Securi-
ties Law.
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portunity to state its case, stop trading on the TASE of the securities
of the company. Such shortcomings are failure either to submit a re-
port required by the specific deadline or submission of a report that
deviates, in a material and substantive fashion, from the stated re-
quirements." Once the relevant reports have been submitted or
amended to the Authority's satisfaction, then the Authority should in-
struct the TASE to resume trading in the securities."
The Law also provides that an interested party who has submit-
ted a report under this chapter has the same civil liability towards
holders of the company's securities as do signatories and experts who
give opinions in a prospectus." 9
In Boronovitch Properties and Leasing Ltd. v. The Securities Au-
thority,' the Supreme Court, in a leading decision written by the
President of the Court, Justice Meir Shamgar, unanimously upheld the
earlier decision of the District Court. The Court stated that the Au-
thority was correct in demanding the production of the financial re-
ports of a private company that was affiliated with a public company.
The appellant company, before commencing a public offering of its
shares, had transferred part of its operations to a private company
under the control of the same parties who maintained control of the
public company. Before the offering, the appellant company had given
bank guarantees for the general obligations of the private company,
without any security being received in return from the private compa-
ny. The public company pledged a fixed amount of its assets as a secu-
rity for these guarantees, receiving a commission of six percent from
the private company on the obligations for which the guarantees were
needed.
The rental monies that the public company collected from the
properties pledged as security on the guarantees equaled about ninety-
five percent of its total income from rentals in 1987. The Authority,
after a review of the appellant's financial statements, requested a copy
of the financial statements of the private company. The Authority
claimed that examination of the private company's statements was
imperative to the Authority's determination of the appellant's potential
liability due to the guarantees. The appellant company appealed
against the decision of the Authority pursuant to the statutory right of
appeal granted under Section 14A of the Law.
In a sweeping opinion, the Court ruled in favor of the Authority.
Among the reasons given for its decision, the Court relied on some
277. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 38A(a).
278. Id. § 38A(b).
279. Id. § 38B. See also id. §§ 31-34 (concerning liability in connection with a
prospectus).
280. Boronovitch Properties & Leasing Ltd. v. Securities Authority, 46 P.D.(2) 818
(1992).
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issues of technical interpretation of the relevant clauses and their
application to the case at hand. However, more importantly for present
purposes, the Court made a number of general statements regarding
the role of the Authority in the protection of the investing public. The
Court viewed the role of the Authority as twofold. In addition to a one-
time responsibility of insuring the proper disclosure in the prospectus
of material facts at the time of an offering, the Authority also has a
continuing responsibility to ensure full disclosure by the company
when its shares are traded on the secondary markets, in other words
the TASE. The guiding principle behind the operations of the Authori-
ty, expressed in Section 2 of the Law, is the protection of the interests
of the investing public. The subsidiary principle under which the Au-
thority operates, expressed in Section 16 of the Law, is to insure the
full disclosure of any information that a reasonable investor would
consider as relevant to his investment decisions.
Such disclosure serves two purposes: on the one hand, it allows
investors to make rational decisions regarding their investments; on
the other hand, disclosure serves to dissuade controlling individuals of
a company from abusing their positions by fraudulent or manipulative
behavior. As a result, the power to seek further information from a
company concerning particulars, granted to the Authority by Section
36(f), must be viewed broadly, considering the breadth of the task
assigned to the Authority. The section was added in 1988 by Amend-
ment 9, which, according to the representative of the Finance Commit-
tee, MK Yoram Aridor, was primarily based on the principle of full ma-
terial disclosure and the supervision of that disclosure by the Authori-
ty."' In short, the Court stated that the underlying principle of full
disclosure for the protection of the investor outweighs the principle of
the separate corporate personality, whereby a private company need
not reveal details of its financial situation.
In applying these principles to the case at hand, the Court took a
number of factors into account. First, the close, almost inseparable,
relationship between the two companies served to increase the level of
suspicion that any unusual transaction would raise among the Author-
ity, and among investors as a whole. Second, the Court viewed the
obvious accessibility to the public company of the private company's
financial statements as a factor favoring their disclosure. Further, the
level of liability incurred by the guarantors was such that the appel-
lant could not claim that accounting statements and its own financial
reports were sufficient to cover the requirement of disclosure. Lastly,
because the Authority's request for disclosure fell within the bounds of
the test of "materiality," the Court had no place in curbing or limiting
the power of the Authority to request further particulars under Section
36 of the Law. It bears mention that the Court declined to rule defin-
281. Divrei Knesset 109-111, Session of July 20, 1988, at 3871.
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itively on the question of disclosure where it was not within the public
company's legal or practical ability to reveal the documents requested
by the Authority.
With this background, it is possible to give short consideration of
the more general principles that the Boronovitch decision represents.
The Court clearly established the supremacy of the interests of the
Authority, representing the principles of full disclosure and the protec-
tion of the investor. As part of a general trend in all facets of Israeli
securities law, involving the Knesset and the courts, the decision re-
flects a recognition that the courts should take an active role in insur-
ing that the fast-maturing securities markets in Israel provide a level
playing ground for all of the participants. 2 At the same time, the
Law should attempt to avoid overburdening companies with excessive
bureaucratic regulations, and the overriding principle must remain the
protection of the investing public.
VIII. ANCILLARY PROVISIONS
A. Transnational Considerations
The Law contains a collection of miscellaneous provisions relating
to issues and offers of securities to the public and to current reports.
The Law establishes that the issue of securities and their subsequent
offer to the public require a permit from the Minister of Finance or a
person appointed by him for this purpose, without which authorization
the Authority may not grant approval for the publication of the pro-
spectus.' However, the discretion of the Minister is limited so that
the only grounds upon which he can refuse to grant a permit are that
the timing or conditions of the offer are contrary to the economic policy
of the Government.' For many years, this rule was implemented by
a special department of the Ministry of Finance responsible for capital
markets and insurance regulation. More recently, however, a general
permit has been issued by the Minister permitting the issuance of
securities by Israeli companies in Israel, without any special statutory
permission.'
The Law provides that the prospectus requirements, the current
report requirements, and the criminal penalties apply in the case of a
282. See Companies Ordinance, Amendments 4-7 (1983) (New Version) (providing
examples of this trend in the Knesset lawmaking); see also Ido Ben-Yehuda, Adv. v.
Interpharm Industries Ltd., (unreported) (Dist. Ct. Tel Aviv-Jaffa June 6, 1993) (fol-
lowing the same trend in the courts).
283. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 39(a), (c), (d).
284. Id. § 39(b).
285. However, Israeli companies must gain approval of the Ministry to issue secu-
rities abroad even though, in practice, this is dealt with as part of the exemptive
proceedings available to foreign companies issuing their securities outside of Israel
pursuant to Section 40(c) of the Securities Law of 1968, which for the most part has
meant issuance of securities in the United States.
VOL. 22:2,3
ISRAELi SCURtrrIES LAW
public offering by an Israeli company to the public abroad. This provi-
sion is coupled with authorization to the Authority to provide a com-
plete or partial exemption from any of these provisions, whether such
offering is undertaken by the company itself, by another on its behalf,
or by its consent.' The Authority has discretion to exempt a compa-
ny from the provisions of these sections if the circumstances so justi-
fy."' In proposing adoption of a securities law, the Yadin Committee
had suggested this supervisory authority, stating that "[w]e believe
that this arrangement will to a substantial extent prevent distribution
of Israeli securities [abroad] which carry the country's name and are
not worthy of doing so.'
This exemptive authority has been frequently exercised in recent
years, although in the past there were periods during which all public
offerings in the United States had to pass a thorough Authority review
before being approved. There are today over 50 Israeli companies that
have successfully effected one or more public offerings in the U.S. and
other companies presently involved in the registration process. Shares
of those companies are traded over the counter and on the New York
and American Stock Exchanges. The number and volume of those
public offerings has led to considerable familiarity at the SEC about
the special problems that exist in Israeli companies, and that in turn
has led the Authority to be much more willing to exempt Israeli com-
panies from the dual registration process.'
Conversely, if a foreign-registered corporate entity desires to offer
securities to the Israeli public, then the Authority, in its discretion,
may exempt the offeror from some or all of the provisions of the Law if
the corresponding legislation in the country of registration sufficiently
serves to protect the interests of the investing public in Israel.' As
of late 1993, there have been a few efforts by foreign companies to
raise money in Israel, but none has succeeded. The main barrier has
been Israel's Foreign Currency Law and related regulations, and the
need to obtain a special permit from the Bank of Israel for the financ-
ing in Israel of activities abroad. Two efforts that ultimately failed
included a proposed application of some portion of the proceeds to
Israeli related activities. As a result of the increasing openness of Isra-
el to international securities markets, in August 1994 the Bank of
Israel advised that these foreign currency restrictions will be substan-
286. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 40(a)-(c).
287. Id. § 40(c).
288. YADIN, supra note 1, at 22.
289. In a March 1993 circular, the Securities Authority advised that it was now
willing to provide that exemption on a regular basis to companies that affect public
offerings in the U.S. Those companies now have to submit a copy of their U.S. pro-
spectus to the Securities Authority with a one page summary in Hebrew of the
terms of the offering and are then automatically granted the exemption.
290. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 41.
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tially relaxed, effective October 1994. Foreign companies may then
begin to raise capital in Israel for their international activities.
When the State offers securities for acquisition by the public,
unless the securities were issued by the State itself, the offer must be
effected by way of prospectus."' The definition of "securities" ex-
cludes securities of the State of Israel itself or those issued pursuant to
special law.' The State holds substantial securities in commercial
enterprises, however, and where the State holds more than 50% of the
control of such companies, then the activities of those companies are
regulated by a separate law.' The Government has embarked on a
program of privatization of at least some of these government compa-
nies.
A popular mode of privatization in Israel, and to some extent in
the U.S., has been by public offering. In addition, as a result of certain
problems in the banking system, the government has acquired control
of the major Israeli banks, on a temporary basis, with an articulated
goal of selling such control. Privatization of those banks is also being
effected to some extent by public offering. In each of these instances,
the Law requires that a prospectus be filed pursuant to which the
State is the offeror, and the company provides the prospectus. This
procedure is analogous to the situation in the U.S. when a so-called
secondary offering takes place in which controlling shareholders or
others who have registration rights effect an offering pursuant to a
prospectus of the company itself.'
Distribution of bonus shares is not considered a public offering
and therefore is exempt from the prospectus provisions under the Law,
so long as the bonus shares are the equivalent of a stock dividend
(using U.S. nomenclature), where there is no choice given to the share-
holders."5 As a further step adopted by the Law to insure that the
public has access to all relevant documents that are likely to be of
interest to the reasonable investor, an issuer is required to provide
copies of any prospectus or current report, along with all relevant
291. Id. § 42.
292. Id. § 1. When it comes to trading securities on the exchange, however, Gov-
ernment securities are regarded as securities for all purposes. See id. § 52.
293. The Government Companies Law of 1975, as amended.
294. This approach is envisioned by Section 22(d) of the Securities Law, which
provides that in the case of a public offering of securities for the benefit of a party
other than the company, that other party will also sign the prospectus. Sections 31
and 35 of the Law apply then to such offers as well and create civil liability in the
event of a misleading particular in the prospectus. Recent statutory relief was given
to the Government in connection with privatization of the banks, by a technical
amendment to simplify the definition of interested parties for these purposes and
thereby exclude the disclosure of complex, multifaceted relationships of Government
companies and the banks.
295. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 43.
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attachments, for inspection or duplication at the Registry and at the
main office of the issuer.' A final measure, designed to insure that
conflicts of interest do not adversely affect the interests of the invest-
ing public, provides that any person who gives a professional opinion
required under any section of the Law may not be an interested party
in the issuer for which the opinion is granted.'
B. The Stock Exchange
A separate chapter of the Law is dedicated to the provisions that
govern the activities and make-up of the stock exchange. Currently the
TASE is the only licensed market in Israel; as a result, all references
to the current stock market herein refer to the TASE. The TASE is
located in Tel Aviv, the commercial and business center of the country.
There have been suggestions made from time to time that a second
stock exchange should be established in Jerusalem, the capital of Isra-
el, to provide access to public capital for high-tech and other companies
that do not meet the rules for listing on the TASE. Such a develop-
ment is contemplated by the Law - another example of the implemen-
tation of Commissioner Cohen's prescient proposal that the Law be
broad enough to deal with future developments of the securities mar-
kets.
The rules affecting the TASE were very significantly altered by
amendments to the Law in 1988 and 1990. However, before examining
the affected provisions of the Law and the defects of the previous
clauses that the draftsmen hoped to remedy, it is necessary to examine
the underlying framework established by the Law, much of which has
not been significantly altered since being enacted. Further, there have
been a number of significant court decisions in this area, as are dis-
cussed below.
The Law begins by establishing the general principle that no
person may open or administer a stock exchange without a license
from the Minister, to be granted only after consultation with the Au-
thority.2 ' Further, the Minister is given guidelines to govern his
discretion in granting a license. The license is only to be granted to a
company if the Minister satisfies himself that the company, and the
proposed exchange to be established by it, comply with the following
requirements: (i) it does not limit the number of members; (ii) its
Memorandum of Association limits its function to the operation of a
stock market; (iii) its Articles of Association ("Articles") state that
296. Id. § 44.
297. Id. § 44A_
298. In early 1994, the Ministry of Finance published a preliminary tender with
respect to the establishment of a second stock exchange. Groups promoting Jerusa-
lem and Haifa as alternative sites have responded.
299. Id. § 45(a). The TASE was established long before the Law was enacted.
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profits will only be used to further the company's objectives and will
not be distributed among its members, and upon liquidation, the re-
maining assets will be used for objectives designated by the Minister;
(iv) its charter has complied with the requirements of Section 46 (de-
scribed below) and such charter has been approved by the Minister,
after consultation with the Authority, and by the Finance Committee;
and (v) the exchange will operate in a city where no other exchange is
already operating.'
In addition to these general licensing requirements, the Law also
prescribes various specific rules concerning the operation of the market
and its employees. The first area considered is that of the board of
directors of the exchange. Here, the 1988 Amendments took a signifi-
cant step to tighten the controls of the Government (through the Au-
thority) and the investing public over the Exchange. Overturning pre-
vious provisions, the Law now requires that a majority of the directors
of the exchange be "outsiders". The present statutory composition of
the board creates a balance between the interests of the exchange, of
the public and traded companies, and of the governmental authorities.
Currently, the total board of fifteen must consist of seven directors
elected by the members of the exchange, five "external directors" ap-
pointed by the appointment committee with the agreement of the
chairman of the Authority, one director each appointed by the Minister
of Finance and the Governor of the Bank of Israel, and one director
who meets the qualifications of an "external director" who is elected to
serve as chairman by the board with the approval of the chairman of
the Authority, provided that he is not an interested party in any com-
pany whose securities are registered for trading on the exchange."'
The board of the exchange is also mandated to select a non-voting
general manager who must meet the qualifications of an "external
director" and must not be an interested party in any entity whose
securities are registered for trading on the exchange.' The Law pro-
ceeds to define the specially established appointment committee and
the "external directors" that they must appoint. The committee has
four members, including the chairman of the Authority, the chairman
of the board of the exchange, the dean of the Law faculty at the uni-
versity located in the city where the exchange is established (presently
Tel Aviv University) or a member of the academic staff appointed by
such a dean to serve in his place provided that he meets the criteria of
an "external director," and a judge appointed by the Minister of Justice
with the approval of the president of the Supreme Court who is to
300. Id. § 45(b). This limit of one exchange for a given city is the basis for the
suggestion that any second exchange be located in Jerusalem or Haifa.
301. Id. § 45A(aXl)-(5). See also id. § 45A(d) (providing that the definition of
"interested party" in this context means the person himself or in conjunction with
any relative).
302. Id. § 45A(6).
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serve as the chairman of the committee and cast the deciding vote in
case of a tie.' The "external directors," appointed to represent the
interests of the public, may not be any of the following: (i) a member of
the exchange or an employee or interested party in such an entity; (ii)
an interested party or employee of a company that controls a member
of the exchange; (iii) a person who regularly provides paid services to
any of the above; (iv) an interested party due to holdings of shares of
any entity whose securities are registered for trading on the exchange;
or (v) any other person meeting any other criteria established by the
Minister.'
The Law continues by establishing regulations concerning the
terms of office of the various directors and the termination of such a
position. An external director is appointed for a period of two years,
after which he may be reappointed for two further terms of two years
each."° The chairman of the board, on the other hand, is appointed
for a term of five years and may be reappointed for one additional
term of five years.' However, the service of an external director may
terminate prematurely if he resigns, is deemed incapable of performing
his functions by the appointment committee, is regarded by the ap-
pointment committee as fitting one of the disqualifications with respect
to external directors, or is inexcusably absent from a fixed number of
meetings of the board over a period of time.' 7
To prevent the obviously unacceptable position of potential con-
flicts of interest involving staff of the exchange, the board members
and other exchange employees are forbidden, as are employees of the
Authority, from acquiring securities other than under a permit from
the Minister. Such a permit may be general in nature or refer to spe-
cific categories of securities. Similarly, each employee must notify the
chairman of the board of the exchange, and the Authority, of all hold-
ings of securities by himself or his spouse and of any acquisitions of
shares by himself or his spouse, within seven days of his appointment
or the relevant transaction, respectively.'
303. Id. § 45A(d). This is an interesting example of the statutory assignment to a
judge of a role with respect to a quasi-public institution, and one which is itself
subject to judicial review.
304. Id. § 45A(f).
305. Id. § 45A(b).
306. Id. § 45A(c).
307. Id. § 45B. A director absent from four consecutive board meetings or a total
of six board meetings in a calendar year is removed, unless the appointment com-
mittee concludes that the absences are reasonably justified. A similar provision ap-
pears in Section 22(aX2) of the Government Companies Law of 1975.
308. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 45C. The provisions were directly lifted from
§ 5(a)-(b) of the Law regarding similar restrictions on employees of the Authority.
However, the one slight change is that while the required notices there are to the
chairman of the Authority and the Minister, here the notice is to the chairman of
the Authority and to the chairman of the board of the exchange.
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One of the major areas improved under the 1988 and 1990 amend-
ments was the charter of the exchange. "Charter," for these purposes
("takanon" is the term used in the Hebrew original), is the set of rules
that govern the conduct by the exchange of its listing and other re-
sponsibilities, and is to be contrasted with the corporate governing
documents, in Israel (as in England) called the Memorandum of Asso-
ciation and the Articles of Association. The charter of the exchange,
which must be published for public scrutiny, has to include rules that
will generally provide for the proper and fair management of the ex-
change." The Law proceeds to provide a non-exhaustive list of vari-
ous topics that may be covered by these charter rules, only some of
which are considered herein.
While the 1988 Amendment made significant progress towards
defining the rules to be covered in the charter of the exchange, the
lawmakers, when considering the enactment of the 1990 Amendment,
still clearly felt further clarification regarding the authority of the
exchange to establish rules in certain areas was needed. As the ex-
planatory notes to the proposed legislation state,
with respect to a portion of these matters, it was argued that the
exchange did not have the authority to regulate them and this
argument was even accepted in the Tel Aviv-Jaffa District
Court .... It is proposed to detail the subjects which may be set
forth in the charter of the exchange, and to determine the authority
to add details, terms, and exceptions with directives of the board of
directors of the exchange, which will require the approval of the
Authority.
The first issue, in this regard, relates to rules governing member-
ship on the exchange. The exchange may, in its charter, adopt rules
concerning, among other things, eligibility requirements for member-
ship, types of activities that members may undertake, and obligations
of the members towards clients and towards the exchange and other
members. However, in order to allow for a smooth and fair transition
to the new provisions of the Law and the regulations, the Law does
state that any person who was a member of the TASE on the eve of
the adoption of the Law is permitted to continue operating in that
capacity, notwithstanding his failure to meet any new qualifications
stated therein.10 In addition, the rules may encompass procedures
for disciplinary offenses and the resulting proceedings. 11
More significantly, this section covers the rules the exchange may
adopt regarding listing requirements for companies that will register
their shares for trade on the exchange. These requirements may in-
309. Id. §§ 46(a), 49.
310. Id. § 55.
311. Id. § 46(aXl), (c), (g).
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clude the following: (i) the types of companies that may register their
securities for trading, regarding the length of time since the company
was established, the scope of and the results of its activities, the value
of its assets and extent of its liabilities, its relationship to other corpo-
rate bodies, and categorization for registration purposes (the exchange
may prescribe different requirements for the various categories of
economic activity undertaken by companies); (ii) the types of securities
that may be registered; (iii) the manner in which the securities will be
issued and offered, and the relationship between the initial offering
price of the securities and the trading price of the securities on the
exchange; (iv) an undertaking by the company that the offering will be
made on terms, at a price, and by a manner that is equal for all pro-
spective investors, or the conditions, where necessary to encourage
investment in the particular circumstances, under which a company
may deviate from such an undertaking; (v) the manner by which secu-
rities that were not issued by way of public offering may be registered
for trading; and (vi) an undertaking on the part of the company that
all of its outstanding issued capital be registered for trading, with cer-
tain exceptions for industrial companies and special Government is-
sued shares."'
In 1990, Amendment 11 provided a similar list regarding the
third subject as to which the exchange may enact rules. In the area of
rules regarding trading activity on the exchange, the regulations in-
cluded in the charter may encompass (i) times and methods of trading;
(ii) supervision and orderly conduct of trading on the exchange; (iii)
circumstances and procedure under which trading may be suspended
or limited with regard to one share or a group of shares; (iv) release of
trading results; and (v) terms and manner of obtaining permits by
members of the exchange and the conditions under which such permit-
ted members may execute trades involving registered securities outside
of the exchange. 1 The Law also provides for the enactment of rules
regarding the continuing obligations of companies whose shares are
registered for trading, the procedures and conditions for organization
and cancellation of trading in a given security, the method of publica-
tion of information by the exchange, the fees for the services of the
exchange, and the applicability and the adjustment of all of these rules
for entities that are not companies. 14
The last major subject covered by this section relates to the
exchange's refusal to register certain securities. The Law provides that
the charter of the exchange may state that the board of directors of the
exchange may refuse to register a security for trading if the board
considers that a material conflict of interest exists between the compa-
312. For the complete list, see id. § 46(aX2).
313. Id. § 46(b).
314. Id. § 46(aX4)-(8).
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ny making the application and a controlling party in that company or
between the company and a company under the control of a controlling
party in the first company.815 However, the Law establishes that such
a decision may only be made by a majority of the board of directors of
the exchange who represent at least two-thirds of the participants in
the relevant meeting; the company must also be given a reasonable
opportunity to present its case at that board meeting. 16
The scope of the rules to be adopted by the TASE was explored in
the 1984 District Court of Tel Aviv-Jaffa case of Tzvi Shaul v. United
Mizrahi Bank. 17 In the context of a decision that focused on the
agency responsibilities of a bank towards a customer who places an
order for the purchase of securities, the court made several interesting
remarks regarding the TASE and its rules. The court stated that the
discretion granted to the exchange under Section 46 to enact rules
regarding a wide range of topics showed that the TASE was a self-
managing body. As a result, there exists an implied agreement be-
tween the investor and his agent (a member of the exchange) that the
relations of the two sides involved in the complex and fast-changing
business of trading in securities will be governed by the rules estab-
lished by the TASE. Therefore, the rights of the member against his
client will be secured as long as the former remains within the bounds
of the rules adopted by the exchange, while at the same time the client
can be assured of his rights as long as the member of the exchange
does not stray beyond those bounds. Thus, the court was recognizing
that the wide discretion granted to the exchange in enacting its char-
ter made the charter the source of legitimate expectations, and per-
haps even rights, as between parties who transact business within that
framework.
Amendment 9 in 1988 also made a significant contribution to the
provisions under which the TASE is authorized to issue temporary
directives, in addition to the permanent rules contained in its charter.
While prior to the amendment the exchange often issued temporary
guidelines subject to little or no public or governmental scrutiny, now
these temporary directives must, as is the case with the permanent
guidelines, gain the approval of the Authority. 8' The Law states that
315. Section 1 of the Law defines "control' as the ability to guide the activity of
the corporate entity, to the exclusion of such powers that derive solely from an
individual's filling the position of director or other position in the entity. Additional-
ly, it is assumed that a person "controls" a corporate entity if he holds one half or
more or a certain "means of control" in that entity. "Means of control" in a corporate
entity are defined as one of the following: (i) the right of voting in the General
Meeting of the company, or in the corresponding body of another corporate entity; or
(ii) the right to appoint directors or the general manager of that entity.
316. Id. § 46(b), as amended on Feb. 21, 1994.
317. Tzvi Shaul v United Mizrahi Bank, 1983 P.M. 177 (Dist. Ct. Tel Aviv/Jaffa
1984) (Isr.).
318. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 46A(b). See also id. § 45(bX3) (establishing
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the exchange is authorized to issue trial directives regarding any of
the matters on which they may pass permanent guidelines, for the
purpose of testing their possible inclusion in the charter itself.319
However, the Authority is obligated to inform the Minister of Finance
and the Knesset Finance Committee of the proposed temporary direc-
tives, which will then only take effect fourteen days after the commit-
tee was notified. If a member of the committee objects to the enact-
ment of the temporary directives, they will only take effect after thirty
days following the demand that they be considered by the committee,
unless during that period the committee votes to cancel the proposed
directives completely.' In order to curb the all-too-common abuses
by the TASE of the temporary directive provisions, Amendment 9 also
limited the term of any temporary directives to a period of one year,
subject to the possibility of the Authority approving a further one year
extension. 21 Lastly, the Authority, for supervisory purposes, is also
empowered to demand reports regarding the manner and results of the
enactment of these temporary directives.' 2 These provisions as to
temporary directives have certainly not ended all controversy. In late
1993, the TASE substantially tightened the rules as to new listing
requirements, pulling the rug out from under quite a few companies
who were about to file their prospectuses. An outcry resulted that has
led to discussions in the Finance Committee as well as an action
against the TASE and the Authority. In this action, the District Court
required the Board of Directors of the TASE to reconsider its decision
at a future meeting.'
Similar improvements under Amendment 9 have tightened the
regulations surrounding the adoption of changes to the charter of the
exchange. The exchange itself, through action of its Board of Directors,
may initiate the process of amending the charter. Such a change, like
the provisions of the original charter, requires the approval of the
Minister in consultation with the Authority and of the Finance Com-
mittee.' However, more significantly, the Law now provides a mech-
anism by which the Authority itself can initiate the process of adopting
such a change. If the Authority believes that a change is required to
facilitate the fair and proper functioning of the exchange, then it may
inform the exchange of that belief. If the exchange refuses to change
its charter in accordance with the suggestion, then the Authority may
apply to the Minister who, with the consent of the Finance Committee,
that the permanent charter of the exchange must be approved by the Minister in
consultation with the Authority, and by the Finance Committee).
319. Id. § 46A(a).
320. Id. § 46A(c).
321. Id. § 46A(d).
322. Id. § 46A(e).
323. Association of Public Companies Registered on the Exchange v. TASE and
the Securities Authority (Dist.Ct. Tel Aviv/Jaffa, Misc. Appeals 1672/93, unreported).
324. Id. § 48(a).
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may by executive order force such a change into the charter.' 2 Un-
derstandably, a change effected by order of the Minister may in the
future only be amended or removed by the exchange if it has the per-
mission of the Minister.'
One of the most radical changes under Amendment 11 (1990) was
the adoption by Israeli law of provisions regarding what is commonly
referred to as the "one share, one vote" rule. Generally, this rule re-
quires that the exchange ensure the existence of certain conditions of
equal voting rights in both initial and subsequent offerings of securi-
ties that are to be registered on the exchange. The prior situation,
under which no such rule existed, was considered unsatisfactory for
the needs of the maturing capital markets in Israel. As the explanato-
ry note to the amendment stated,
[tihe situation whereby founding shares or shares with preferred
voting rights allow their holders to exert control over the company
in disproportion to the amount of capital that they invested in the
company, while the rest of the public provides most of the operating
capital of the said company, is inappropriate.
The amended Law provides that the exchange is not allowed to
register shares or securities convertible into shares for trading on the
exchange unless the following conditions are met: (i) in the case of a
company first registering its shares on the exchange, the capital of the
company may include only one class of shares that grant equal voting
rights in proportion to their nominal value; or (ii) in the case of a com-
pany whose shares were already registered on the exchange prior to
the amendment, any future offerings of shares must be of the class
that grants the greatest level of voting power.
The Law adds that the provisions for equal voting rights for com-
panies first registering their shares on the exchange do not apply to
"special State shares." These are shares that the government decides it
needs to hold in the interest of protecting a vital matter and that grant
special rights, defined by the Government prior to the registration of
the shares for trading. Such shares, sometimes referred to as "golden
shares," have been created or contemplated as part of the
Government's program of privatization. Israel Chemicals Limited,
Israel's leading natural resources Government company, is the classic
case in which such a special State share was created prior to an Israeli
public offering, as the first phase of privatization. Furthermore, not-
withstanding the other provisions applicable to companies registering
for the first time, a company is authorized, after the expiration of at
least one year subsequent to the date that the shares were registered
on the exchange, to issue non-voting preferred shares. A similar excep-
325. Id. § 48(b).
326. Id. § 48(c).
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tion exists for companies whose shares have been previously registered
and whose capital only includes classes of shares permitted under
provision (i). They, too, may issue non-voting preferred shares, pro-
vided that more than one year has passed subsequent to the date that
the capital of the company met the qualifications of provision (i)."7
In addition to these requirements, a further provision governs the
holders of founders' shares in the company. These are shares that have
been quite popular in Israel historically, particularly in banking, by
which private and public companies have been controlled by founders
or their successors. The 1990 Amendment 11 changed the Law to pro-
vide that anyone who holds founders shares and capital shares in a
publicly traded company as of August 1, 1990, or any person who ac-
quires the said shares, must continue to hold capital shares in a pro-
portion that does not fall below the proportion held on that date, un-
less that proportion falls below the limit by virtue of the exercise of
rights to acquire or convert shares that were granted to the other hold-
ers of securities in the company prior to the said date.'
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to examine the question
of equal voting rights in the period prior to the enactment of Amend-
ment 11. In the 1984 case of Abramson v. Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, the
appellant, in his status as an owner of securities traded on the TASE,
sought a court order to force the relevant authorities to effectively
adopt the "one share, one vote" rule before it was finally adopted into
the Law. 2 As discussed below in the section regarding appeals to
the courts against decisions of the exchange, the Supreme Court re-
stated its traditional stance that it would not take sides in an argu-
ment where there were reasonable positions on both sides. The guiding
principle behind the rules that the exchange might or might not enact
is the standard of "fairness" and "propriety." The Court proceeded to
review decisions of the courts, reports of various committees (including
the Yadin Committee) on this topic, and the solutions adopted in other
countries that have a developed securities law. On the basis of this
review, the court concluded that the principles of democratic manage-
ment, proper scrutiny, and unfettered fluidity of markets all stood in
favor of adopting a rule dictating equality of voting power. However,
the court also recognized that the principles of freedom of contract and
other economic interests, such as encouraging private and family con-
trolled companies to seek expansion by using the proceeds of a public
offering without fearing the loss of control in the company to outside
interests, stood equally firm against such a proposal. In the absence of
overwhelming evidence pointing in either direction, the Court conclud-
ed that it could not say that one alternative was "less proper" than
327. Id. § 46B(aX).
328. Id. § 46C.
329. Abramson v. Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, 38 (2) P.D. (1984).
1994
DENV. J. INVL L. & POLY
another. In the case at hand, the appellant was unable to convince the
Court that the result of the decision of the authorities not to adopt the
proposed rule caused such manifest unfairness that the decision could
be said to be outside of the realm of propriety. Thus, it was left to the
Knesset, a few years later, to adopt the rule that the appellant had
hoped to force upon the TASE by way of the courts.
The Law provides for a special right of appeal against decisions of
the stock exchange. Any person who feels injured by virtue of a deci-
sion of the exchange regarding an application for membership, the
suspension or cancellation of membership, or the effects of any disci-
plinary proceedings may appeal such a decision to the District
Court.' 0 Similarly, any person who feels wronged by any other de-
cision of the exchange that is not taken in the course of trading may
also appeal to the District Court. However, in the case of this latter
appeal, notice of the commencement of proceedings must be given to
the Authority. The Authority may appear in such proceedings and
present its position if it wishes."1
The Law Procedure Regulations (Securities) 1991, mentioned
above in the context of applications to the Jerusalem District Court for
an order concerning the submission of reports (Section 38 of the Law),
also established procedural regulations regarding the right of appeal
under Section 47(a). The appeal must be submitted to the District
Court in whose jurisdiction the company that controls the exchange is
located - in other words, in Tel Aviv."2 The writ of appeal, stating
certain particulars including the nature of the decision appealed
against and the grounds for an appeal, must be filed within sixty days
of the decision of the exchange.' Next, the company that controls
the exchange, the respondent in those proceedings, must file its re-
sponse to the appeal within fifteen days of the service of the writ upon
the company unless a special exemption has been granted.' Beyond
the limited special procedural provisions in these regulations, the pro-
ceedings are to follow the standard practices established by the Civil
Law Procedures Regulations 1963.'
An interesting case involving this statutory right of appeal
against decisions of the exchange made its way through the Israeli
courts, culminating in a Supreme Court decision in 1992. At first in-
stance, the District Court of Tel Aviv-Jaffa decided in favor of the
appellant in the case of Marcus David Katz v. Tel Aviv Stock Ex-
change.' The facts of the case can be summarized as follows. The
330. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 47(a).
331. Id. § 47(b).
332. Legal Procedure Regulations of 1991, § 2.
333. Legal Procedures Regulations of 1991, § 3.
334. Legal Procedure Regulations of 1991, §§ 4, 6, 7, 8.
335. Legal Procedure Regulations of 1991, § 9.
336. Marcus David Katz v. Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, 1991 (2) P.M. 296 (Dist. Ct.
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TASE, upon receiving notice from the controlling party in a company
that he wished to purchase all of the outstanding shares of the compa-
ny and to delist the shares from trading on the exchange, decided to
begin delisting proceedings upon being informed that this shareholder
had reached the level of holding nearly 99.8% of the outstanding
shares as a result of a tender offer, which was required by TASE pro-
cedures. The appellant, upon receiving notice of the TASE's intention
to delist, advised the TASE that he had an outstanding legal claim
against the controlling party with respect to a block of 60% of the
outstanding shares that the appellant claimed to have acquired. As a
potential major shareholder in the company if his claim succeeded, the
appellant stated his opposition to delisting the shares of the company,
a view rejected by the TASE, which decided nevertheless to delist the
shares. As a party allegedly aggrieved by a decision of the exchange,
the appellant appealed to the District Court under Section 47(b) of the
Law to reverse or stay the decision of the board of the TASE.
The District Court ruled partially in favor of the appellant. The
Court stated that in the circumstances the TASE had two avenues
open to it: it could have either ordered a suspension of trading of the
shares, or it could have adopted the more severe step of delisting. The
Court felt that the TASE had wrongly failed to take account of all the
relevant considerations by refusing to take notice of the interests of
the appellant; in addition, the TASE could have better fulfilled its
mandate, insuring the fair and proper management of the exchange,
by adopting the less severe interim measure of suspension. Further,
the TASE, in its function of facilitating trading rather than stifling it,
should always adopt the alternative that holds out the greatest possi-
bility of the resumption of trading in a security at some point in the
future. Finally, the Court did not doubt that the appellant had stand-
ing to appeal to the District Court under the Section 47(b) test of an
"aggrieved party." Contrary to the claims of the TASE, there was no
need that the applicant to the court be a registered shareholder in the
company. The District Court suspended the decision of the TASE for a
two month period, during which time it said that it hoped that a deci-
sion would be reached in the litigation between the parties.
The TASE appealed to the Supreme Court, which was asked to
consider two questions: What is the scope of the review of the District
Court of TASE decisions under Section 47, and is the exchange obligat-
ed to take the interests of a non-shareholder into consideration when
making decisions? The Supreme Court began by stating that
Amendment 9 had clearly intended that the previous path of appeal
against decisions of the exchange to the Supreme Court sitting as a
High Court of Justice be replaced by the new route via the District
Court. 7 The Court proceeded to define the scope of the review that
Tel Aviv/Jaffa 1991), rev'd, 46 (2) P.D. 441 (Supreme Ct. 1992) (Isr.).
337. While some commentators saw this as an unfortunate move away from tight-
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was available under the old system. The Court, quoting from the deci-
sion in Abramson, stated that it would not substitute its discretion for
that of the exchange.' Where two possible approaches to a problem
could both objectively meet the test of being "proper," the Court would
not force the TASE to reverse its original ruling. Further, as explained
in the Supreme Court decision in Babchuk v. Tel Aviv Stock Exchange,
the Supreme Court would only interfere and reverse a ruling where
the decision was void for legal reasons; the Court would not interfere
with the professional judgment of the administrative body."9 The
question before the Supreme Court in the Katz case was whether un-
der the new regime of appeals to the District Court the extent and
scope of the review was to be expanded.
After a detailed discussion of the arguments and authorities cited
by the parties, the Court decided in favor of an expanded scope of
review. The Court stated that the expanded review by the District
Court, allowing the judge to order adoption of a decision that the ex-
change could have adopted in the first place, would not constitute the
substitution of the discretion of the District Court for that of the
TASE. Of course, the District Court would take notice of and give
weight to the professional expertise of the TASE and hesitate to inter-
fere with their decisions, especially where those decisions related to
technical, rather than legal, questions. However, the Court was quick
to comment that the substantial measure of professional knowledge
possessed by the TASE would not render it immune from the review of
the court.
Applying these principles to the case at hand, the Court decided
that the TASE procedure supported by the District Court at first in-
stance varied from the approach expected under the Law. The District
Court should move far beyond the tests of "irrelevant considerations"
and "unreasonableness" available under judicial review and undertake
a fundamental review of the TASE decision being appealed. The Court
addressed whether the exchange, when deciding whether to delist a
er scrutiny, others felt the lower costs and increased efficiency of the lower courts,
coupled with the limits on the time of the Supreme Court, pointed in favor of the
switch under the amendment.
338. Abramson v. Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, 38 (2) P.D. 1 (Supreme Ct. 1984)
(Isr.). In that case, the limitations on the Supreme Court's willingness to interfere
and the resulting negligible scrutiny were evident. The Court in that case stated
that the TASE and the Authority were permitted to take many varied considerations
into account when making decisions. A decision is not nullified, and there is no
violation of the principles of "fairness" or 'propriety," if the body takes a decision
where the authorities and the experts are divided in their support. It is not the role
of the Supreme Court to exercise discretion statutorily granted to a legal body; rath-
er, the court will only review the decision's compliance with standards of administra-
tive law and judicial review.
339. Babchuk v. Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, 32 (2) P.D. 377 (Supreme Ct. 1978)
(Isr.).
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particular security, should consider the interests of a potential share-
holder whose claim to be recognized as a shareholder is still pending in
separate litigation. It is clear that this is not an issue upon which the
District Court should be overly respectful of the expertise of the TASE.
Rather, this question, at its heart, was a quasi-legal question, as to
which the courts of law are more qualified than the exchange to decide
the proper approach.
Despite the expanded review process supported by the Supreme
Court, it still proceeded to reverse the lower court ruling by stating
that, in a specific case, the proper interests to be taken into consider-
ation were limited to those of the current registered shareholders of
the company. The exchange was in no position to begin measuring the
probability of success of the appellant in his legal claim that could
potentially enable him to attain the status of shareholder at some fu-
ture point. The exchange could not predict future events and could
only effectively give credence to the concerns of the present sharehold-
ers. Thus, the TASE had acted appropriately by acceding to the wishes
of the controlling party that the shares be delisted. The Court conclud-
ed by stating that the door remained open for the appellant to seek
civil damages from the current controlling shareholder, if the appellant
were to succeed in his legal battle and the appellant could prove that
the decision to delist the securities had caused him financial damages.
Returning to the Law, provision is also made to protect the inter-
ests of the investing public by insuring the continuity of operation of
the stock exchange. The exchange is generally not allowed to close,
unless in its opinion or in the opinion of the Minister such an action is
necessary to protect the interests of the investing public.' Moreover,
the exchange is not authorized to close on its own initiative for more
than one business day, except with the approval of the Minister of
Finance." If a decision is made to close the exchange for even one
day, notice of that decision must immediately be given to the Minister,
who may order that the exchange not close or, if it has closed, that it
reopen."2 In short, the Law states that there is a public interest in
an ongoing, regular course of exchange activity, an interest which is to
be protected by the Minister rather than by the Authority. This exam-
ple of the dual role played by the Minister and the Authority under the
Law stands in contrast to the pattern of SEC dominance established
by U.S. securities laws, to the complete exclusion of the executive
branch.
Finally in this respect, the Law, in effect reasserting the role of
the Authority, deals with the supervision of the exchange by the Au-
thority. Amendment 9 made significant changes, dramatically increas-
340. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 50(a).
341. Id. § 50(b).
342. Id. § 50(c).
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ing the scope and manner of supervision and conferring a broad dis-
cretion in this regard on the Authority, in lieu of the previous supervi-
sory role of the Minister. The general principle governing the exercise
of this control is that the Authority is responsible for the fair and prop-
er functioning of the exchange.' As a result, the Authority is em-
powered, after allowing the chairman of the exchange to state his case,
to direct the exchange to take corrective action if, in the Authority's
opinion, the exchange is operating in a manner contrary to its charter,
its directives, or the general principles of fair and proper manage-
ment.' In order to enable the Authority to properly exercise these
functions, the Law provides that the exchange must submit all reports
to the Authority and turn over any information on the affairs of the
stock exchange that the Authority may request.' Furthermore, a
representative of the Authority is entitled to be present at all general
meetings and board and committee meetings of the exchange in order
to ensure that the Authority is aware of all decisions and proposals of
the exchange.'
In the period since the adoption of Amendment 9 in 1988, the Au-
thority has shown a willingness to pursue the supervisory responsibili-
ties assigned to it. In order to cope with these responsibilities, the
Authority has established a new committee whose sole task is to pur-
sue the functions of the Authority in relation to the TASE. The com-
mittee focuses in particular on examining the proposed directives of
the TASE and submitting suggestions to the Authority, the Minister,
and the Finance Committee. As a result, the TASE has found that its
heretofore relatively unfettered discretion on various issues concerned
with its operations is increasingly being narrowed by the supervision
of the Authority.
A number of pertinent issues were raised in the case of Nimrodi
Land Development Ltd. v. Tel Aviv Stock Exchange in the District
Court of Tel Aviv-Jaffa." ' While certain technical aspects of the case
were considered in a further 1991 proceeding in the Supreme Court
sitting as the High Court of Justice,' the decision of the lower court
is a more relevant one for present purposes. The case dealt with an
appeal by a company from a decision of the TASE to impose certain
conditions regarding the capital of any company, especially in relation
to founder's shares, that must be met before a registered company may
undertake a public offering."' The TASE was attempting to move in
343. Id. § 51(a).
344. Id. § 51(b).
345. Id. § 51(c).
346. Id. § 51(d).
347. Nimrodi Land Development Ltd. v. Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, 1990 (2) P.M.
89 (Dist. Ct. Tel Aviv/Jaffa 1990).
348. Nimrodi Land Development Ltd. v. Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, 45 (3) P.D. 154
(Supreme Ct. 1991) (Isr.).
349. See the discussion above of the changes caused to the Law by Amendment
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the direction of the "one share, one vote" rule reflected in Section 46C,
as discussed above, by requiring that holders of founder's shares main-
tain a certain ratio of regular shares to founders shares. It is not so
much the particular facts of the case, but rather the Court's review of
several important principles regarding the TASE and the Authority
and their respective powers under the Law, that is important for pur-
poses of this section.
The District Court confirmed that appealing a TASE decision is
not limited by the usual framework of review. Rather, the District
Court is mandated to undertake a fundamental review of the decision
appealed from and to rule accordingly.' The District Court moved
on to consider the nature of the exchange's powers. It stated that the
exchange acts under the authority of the Law, and, although it is orga-
nized as a corporate entity, it is in fact an administrative body subject
to the general legal principles that govern such entities. Before taking
any action, the TASE had to point to the source, whether in the Law,
its corporate charter or any other source, that authorized it to exercise
such powers. Hence, the exchange was prohibited from limiting or
canceling the rights of shareholders who had acquired their securities
legally and in good faith without appropriate compensation. This espe-
cially held true in the case at hand, where the decision affected holders
of founders' shares that were not even registered for trading on the
exchange. While the Law revolved around the principle of full material
disclosure, it in no way authorized the exchange to set conditions on
an offering or the securities issued therein based on extraneous mat-
ters.
The Court continued by distinguishing the respective roles as-
signed to the exchange and the Authority under the Law. The
Authority's function centered around the protection of the interests of
the investing public. The exchange, on the other hand, is, as its name
implies, a market for trading securities; the exchange's sole mandate is
the management of that market in a manner that guarantees fair and
proper transactions. As a result of this clear distinction, the TASE had
to be careful not to interfere in the realm of functions assigned to the
Authority by the Law.
The Court concluded by considering the principles that must lie
behind decisions of the exchange. A legal entity such as the exchange
could only make decisions in areas authorized by its founding corpo-
rate documents, or alternatively, by the Law or other regulations. Any
decision regarding an issue not expressly within such boundaries was
void as ultra vires. Thus, in the absence of clear authority to enact a
decision such as the one taken by the TASE in the case at hand, the
11 regarding this subject after the Nimrodi decision.
350. For a concurring view, see supra note 336.
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Court concluded that it had no choice but to nullify such a decision.
The appeal of the company was upheld and the decision of the ex-
change reversed.
One other feature of TASE function, not directly related to the
Law, should be discussed. Due to the exemption from capital gains
taxation for listed securities, a strong motivating factor for listing on
the exchange, the TASE review process with respect to new prospec-
tuses has assumed a major role. A company affecting a public offering,
therefore, must overcome the hurdles of both Authority and TASE
review. The TASE, in addition, has adopted substantive rules with
respect to the size and track records of companies offering securities,
including special rules for particular classes of securities, such as those
in more speculative fields like oil and gas exploration. Consequently, to
some extent the TASE has assumed the role of a demanding blue-sky
commissioner in the U.S.
C. Insider Trading
Although the Law in its original format was largely based upon
the U.S. Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
insider trading regulation was added by amendment in 1981. In con-
trast to the extraordinary interpretive structure based upon Rule 10b-5
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Israeli approach to
insider trading regulation is much more detailed, to a substantial
extent drawn from English and other sources. Furthermore, in contrast
to the vague U.S. approach to insider trading, the Israeli approach was
designed to achieve maximum clarity through detailed rules and ex-
plicit definitions.
The Law defines a company for these purposes to be one whose
shares have been issued to the public by a prospectus or are traded on
the TASE and, in both cases, remain in the hands of the public. The
definition also includes subsidiaries and affiliated companies. The term
"insider information" is specifically defined to mean any knowledge of
a development or expected development in a company, a change or
expected change in its standing, or other information regarding the
company that is not known to the public and that if known would
cause a material change in the price of the securities of the company.
An "insider" in a company is (i) a director, general manager, "prin-
cipal shareholder," 1 or another individual whose standing, position
in, or ties to the company grant him access to insider information on
the "determining day," defined as the day when use is made of the
insider information, or within six months prior to such a date; (ii) a
351. Defined as an individual who holds five percent or more of the nominal
value of the outstanding capital of the company, or of the voting rights in the com-
pany, or who has the power to appoint one or more directors.
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relative of any individual listed above; and (iii) a company or other
entity under the control of any person named in (i) or (ii). Finally, a
"transaction" is defined as the exchange, sale, purchase, or subscrip-
tion of a security, or an undertaking to affect the same, whether the
individual is acting for his own account or on behalf of others and
regardless of whether he acts through an agent or trustee. 
2
The Law establishes a variety of scenarios that, by statute, are
considered the use of insider information. These include the execution
of a transaction in securities of the company while insider information
is in the individual's possession. Another example is passing insider
information or an opinion based thereon to a person where there is
reasonable basis to assume (or it is actually known) that the person
will make use of the information or the opinion to affect a transaction
or pass it to someone else. This is generally called the "tipper" liability
in the "tipper-tippee" relationship in legal scholarship.' Similarly, a
company will be deemed to have access to or possess insider informa-
tion if a director or employee of the company has access to or is in the
possession of the insider information, unless the company has enacted
clearly drawn and properly published directives that strictly prohibit
the use and dissemination of such information by those individuals for
the purpose of undertaking transactions in the relevant securities and
has ensured that arrangements are made for internal supervision to
guarantee compliance with such directives.'
The Law provides that a presumption of the use of insider infor-
mation will arise in certain circumstances. For these purposes, the
Law created a new category, that of a "principal insider," a more tight-
ly defined group than the general class of insiders. A principal insider
is defined as (i) a director, general manager, deputy or assistant gener-
al manager, controller, internal auditor, and any individual who fulfills
those duties under a different title, in addition to a principal share-
holder; (ii) a relative of any of the above; and (iii) a corporate entity
under the control of any individual listed in (i) or (ii). The approach is
somewhat similar to the short swing profit provisions of Section 16(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 but with significant differences.
Whereas Section 16(b) provides for an absolute, irrefutable presump-
tion of use of inside information for transactions made within a six
month period, the Law provides that when a principal insider profits
from a purchase and sale, or a sale and purchase, of securities within a
352. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 52A.
353. Id. § 52B(a). See also LOUIS Loss, FUNDAMENTAIM OF SECURITIES REGULA-
TION 83-84 (1983).
354. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 52B(b) (prescribing the exact nature of the
directives that must be enacted). The legislative message to companies is clear: com-
panies should institute internal programs to police the access to insider information
and to prevent misuse of that information; otherwise they will be liable for employee
misconduct.
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three month period, that will be viewed as prima facie evidence that
he utilized insider information, unless the principal insider can prove
that he did not have any insider information at the time of the trans-
actions, or under the circumstances it is reasonable to assume that he
did not have such insider information.'
The Law provides that certain information is not considered insid-
er information. For instance, any data concerning a report submitted
to the Authority or to the TASE published or publicized in some ac-
cepted manner is not considered to be insider information once one
exchange trading day passes subsequent to the publication. In the
alternative, the facts cease to be insider information upon the passing
of four days after the report is submitted to the TASE or the Authori-
ty, if they decide not to publish the report.' However, the Law es-
tablishes that the burden of proof is on the defendant to prove that the
material was submitted and/or published in accordance with these
provisions. 7
If an insider in a company makes use of insider information, the
Law makes him liable to one year in prison or a fine of NIS 6,000.'
Similarly, a person (the "tippee") who makes use of insider information
that he has received, directly or indirectly, from a person whom he
knows is an insider in the company, is liable to a prison sentence of six
months or a fine of NIS 3,000.s" In addition to the criminal penal-
ties, the Law makes a person who profits from the use of insider infor-
mation liable in a civil action to pay the profits to the company whose
securities were involved in the transaction.' The calculation of the
profit from the transaction is computed by figuring the difference be-
tween the price at which the transaction (presumably the transaction
in which the profit was realized) was executed and the price of the
relevant security immediately after the information is made public." 1
After establishing the scope and extent of the criminal and civil
liability, the Law continues by listing a wide range of defenses that
may be raised by a defendant to escape liability. Thus, the defendant
is free of liability if he can prove one of the following: (i) the sole pur-
pose of the transaction was the acquisition of "qualifying shares" that,
according to the Articles of Association of the company, a director must
355. Id. § 52E.
356. Id. § 52F(a).
357. Id. § 52F(b).
358. Id. § 52C. To appreciate the size of fines, it is worth noting that the current
exchange rate is about NIS 3 to U.S. $1. Thus, the maximum fine under § 52C is
equivalent to approximately U.S. $2,500. Clearly, the prison sentence is the much
more serious deterrent. Note, however, that some of the fines provided for other
offenses, discussed below, are much more substantial.
359. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 52D.
360. Id. § 52H(a).
361. Id. § 52H(b).
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acquire as a condition of his service;"' (ii) the transaction was exe-
cuted in good faith in fulfillment of the defendant's responsibilities as
receiver, trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator, or in the realization of a
pledged security; (iii) the transaction was part of the good faith imple-
mentation of an underwriting agreement; (iv) the reason for the use of
the insider information was not, or was not significantly, for the pur-
pose of obtaining profits or preventing losses to the defendant or an-
other; (v) the transaction was concluded by the defendant in his role as
agent of another, and he did not exercise his discretion and did not
give his opinion or information in a manner that brought about the
execution of the transaction; (vi) the transaction was effected outside of
the framework of the TASE and the other party also had the relevant
insider information in his possession; (vii) the transaction was affected
on behalf of an insider by a "blind trust," defined as a trust that oper-
ates at the sole discretion of the trustee without any input from the in-
sider; (viii) the purpose of the transaction was the stabilization of the
price of the security, as to which the company had established guide-
lines and advised the Authority of these guidelines before the transac-
tion was affected;' or (ix) in the circumstances of the case, the rele-
vant transaction was justified.' A special defense is available to a
company in response to either civil or criminal charges in a case
brought under the provision concerning the vicarious possession of
insider information by the company.' Although a director or em-
ployee had access to or was in the possession of the insider information
about the company whose securities were involved in the transaction,
the company will be excused from liability if it can prove that the
director or employee in question was not the individual who made the
decision to effect the transaction and that there is a reasonable expla-
362. Whereas qualifying shares were once reasonably common in Israeli compa-
ies, especially private ones, they are almost non-existent today in Israeli public
companies or substantial private ones.
363. The existence of the stabilization defense was used by the major Israeli
banks as one of a series of arguments in legitimization for very substantial market
support of their shares. Those arguments were submitted before a special govern-
ment commission, the Beisky Commission, which was established to review these
matters, and more recently in a criminal proceeding against those banks, their chief
officers and some bank accountants. Most of the defendants were convicted on Feb-
ruary 16, 1994 and sentenced on April 14, 1994. Israel v. Bank Leumi Le-Israel
B.M., (Dist. Ct. Jerusalem, unreported decision). The case has been appealed to the
Supreme Court. The background to the indictments was discussed in Uri. Ganor v.
Attorney General, 44 (2) P.D. 485 (1990), a case brought in the Supreme Court, act-
ing as the High Court of Justice, as a result of which the Attorney General was
required to reconsider his earlier determination not to prosecute the banks and re-
lated parties.
364. Securities Law, supra note 2. § 52G(a). The last defense constitutes a fully
justified grant of broad authority to the courts, in this complex area, to create addi-
tional defenses where justified on a case by case basis.
365. Id. § 52B(b).
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nation for the execution of the transaction.' The Law establishes
that no transaction will be voided only by virtue of the violation of any
provision as to insider trading."7
The Law adopts rules governing securities transactions by em-
ployees of the members of the exchange.' For purposes of this sec-
tion, an "employee of a stock exchange member" includes a director or
employee of the member, his spouse, his family members whose suste-
nance depends on him, and companies under the control of any of
those. Similarly, "security" is taken to include shares, or securities con-
vertible or realizable into such shares, that are registered for trading
on the TASE.' The Law provides that an employee of a member
may not affect a purchase or sale of securities, otherwise than in the
course of trading on the TASE by written instructions given at least
one day prior to the date of the transaction 7 ° Further, such an em-
ployee must hold all of his securities in an account under his own
name with a member of the exchange." 1 Similar provisions apply to
limit the manner in which an employee of a member may effect a
transaction on behalf of someone else."72 The Minister is empowered
to enact regulations, after consultation with the Authority and with
the approval of the Finance Committee, that place a ban on trading for
various categories of employees of members and in relation to various
categories of securities.7
Some other insider trading issues were examined by the Jerusa-
lem District Court in the 1988 case of Establissement Mollet de Dupont
Freres, Vadus v. United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. and Aaron Meir.374 The
individual defendant, managing director of United Mizrahi Bank Ltd.,
acquired shares from the plaintiff in an Israeli company for the bank a
short time before the company was to make a public offering and regis-
ter its shares for trading on the TASE. Although the public offering
366. Id. § 52G(b).
367. Id. § 52J.
368. See id. § 45C (concerning acquisition of securities by board members and em-
ployees of the TASE).
369. Id. § 521(a); see also supra note 111 (discussing a case in which this limited
definition of "securities" resulted in the acquittal of one of the defendants on a
charge under Section 52 of the Law). Because the change dealt with the purchase of
the shares in an initial public offering, the shares did not yet fit the definition of
"being registered for trade on the TASE."
370. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 521(b); see also supra note 233, where one of
the charges in the case included offenses against § 521(b), (c) by an employee of an
exchange member.
371. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 521(c).
372. Id. § 521(d); see also supra note 112 where the judge conducted an exami-
nation of some of the technical aspects of the interpretation of this section in con-
victing one of the defendants of offenses under its provisions.
373. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 521(e).
374. Establissement Mollet de Dupont Freres, Vadus v. United Mizrahi Bank Ltd.,
1989 (2) P.M. 268 (Dist. Ct. Jerusalem 1989).
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and the act of registration for trading was likely to result in a rise in
the value of the shares, the defendant, who was also a member of the
board of directors of the company, decided that it was not necessary to
reveal the fact of the intended public offering and registration to the
plaintiff. Based on this background, the plaintiffs applied to the court
for a declaratory judgment that the defendants had not acted in good
faith in the negotiations for the purchase of the shares."'
One of the defenses offered by the individual defendant centered
around the question of insider information under the Law. Because the
plans of the company were not known to the public, the defendant
claimed that under Section 52C of the Law he was prohibited from
revealing this information to the other party, information to which
only the defendant had access in his capacity as director of the com-
pany. The judge rejected this claim and instead stated that the terms
of the Law regarding insider information in fact further served as a
basis to criticize the defendant's actions. She stated that the defendant
himself had run afoul of that section of the Law by making use of
insider knowledge in effecting the questioned transaction. 7 Finally,
the judge on her findings of fact rejected outright the defendant's claim
of falling under a number of the defenses listed in Section 52G."77
The judge continued by stating that the provisions of the Law
regarding insider information were meant not only for the protection of
the company but also for the protection of parties who deal with an
individual with inside information. While the Law does state in Sec-
tion 52G(a)(6) that a defense is available where the transaction was
affected with another party outside of the exchange and where both
parties have access to the inside information, the judge stated that
where, as in a case like the one before the court, an individual was
prohibited under the Law from disclosing the information to the other
party, the party with the information was not allowed to execute the
transaction by virtue of his possession of an unfair advantage.
However, as stated above, the Law also provides (in Section 52J)
that a transaction is not voided solely by virtue of a violation of any of
the offenses. Further, the Law does not make anyprovision regarding
the obligation of good faith in the framework of transactions that it
outlaws. Thus, the judge felt that the ordinary principles of good faith
that apply in Israeli civil law must apply to these cases. As a result,
the judge undertook to apply some of those principles, as articulated in
the Contracts Law 1973, to the facts of the case. She pointed out that
375. Contracts Law of 1973, § 12 (requiring good faith in contract negotiations,
just as § 39 of that law requires good faith in contract implementation). These sec-
tions, based mainly upon Continental civil law precedents, have spawned case law
extending the good faith requirement to other fields as well.
376. The judge especially pointed to § 52B(aXl) of the Law.
377. The claimed defenses are found in § 52G(aX4), (5), (9) of the Law.
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the failure to disclose a material fact to the other party in a transac-
tion, when that party could not himself have discovered that informa-
tion, was enough in itself to constitute bad faith. She also noted that
such obligations could apply in the pre-contractual stages of negotia-
tions and that, in certain circumstances, the obligation to disclose may
require the party to reveal the facts of his own initiative, and not nec-
essarily in response to a question of the other party. Therefore, in the
court's opinion the defendant had acted contrary to good faith and the
plaintiff merited the requested declaration.
While there are not many reported cases of litigation in Israel
regarding the insider information provisions, there have been an in-
creasing number of criminal indictments brought in the Magistrate's
Court, with convictions obtained in most of the cases (in non-reported
decisions).378 These indictments and convictions have resulted in a
flurry of news articles that will probably have a material deterrent ef-
fect in this area.
IX. SPECIAL CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LIABILIrIs
Two chapters of the Law consider the extent and scope of the civil
and criminal liabilities incurred by parties who violate provisions of
the Law and regulations. Liability connected with the publication of a
defective prospectus was reviewed above. Other securities law liabili-
ties are discussed herein.
The Law establishes a general civil liability of an issuer of securi-
ties for all damages caused to a holder of the securities caused by the
issuer's violation of the Law or regulations, of the Joint Investments
Trust Law of 1961 or regulations, or the terms of the trust indenture
under which debentures of the company are held.879 The liability of
the issuer extends to the directors, the general manager, and any con-
trolling party in that company.'
This section may have the unintended effect of adding to the num-
ber of parties potentially liable for misleading particulars in a pro-
spectus. For instance, controlling shareholders and general managers
who are not directors are not obligated to sign the prospectus and,
therefore, are not liable under Section 31 for misleading particulars in
a prospectus. Similarly, a trustee who holds certificates of obligation in
trust for the holders of the issuer's debentures is liable to those holders
for any damages caused to them by the trustee's violation of the trust
378. See e.g. Israel v. Gibor Sabrina, Crim. Action 5322/90 (Tel Aviv-Jaffa Magis-
trates Court); Israel v. Joseph Peleg, Crim. Action 6206/89 (Tel Aviv-Jaffa Magis-
trates Court). The judge in both of these cases, Judge Bracha Ofir, has been particu-
larly active in dealing with securities law cases.
379. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 52K(a); see §§ 35A-350 for the provisions
regarding trust indentures.
380. Id. § 52K(b).
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indenture or of the provisions of the relevant sections of the Law and
regulations."'
The liability may be avoided if a defendant can meet the require-
ments of one of the listed statutory defenses. A party will not be liable
if he can prove that (i) he took all the appropriate steps to prevent the
breach; (ii) he did not, could not have known, or ought not to have
known of the violation; (iii) the injured party acquired the securities at
a time when he did know or ought to have known of the existence of
the violation.s 2 In any case where more than one party is liable to
the plaintiff, a common occurrence in securities cases, the defendants
are liable, jointly and severally, for all damages. Among the defendants
themselves, the rules governing the contributions of tortfeasors will
apply.'
The Law establishes a broad range of criminal sanctions available
against various parties for violations of different sections of the securi-
ties law.' The first portion of the chapter consists of different group-
ings of uniform penalties for sets of violations.
The first category of these offenses renders the party liable to
three years imprisonment or a fine that is calculated as four times a
standard rate set in Section 61(aX3) of the general Penal Law of 1977
(the "Penal Law").' The offenses include (i) the issuance of a pro-
spectus without a permit from the Authority, as required under Sec-
tion 15(a) of the Law, with the intention of misleading the reasonable
investor, the burden of proof being on the defendant to prove that he
did not so intend to mislead; (ii) the violation of Section 16(a) of the
Law, which provides that a prospectus must contain all information
likely to be important to the reasonable investor, if the defendant is
unable to prove that the failure to do so was not calculated to mislead
the investing public; (iii) the giving of an opinion, report, or confirma-
tion containing misleading particulars, that was included or mentioned
in the prospectus with the prior knowledge of the defendant; and (iv) a
variety of violations of the terms of Sections 36-37 regarding current
reports to the Authority or the TASE, including the provision of a
381. Id. § 52L.
382. Id. § 52M.
383. Id. § 52N.
384. See Rubinstein, supra note 112, where the judge stated that the securities
law has focused its attention on civil remedies. The lawmakers have continued to
ignore criminal sanctions at the same time that they have amended numerous provi-
sions relating to civil remedies over the year. The judge especially pointed to the
Knesset's unwillingness to ease the difficult burden placed on the prosecution of
proving fraudulent influence in order to constitute an offense under § 54(aX2) of the
Law.
385. Section 61(aX3) of the Penal Law provides for a fine equal to NIS 36,000, so
that the fine provided for by the Securities Law would be NIS 144,000, roughly
equal to U.S. $48,500 (based on mid-December 1993 exchange rates).
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report under those sections to the Authority or TASE that includes a
misleading particular that is intended to deceive a reasonable inves-
tor.3s
The second, less severe, grouping renders the offender liable to
one year in prison or a fine equal to three times the standard set in
Section 61(a)(2) of the Penal Law. 7 These offenses include (i) viola-
tion of Section 13 of the Law, which provides for the confidentiality of
the proceedings of the Authority and the materials submitted to it; (ii)
violation of Section 16(a) or Section 18(a), regarding the inclusion of all
relevant information in the draft or final prospectus;' (iii) failure to
comply with the provisions of Section 25(d), which outlines the respon-
sibilities of various parties to furnish a report to the Authority imme-
diately upon learning of the inclusion or omission of a particular from
a prospectus that the Authority might consider warrants amendment
of the prospectus; (iv) failure to follow instructions of the Authority
under Section 25(a) or Section 25A(b) regarding the amendment of a
prospectus; (v) neglecting to perform responsibilities under Section
35B(a) regarding the appointment of a trustee by deed before the issu-
ance of certificates of obligation or under Section 35J concerning re-
ports of the issuer to the trustee in such cases; (vi) the offering of secu-
rities to the public without the permit of the Minister, contrary to
Section 39(a); (vii) the operation of a stock exchange without a license,
in violation of Section 45(a); (viii) violation of Section 521(b), which
prohibits an employee of an exchange member from engaging in a
transaction in securities other than in the course of trading on the
TASE via written instructions given at least one day before the trans-
action is effected; (ix) breach of Section 521 (c or d), which governs the
holding of securities and transactions involving them by an employee
of an exchange member on his behalf or on behalf of others; (x) failure
to fulfill the provisions of Section 56A(a) or Section 56C(a), which pro-
vide authority to subpoena information or documents and to interro-
gate involved parties when there exists a suspicion that a provision of
the Law may have been violated; and (xi) breach of Section 56E, which
386. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 53(a) (providing also that certain evidentiary
rules construe delays and improper reports as prima facie proof that the intention to
mislead lay behind the hesitation to submit the proper reports within the time set
by the regulations).
387. Section 61(aX2) of the Penal Law provides for a fine of NIS 14,000. Accord-
ingly, the fine provided for in this section of the Law would be NIS 42,000, equal to
approximately US$14,150 (based upon mid-December 1993 exchange rates).
388. The lack of a distinction between a violation of the prospectus rules in the
draft or final prospectus should be noted. As indicated previously the 1988 amend-
ments added the requirement for director signatures on draft prospectuses. Civil
liability under Sections 31, 32, and 35 of the Securities Law of 1968 only applies to
the final prospectus. Therefore, in order to raise the level of draft prospectus prepa-
ration, stiff criminal sanctions were imposed, an approach that is too harsh and
therefore impractical.
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guards the confidentiality of the information obtained under the pow-
ers of investigation granted to the Authority under the Law.'
The last major grouping subjects offenders to a fine of three times
the standard level established in Section 61(aXl) of the Penal Law"
but does not refer to a prison term. The relevant offenses include (i)
violation of the terms of Section 5 or Section 10(b) regarding the acqui-
sition and notification of holdings of securities by members or employ-
ees of the Authority; (ii) the failure of an interested party to deliver
particulars to the issuer under Section 17(c), which the latter needs in
order to fulfill its disclosure requirements in the prospectus; (iii) publi-
cation of a prospectus where the provisions of Sections 22 and 23 re-
garding the approval and signature of the prospectus by the relevant
parties and the proper manner of dating and publishing the prospectus
have not been fulfilled; (iv) failure to comply with the terms of Section
23(c) regarding submission of the prospectus to the Registry and public
notice of its publication, or with the instructions of the Authority un-
der Section 23(d) regarding the distribution of copies; (v) the accep-
tance of orders for securities offered by prospectus outside of the peri-
ods allowed under Sections 24(c) and 25(c); (vi) failure to fulfill obli-
gations under Section 26(b) or (c) or Section 27(a) or (b)(3) regarding
the refund of payments to those whose orders for securities under the
prospectus were canceled or not filled for other reasons; (vii) violation
of the terms of Section 28(a, b) concerning the investment of monies
received on account of orders for securities and the refund of such
funds, or of the terms of Section 30 regarding the notification to the
Authority of the results of an offering by prospectus; (viii) non-compli-
ance with regulations made under the authority of Section 35D(b)
regarding the nature and obligations of a trust company holding cer-
tificates of obligation on trust for the holders; (ix) violation of the pro-
visions of Sections 36, 36B, or 37 regarding current reports to be sub-
mitted by various parties to the authorities or failure to comply with
regulations or directives regarding such reports that the Authority is
empowered to enact under Section 36A; (x) an offeror or other corpo-
rate entity that fails to fulfill its obligation to provide for the inspec-
tion of documents by the public under Section 44; (xi) failure to publish
the charter of the exchange under Section 49; and (xii) violation of
Section 51(c), which states that the exchange must submit reports and
information as requested by the Authority."'
The Law addresses a number of special provisions regarding par-
ticular offenses. If a continuing offense is committed under the pro-
389. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 53(b).
390. The fine provided for by Section 61(aX1) of the Penal Law is NIS 7,000.
Thus, the fine called for by the Law is NIS 21,000, equal to approximately U.S.
$7,100 at mid-December 1993 exchange rates.
391. Securities Law, 8upra note 2, § 53(c).
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visions of Sections 36, 36B, or 37, regarding the submission of current
reports to the authorities by various involved parties, or under the
regulations established by the Authority by virtue of Section 36A re-
garding such reports, the Court may impose an additional fine equal to
one-fiftieth of the total fine for each day that the offense continues.392
Further, if any of the offenses detailed in this section were committed
by a company, the directors and general manager are also criminally
liable, unless they can prove either that the violation occurred without
their knowledge (and that they did not need to or could not have
known of them) or that they took all reasonable steps to prevent the
commission of the offense.' In one case, a company was convicted of
failing to render periodic reports. The court, however, excused a senior
officer of the company from any responsibility on the assumption that
he had indeed taken all reasonable steps to prevent the commission of
the offense. It took fifteen detailed pages to get to that result.3 "
The final area of criminal liability covered in this chapter regards
the more serious offense of committing fraud in connection with securi-
ties transactions. A person violating one of these rules is liable to five
years imprisonment or a fine equal to five times the standard stated in
Section 61(aX4) of the Penal Law: (i) the inducement or attempted
inducement of a person to acquire or sell securities by way of a fore-
cast or promise, written, verbal, or otherwise, when he knows or ought
to know that such are false or misleading, or by way of withholding of
material information; or (ii) the fraudulent or manipulative influence
on the movement of the price of securities.'
An important case arose under this Section in the State's appeal
to the District Court of Tel Aviv-Jaffa from an acquittal of the defen-
dants by the Magistrates Court in the 1989 case of State of Israel v.
Yaakov Rosenbach.' The case concerned the execution of "matched
orders" by the defendant in order to arouse a dormant market for trad-
ing in the securities of a certain company. The operation accomplished
its goal of driving the price of the shares to a level that the defendant
392. Id. § 53(d).
393. Id. § 53(e). For similar provisions regarding the civil liability of the issuer
and its employees, but without the defenses specified as to criminal liability, see id.
§ 52K(a), (b).
394. Israel v. Rassco Ltd., Crim. Claim 1298/90 (Magistrates Court Tel Aviv-Jaffa
1991) (unreported).
395. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 54(a); see Sassoon H'ugi v. The Int'l Bank,
1985 (1) P.M. 256, (Dist. Ct. Tel Aviv/Jaffa 1985) (concluding that once the judge
had decided that the investment advice given by the defendant to the plaintiff was
not negligent, there could be no finding of violation of the terms of § 54(aXl) of the
Law).
396. Israel v. Yaakov Rosenbach, 1989 (2) P.M. 309 (Dist. Ct. Tel Aviv/Jaffa).
Under Israeli jurisprudence, the State can appeal from an acquittal in a criminal
case, and the higher court may convict. Such an appeal is a fairly common occur-
rence in Israel.
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felt was appropriate, considering the circumstances of the company, a
level at which investors would have been willing to sell their shares to
allow the defendant to increase his holdings. The question before the
court was whether the execution of matched orders transgressed Sec-
tion 54(a)(2) of the Law, which prohibits the fraudulent manipulation
of the price of securities. The three judges arrived at the same verdict,
overturning the acquittal. However, one judge, Michael Ben-Yair, who
in late 1993 began to serve as Israel's Attorney General, arrived at his
decision by applying different principles than those considered by the
other two.
The other two judges, Judges Ben-Ito and Even-Ari, followed the
standard established by Judge Ben-Ito in her judgment in the 1980
District Court case of State of Israel v. Yaakov Levinkoff."7 There, as
part of a 2-1 majority, she stated that speculation is an acceptable
form of trading in securities - in a sense, as a form of betting on the
market based on evaluations of market conditions, economic knowl-
edge, and an analysis of the available information. Manipulation, on
the other hand, is a direct action that seeks to influence the fluctua-
tions in the value of the securities beyond that which the market itself
justifies. However, in order to constitute a crime, the manipulation has
to be in a deceitful manner.
In Levinkoff, Judges Ben-Ito and Even-Ari held that even a legiti-
mate action could become manipulative in the legal sense if the action
is utilized, in a deceitful manner, to create a false impression regard-
ing the value of the shares and to influence that value. In their opin-
ion, the execution of matched orders was a classic example of such a
manipulative action. Manipulation is not established by the fact that
the action was simply intended to adjust the price of the security to a
suitable level, even if the action did create a false impression regard-
ing the market for the securities. However, Judge Even-Ari added,
creating a false impression of activity in the market for a security
when in fact no such activity existed was enough, in itself, to consti-
tute a violation of the Law, if the purpose was to influence the value of
the security. He rejected as groundless the distinction between the
proper motive and the criminal intention, pointed to as integral by
Judge Ben-Yair. Judge Even-Ari concluded by stating that it is possi-
ble that a situation may arise where there is no legal way to accom-
plish a desired goal. However, the absence of such a legal route does
not in any way validate a violation of the law by a citizen in the pur-
suit of that goal. The prosecution was not required, contrary to dicta of
Judge Ben-Yair, to offer proof of an alternative method of achieving
the goals before it can be said that it had proved criminal intention.
Judge Ben-Yair, on the other hand, showed greater concern for
397. Israel v. Yaakov Levinkoff, 1980 (2) P.M. 221 (Dist. Ct. Tel Aviv/Jaffa 1980).
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the motives behind the defendant's activities. He stated that the na-
ture of the activities causing fluctuations in the value of the shares
could not be properly established without paying attention to the mo-
tives of the individual who undertakes those actions. He established,
as a principle, that if the motivation for the activity is legitimate and
proper, then the activities will not be illegal regardless of the influence
they may have on the price of the securities. This holds true whether
or not these fluctuations were a principal or concurrent result of the
actions. Thus, transactions in securities, including matched orders that
contain a measure of pretense, may be legal if they are accompanied
by a legitimate motive. The underlying motive of the defendant in this
case, in the end, was to increase his holdings in the securities of the
company; both sides conceded that this was a legitimate motive.
However, contrary to Judge Even-Ari, Judge Ben-Yair felt that
there was an important distinction between a legitimate motive and
criminal intention. He stated that the issue at hand was whether such
a distinction could be drawn, thus allowing the prosecution to prove
the requisite criminal intention. He decided that it was necessary to
prove that the defendant had an alternative method of fulfilling his
desire without influencing the price of the shares, in order for the
court to distinguish between the possibly legitimate motive and a crim-
inal intention. Judge Ben-Yair felt that the possibility of accomplishing
the stated goals by continually entering buy orders on the market, in
conjunction with a willingness to purchase any offered shares until the
price of the shares reached the desired level at which the public would
be willing to sell its shares, showed that there was such a legitimate
alternative. This option, albeit slower than the one selected, was the
proper route that the defendant should have adopted, rather than at-
tempting to reach his goal by creating a false picture of activity that
constitutes an offense. Once this alternative had been provided, the
prosecution had relieved itself of the burden of proving criminal inten-
tion despite the legitimate motives behind the defendant's activity.
In a 1993 case, the District Court held that a money manager who
acted also as a financial reporter had used his newspaper column to
affect the market price of securities, using false information and fore-
casts, while benefitting personally from transactions in those securi-
ties. He was held to have committed fraud in connection with these
transactions, a violation of Sections 54(aXl) and 54(aX2) of the Securi-
ties Law. The Court acquitted him other such claims.'
The difficulties in defining the offense and the circumstances of its
commission, reflected in the varied approaches of the judges in the
Levinkoff and Rosenbach cases, shows the need for legislation to pro-
398. State of Israel v. Aharon Zilberman, Crim. Action 97/91 (Dist. Ct. Tel
Aviv/Jaffa, 1993) (unreported).
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vide a more accurate definition of the elements of the offense.' In
light of the severity of the violations involved and the potential finan-
cial effects on the investing public, lawmakers should overcome their
reluctance to reconsider the criminal sanctions under the Law and
clarify these essential sections in the interests of fairness and certain-
ty.
A. Representative Class Actions
One of the most significant additions to the Law under Amend-
ment 9 was the creation of representative class actions in securities
cases. The explanatory notes to the draft of the Amendment explained
that the goal was to provide a mechanism by which an investor, whose
personal damages are small but are part of a significant potential sum
of collective damages, could seek restitution in the courts without hav-
ing to contend with the large expenditures of money and time required
to prove a claim. This form of action has recently begun to be a sig-
nificant weapon in combating violations of the Law. Israeli securities
law procedures have thus been revolutionized, bringing them much
closer to U.S. procedures.
The Law defines a number of the general principles underlying
the representative class action. Any holder of securities is authorized
to bring a suit in the name of a group of holders on any legal grounds
and against any defendant against whom an individual could have
brought suit in his own right.' If the requested remedy under the
claim is damages, the only prerequisite to establishing the action is
proof that he has suffered such damages." In addition, a decision of
the court in the class action is considered to be a verdict for all mem-
bers of the class, subject of course to the definition of "class" provided
by the Law as described below.'
Before the class can be defined, the court must sanction the pro-
posed representative action. A court will permit an action if it is con-
vinced of the following facts: (i) the action is brought in good faith; (ii)
there is a reasonable chance that material questions of fact and law,
common to the members of the class, will be decided in their favor in
399. See supra note 25. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a defen-
dant under § 54(c) of the Securities Law of 1968 for use of misleading offering ma-
terials.
400. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 54A(a). Thus, the action may lie against,
among others, an offerer, issuer, underwriter, or interested party, or directors or
senior management, in addition to professionals who rendered opinions to be includ-
ed in a prospectus or report. Interestingly, the Section speaks of a suit "on any legal
ground", suggesting that the Israeli representative class actions may be available for
claims arising from legal theories outside of securities law. The Section has not yet
been tested in this respect.
401. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 54A(b).
402. Id. § 54A(c).
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the course of the proceedings; (iii) the size of the class justifies the
claims being brought as a representative class action; (iv) under the
circumstances, the representative class action is the most effective and
fairest manner to decide the relevant issues; and (v) there is a reason-
able basis to believe that the plaintiff represents the interests of the
entire group in a proper fashion.' One very important factor in the
Law's approach is the need to have court approval of the legitimacy of
the class action, an extremely important safeguard against abuses of
judicial process. This safeguard is even more important inasmuch as
the class action was added to an already busy, competitive judicial
legal system.'
Once the court has certified the class action, it must define the
class on whose behalf the action will be conducted and give directives
for the publication of its decision in that respect. The Law does not
require a potential claimant to opt in to a group action. Rather, it
considers any person falling within the court-defined class as consent-
ing to be included in the group claim. That person may, however, noti-
fy the court within forty-five days of publication of the decision that he
desires to opt out of the class. This period may be extended in special
circumstances for certain persons upon application to the court.'
Because the interests of the group are being put forward by a
single representative plaintiff, that individual is prohibited from drop-
ping the action or arriving at a compromise settlement with the defen-
dants without court approval. Thus, the court has an active role to
ensure that group interests are not sacrificed in favor of a collusive
settlement."
The Legislature authorizes the Minister of Justice to adopt regula-
tions concerning procedural issues regarding the submission of group
claims and of their conduct by the courts. In particular, the Minister
may establish guidelines for proving damages by each member of the
class. Such regulations were published soon after the Amendment was
adopted, under the title Securities Regulations (Procedure in Class Ac-
tions) 1991. Whereas the Law provides that all other regulations are to
be promulgated by the Minister of Finance, the regulations concerning
court procedural matters are to be issued by the Minister of Jus-
tice.'
The regulations state that a plaintiff seeking certification for a
403. Id. § 54B.
404. There were over 12,000 licensed lawyers in Israel in late 1993, and the num-
ber promises to increase very rapidly in the years ahead. Over 2,000 new lawyers
are expected by the end of 1995.
405. Id. § 54C.
406. Id. § 54D. This protection seems fair since many of the plaintiffs will usually
be forced into the class action in default of opting out of the group.
407. Id. § 54E.
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class action should attach a request to the statement of claim, submit-
ted under summary proceedings.' The request should include de-
tails such as the estimated maximum number of claimants in the
class, the material issues of law and fact common to the group, the
bases upon which the request for class certification are grounded, and
the proposed method of remuneration of the lawyer who represents the
claimant.'
The court may accept the application and sanction the class, or it
may amend the application regarding any of the particulars of the
action where necessary to ensure the effective and fair pursuit of the
claim. If the court accepts the application after amending it, the appli-
cant is authorized to amend his statement of claim accordingly or to
drop his claim altogether.4 1 If the plaintiff elects not to pursue the
action, or if the court decides not to certify the claim because of its
failure to meet any of the conditions listed in Section 54B of the Law,
then the "failure" of the class action does not prevent either the rep-
resentative plaintiff from pursuing a claim in his own name or another
claimant from applying for the certification of a class action in the
name of the same or a similar group.
11
The regulations then deal with cases where the court certifies the
class. They detail the approval that the court must give and the notice
that must be publicized. These requirements include (i) the definition
of the class that will be covered by the action; (ii) the basis of the claim
and the desired remedies; (iii) the material questions of law and fact
which are common to the whole group; (iv) any instructions regarding
the proceedings in the court, as the court deems appropriate; and (v)
instructions regarding the manner and content of the notice of the
decision of the court and who will bear the costs of publication of the
notice.12
The notice must contain the following information: (i) the name
and address of the representative plaintiff; (ii) the definition of the
class and the grounds of the claim and the desired remedies; (iii) the
name and address of the lawyer who will represent the group; (iv)
advice of the fact that the decision of the court in the action will be
considered a verdict binding on all members of the class; and (v) notice
that all people included in the group will be deemed to have agreed to
the class action unless they indicate to the court their desire to opt-out
of the group, within forty-five days of the notice or within an extended
period that the court may set, on application, for a particular individu-
408. Id. § 2-5752.
409. Id. § 3.
410. Id. § 5.
411. Id. § 5 & 6.
412. Id. § 7.
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Once these procedural outlines have been established, the regula-
tions deal with the verdict in the action. If the court decides that the
grounds of the claim have been proven in favor of the plaintiff, it is
authorized to instruct each member of the group to prove his entitle-
ment to the requested remedy by way of an affidavit. " If the re-
quested remedy is damages, the affidavit should at least include infor-
mation regarding the type, amount, and value of the securities held by
the claimant at the date relevant to the claim.'15 However, the court
is authorized to waive or amend this requirement for an affidavit if
convinced, in the circumstances of the case, that such a requirement
would place an unwarranted burden on the members of the group."1"
The court may also, as it deems appropriate, direct the manner in
which its decision will be brought to the notice of the members of the
class.417
The regulations state that the withdrawal of one plaintiff from the
representation of an authorized class, with the permission of the court,
does not impair the substitution of another plaintiff as representative
of the class. However, withdrawal of all potential plaintiffs from repre-
sentation of the group will result in the cancellation of the action. 1 '
The regulations conclude by stating that any issue regarding represen-
tative class actions not covered by the Law or the regulations will be
dealt with under the general regulations on civil procedure."9
A plaintiff who submits a class claim is required to notify the
Authority, the exchange upon which the relevant securities are traded
- the TASE - and the Attorney General.' Since it is unfair to ask
the representative plaintiff to bear the full cost of the application and
a claim that is in the public interest, the Authority may accede to a
request to pay the costs, on terms and in an amount set by it, if the
Authority is convinced that the claim is in the public interest and that
there is a reasonable chance that the court will certify the class. 2 If
413. Id. § 8.
414. Id. § 9(a).
415. Id. § 9(b).
416. Id. § 9(d).
417. Id. § 9(c).
418. Id. § 10.
419. Id. § 11.
420. Id. § 54F. In Israel, the Attorney General is the senior legal official in the
Government. His role, a strictly non-political and professional one based on the Eng-
lish pattern, is to provide legal advice on matters of importance and to serve as the
final arbiter of questions whether an indictment should be pursued in a controversial
case.
421. Id. § 54G. It should be considered whether the decision on financing claims
that are in the public interest would be better left to an independent (possibly judi-
cial) figure, better qualified to identify deserving claims and free from possible accu-
sations of conflicts of interest.
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the final verdict includes an award of damages, the court is instructed
to order that the Authority be compensated, on terms and conditions
set by the court, for any expenditures undertaken in the financing of
the representative action.'
Further, the court is directed to set the remuneration of the law-
yer who represents the class in the action, notwithstanding any
agreement between the lawyer and the representative plaintiff. In
addition, the total fees of the lawyer may not exceed the sum set by
the court for these purposes.4 In order to encourage claimants who
are often reluctant to serve as the representatives of the class, the
court is authorized, in its verdict of damages, to order that a specified
share of the total award, after expenses and lawyers fees have been
deducted, be paid to the representatives in recognition of their efforts,
with the remaining amount being divided between the other claimants
in proportion to their damages.'
The Law concludes with this topic by stating that its provisions do
not in any fashion affect the ability of any holder of securities to seek
an alternative form of remedies against the defendant.' The provi-
sions regarding the class actions only apply to cases where the claim
arose after October 31, 1988.'
The Supreme Court first considered the issue of representative
class actions in October, 1993."7 The Court, led by its president, Jus-
tice Meir Shamgar, considered a request for permission to appeal
brought by the Teva Corporation against a decision of the District
Court of Tel Aviv-Jaffa to certify a representative action brought by a
group of investors against the company. The action concerns a claim
that the company delayed the release of the news of an approval of one
of its generic drugs by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration until
after the expiration of a group of options held by the investing public.
The plaintiffs claimed that the company wanted to prevent the inevita-
ble rise in the price of Teva's shares on the TASE from occurring be-
fore the options expired in order to ensure that the investors would not
exercise their options. When the plaintiffs applied to the District Court
for certification of the case as a representative action, the company ob-
jected on two grounds. First, the company claimed that the representa-
tive plaintiffs did not fall within the scope of potential claimants con-
sidered by the Law, which includes only holders of securities. Since the
422. Id. § 54I(1).
423. Id. § 54H.
424. Id. § 541(2).
425. Id. § 54J.
426. Id. § 54K.
427. Teva Pharmaceuticals Industries Ltd. v. Zat Economic Advisors Co. Ltd.,
Civil Request for Permission to Appeal 1701/93 (not yet reported). The decision was
rendered on October 14, 1993.
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claimants had only held options that had now expired, some even sell-
ing them before the expiration, they could only be described as former
holders of securities. Second, the options upon which the claims were
based could not, according to the company, be described as securities
for the purpose of class actions. The District Court rejected both of
these arguments.
In response to the request for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court
upheld the decision of the District Court rejecting the claims of the
company. The Supreme Court held that the only relevant date for the
establishment of a claim was the date on which the grounds for the
claim were established. Thus, the plaintiffs only needed to prove that
they were holders of securities on that date for the purposes of bring-
ing an action. This ruling significantly increases the scope of potential
claims as representative actions. Despite Teva's claims that such a
decision would widen the scope of an action beyond manageable
bounds, it is now clear that the Court was prepared to allow even
those investors who sold their securities to participate in the claim.
Thus, the Court held, it is possible that a defendant will be required to
compensate more than one investor with regard to damages for the
holding of the same security, so long as the class members were dam-
aged.
On the second claim of Teva, the Court held that it went against
the spirit of the Law to claim that options fall outside the definition of
security for the purposes of these actions. As a possible alternative, the
Court suggested that the company should have explicitly stated in the
prospectus the fact that the options are not to be considered as securi-
ties, if the company so desired. Justice Shamgar noted, in all fairness,
that after the Court had reached its decision, but before it was an-
nounced, Teva's lawyers withdrew their argument as to the definition
of "security."
Once a class has been certified, it remains for the courts to consid-
er the claims for damages themselves. It seems that this case, as well
as other cases involving various large Israeli companies that the press
has reported as forthcoming,' will provide the courts with ample
opportunity to make various judicial pronouncements and rulings as to
important mechanism for investor protection. Perhaps, courts in the
future will follow the Supreme Court in the Teva case and maintain a
broad approach to the representative action. In the present market,
such a mechanism is an indispensable tool in the arsenal available to
the courts for policing the conduct of companies towards their share-
holders.
428. For example, a class action was filed in December 1993 against the Isramco
group of oil and gas exploration companies for NIS 96 million.
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B. General Provisions
The final chapter of the Law is a collection of miscellaneous provi-
sions regarding a wide range of issues that were not otherwise covered.
The most important of these provisions are discussed below; a few
provisions in this chapter of the Law have been considered elsewhere
herein.
The Law outlines a number of powers granted to the Minister of
Finance. The Minister is authorized, after consulting the Authority
and gaining the approval of the Finance Committee, to adopt regula-
tions concerning payment and collection of fees to the Authority.4"
Further, in a broad statement, the Minister is charged with supervis-
ing the implementation of the Law. After consultation with the Au-
thority, the Minister may also enact regulations in connection with any
aspect of that responsibility, as long as the Law does not contain provi-
sions to the contrary. Similarly, the Minister of Justice is authorized to
enact procedural regulations regarding various legal issues raised in
different parts of the Law.' In addition, the Minister of Finance, up-
on the proposal of the Authority, consultation with the Minister of
Justice, and the approval of the Finance Committee, is instructed to
issue regulations concerning an underwriter who undertakes to acquire
all of the securities offered under a prospectus and which are not ac-
quired by the public. These regulations should include provisions re-
garding the following: (i) qualifying conditions; (ii) professional liability
insurance and minimum equity; (iii) reports that the underwriter must
submit; (iv) limitations in relation to conflicts of interest between the
underwriter and any individual who acquires securities offered by the
relevant prospectus through his services or at his behest; and (v) any
other issues related to the underwriter's business." Under the same
mechanism, the Minister should also make regulations concerning the
acquisition of control of and an offer for the purchase of securities of a
company registered for trading on the TASE. Further, the regulations
should cover the issue of securities in the registered company that are
not offered to the public and restrictions regarding conflicts of interest
between the registered company and a controlling party in it or a com-
pany under the control of such a party. 2
The last major area covered in this chapter, widely expanded
under Amendment 9, is a delegation of various investigative powers to
429. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 55A.
430. Id. § 56(a), (b).
431. Id. § 56(c). See also Section 25 of the Prospectus Regulations of 1969 for
provisions regarding the inclusion of details of the underwriter in the prospectus.
432. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 56(d). Sections 56(c)-(d) became effective on
March 1, 1992. Subsection (d) applies for only one year after its commencement with
the possibility of extension for another year by the Minister, with the approval of
the Finance Committee.
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the Authority to assist in the enforcement of the various provisions of
the Law and the Joint Investments Trust Law 1961. Prior to Amend-
ment 9, the Law was subject to considerable criticism for failing to
provide for broad investigative powers in these areas. Amendment 9
was designed to grant powers to the Authority similar to those exer-
cised by the SEC. Under the Law, if the suspicion of a violation arises,
or if assistance is needed to administer the rules, the chairman of the
Authority, or any person authorized in writing to act in his stead, may
demand from any person access to any information or document re-
garding the business of any company to which the provisions of the
relevant laws apply. After inspecting the documents, the Authority
must return them to their respective owners within six months of
obtaining them, unless an indictment has been submitted in a case in
which the, document is likely to serve as evidence. A judge of the Mag-
istrates Court may, on the application of the Authority or a represen-
tative of the Attorney General, conditionally extend the six month
period after allowing the owner of the document a reasonable opportu-
nity to state his case.4"
When suspicion arises concerning a possible violation of the stat-
utes, a person authorized by the chairman of the Authority may apply
to the Magistrates Court for a warrant that allows entry to any pre-
mises to conduct a search and to seize any relevant document. The
Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Stop and Search) [New Version]
19694 provides the conditions for such a search. Similarly wide pow-
ers are granted for interrogation. An individual authorized by the
chairman of the Authority may interrogate any person who, in his
opinion, is connected to the matter and to order any individual to ap-
pear before him &md turn over any detail or information related to the
suspected offense.' The chairman of the Authority may apply to the
Magistrates Court for a temporary or permanent injunction against the
commission or the continued commission of certain acts, if the
chairman has reasonable grounds to assume that a violation of the
statutes or regulations thereunder is occurring or is about to occur.' 5
Further, the Authority may, if necessary to protect the interests of the
investing public, to appoint an independent party to investigate, audit,
and demand the production of documents from a company to which the
Law applies. However, the powers to appoint a third party investigator
do not apply in cases where the investigated body is a stock exchange,
433. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 56A
434. Id. § 56B(b).
435. Id. § 56C. For the purposes of the investigation, the authorized individual is
granted the powers of a police officer of the rank of Inspector, as defined in § 2 of
the Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Evidence) 1969, and the evidence collected by
that individual is covered by the rules in § 3 of that Ordinance.
436. Id. § 56D. It is interesting again to note that the chairman himself, and not
the Authority as a whole, may take certain action.
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banking corporation, or insurer."
Finally, in order to protect the confidentiality of the material or
persons investigated under this chapter, the Law prohibits the revela-
tion of any information or document that came into the possession of
any individual pursuant to these provisions, other than in the pursuit
of the investigation, or to the chairman, or to other authorized employ-
ees of the Authority. However, this prohibition obviously does not in
any way prevent the disclosure of this information at the request of
the Attorney General for the purposes of a criminal trial or on the
demand of a court of law.'
The inclusion of these broad powers under Amendment 9 was an
important step forward in the protection of those who invest in securi-
ties. The Authority, charged with the task of supervising most of the
provisions of the securities law in Israel, now possesses the requisite
investigative powers properly and actively to pursue this responsibili-
ty. The extent and nature of the powers granted to the Authority are
modeled on the powers granted to the SEC in the United States. Expe-
rience in the U.S. convinced the Israeli lawmakers that the absence of
such wide powers makes it very difficult to collect sufficient evidence
to secure convictions in securities cases, which typically involve com-
plex issues and, usually, intelligent and ably represented defen-
dants.43s
X. CONCLUSION
The rapid growth in securities markets in Israel since the mid-
1980's has forced the Government and the courts to wrestle with in-
creasingly complex issues. As shown throughout the course of this
paper, the Government and courts have taken significant steps in the
right direction. The positive effects of Amendments 9 and 11 and the
increased willingness of the courts to delve into the complex questions
raised in cases like Boronovitch and Rubinstein augur well for the
future development of securities law and markets. There are areas,
however, that have not yet been adequately addressed, such as proxy
solicitations, which in the United States are heavily regulated under
the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Proxy regulation is not dealt
with by the Yadin Report, presumably because of the view that this
area of corporate governance is not strictly a part of securities laws.
Nonetheless, proper disclosure in proxy solicitations would generally
seem to be no less important than disclosure in prospectices or interim
reports. Although beyond the immediate scope of this article, increased
regulation of mutual fund activity, now covered by the outmoded Joint
437. Id. § 56F.
438. Id. § 56E.
439. It should be noted that similarly wide powers are granted to the Income Tax
Authority in Israel, presumably for the same reasons mentioned above.
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Investments Trust Law 1961, and regulation of investment advisers
are sorely needed. Proposed legislation for both matters is now being
considered by the Government.
The lawmakers and courts must boldly face the task of balancing
the often conflicting interests of the involved parties, including the
public, the investors, business, and the Government. An overly zealous
approach to regulation could stifle the growth of Israeli companies and
markets; on the other hand, allowing unfettered discretion to the in-
volved parties would be a recipe for disaster, as illustrated at the out-
set by SEC Commissioner Emanuel Cohen. The experience of the Is-
raeli public in the wake of the 1983 crisis involving the collapse in the
prices of bank shares has taught both the Government and investors a
bitter lesson in the dangers of insufficient control over these sensitive
areas. The bad memories of that crisis lie behind much of the move-
ment today in favor of greater investor protection and increased super-
vision of the markets and companies. The continued modernization of
the securities law is essential to the proper maintenance of Israeli
securities markets, which are rapidly attracting world-wide attention
and investment.
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